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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of military psychiatry in the Second World War. Focusing 
on the British Army, it recounts how the military came to employ 
psychiatrists to revise recruitment procedures and to treat psychiatric 
casualties. The research has shown that psychiatry was a valued specialty 
and that psychiatrists were given considerable power and independence. 
For example, psychiatrists reformed personnel selection and placed 
intelligence testing at the centre of the military selection of personnel. 
Psychiatrists argued that by eliminating the 'dull and backward' the tests 
would help improve efficiency, hygiene, discipline and morale, reduce 
psychiatric casualties and establish that the Army was run in a meritocratic 
way. However, it is probable that intelligence testing made it less likely 
that working-class men would receive commissions. 
Still, the Army had no consistent military doctrine about what the 
psychiatrists should be aiming for -to return as many psychiatric casualties 
to combatant duties as was possible or to discharge men who had found it 
impossible to adapt to military life. In the initial stages of the war, the 
majority of casualties were treated in civilian hospitals in Britain, where 
most were discharged. This was partly because the majority were regarded 
as constitutional neurotics. When psychiatrists treated soldiers near the 
front line most were retained in some capacity. The decision on whether to 
evacuate patients was influenced by multiple factors including the patients' 
military experience and the doctors' commitment to treatment or selection. 
Back in Britain, service patients were increasingly more likely to be 
treated in military hospitals such as Northfield -famous for the 'Northfield 
experiments'. These provided an alternative model of military psychiatry in 
which psychiatric intervention refocused away from individuals and their 
histories and onto social relationships, and where the psychiatrists' values 
were realigned with the military rather than with civilian general medicine. 
Vill 
Introduction 
This is a study of military psychiatry in the Second World War. Focusing 
almost exclusively on the British Army, it recounts how the military came 
to employ psychiatrists (and a few psychologists) to reform its recruitment 
and promotion procedures and to treat its psychiatric casualties. In addition, 
it explores how psychiatrists responded to these challenges with new 
selection procedures and therapeutic regimes. The military purpose in 
employing psychiatrists and psychologists was to reduce manpower 
wastage and this was the principle that underscored psychiatry in the 
different military contexts in which it was practiced. Nevertheless, this 
principle was interpreted differently in different military contexts - 
sometimes emphasis was placed on retaining staff who were still of some 
use to the forces and other times on discharging unsuitable personnel who 
were thought of as "consumers of manpower. "' 
A variety of sources has been used for this work. Among them are 
psychiatric, military and government reports, and the minutes from Army 
Council meetings found in the National Archives. Further psychiatric 
reports, anny memoranda as well as unpublished medical articles located in 
the Royal Army Medical Corps Collection and the General Collections of 
the Contemporary Medical Archive Centre, Wellcome Trust, have been 
widely used. Research for this dissertation has benefited greatly from 
access to the personal papers of the Adjutant-General Ronald Adam, Dr 
John Rickman, Dr William Sargant and Dr S. H. Foulkes, some of which 
have included soldiers' medical records from the Second World War, which 
have never previously been written about. Of great advantage have also 
been the parliamentary papers, and the official medical histories of the First 
and Second World Wars. Contemporary articles published predominantly 
in The Lancet, The Journal of the Royal Army Medical Coips, The Army 
1 J. R. Rees, (1945) The Shaping ofPsychiatiy by War, London: Chapman & Hall, p. 43. 
Quartei-ly, The Journal of Mental Science, Proceedings of the Royal 
Society ofMedicine, The Bi-itish Medical Jow-nal, as well as other j ournal s 
have been frequently used, as have contemporary psychiatric monographs 
and textbooks. 
In recent years, shell-shock has been rediscovered. This newfound 
popular interest can be traced to the publication of Pat Barker's 
Regeneration 2 in 1991, the first novel in what came to be known as the 
Regeneration Triloýy. The trilogy capitalised on the British public's 
familiarity with the First World War poets to recount the experiences of 
Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen in a military psychiatric hospital -and 
it succeeded in attracting a huge readership as well as literary acclaim. 
Since then, a number of historical volumes on military psychiatry have 
been published, though mostly covering the more commercial end of the 
market, there have also been scholarly works. 3 While some of these 
2 p. Barker, (1991) Regeneration, London: Penguin Books. Prior to the Regeneration 
trilogy, the most widely-read pieces on shell-shock were E. Leed, (1979) No nian's 
land. - Combat and Identity in JVorld TVar I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
chapter X, and E. Showalter, (1985) The Feinale Malady, TVoinen, Madness and English 
Culture, 1830-1980, New York: Pantheon Books, chapter 7. Nonetheless, both these 
texts found a much wider readership once they became known as the acknowledged 
sources for Regeneration. Other works published in this period are: T. Bogacz, (1989) 
'War Neurosis and cultural change in England 1914-22: The work of the War Office 
Committee of Enquiry into shell-shock', Journal of Conteinporary History, 24, pp. 227- 
256; M. Stone, (1985) 'Shellshock and the psychologists', The Anatomy of Madness, 
Vol. II, Institutions and Society, (eds) F. Bynum, R. Porter & M. Shepherd, London: 
Tavistock Publications. 
3 A. Babington, (1997) Shellshock, A history of the Changing Attitudes to [Far Neurosis, 
London: Lee Cooper; A. Becker, (2000) 'The Avant-garde, madness and the Great 
War', Journal of Contemporary Histoiy, 35, No 1, pp. 71-84; H. Binneveld, (1997), 
Froin Shellshock to Combat Stress, A coniparative Histoiy of Militaiy Psychiatiy, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; J. Bourke, (2000) 'Effeminacy, ethnicity and 
the end of trauma: the sufferings of 'shell-shocked' men in Great Britain and Ireland, 
1914-39', Journal of Contempormy Histoiy, 35, No 1, pp. 57-69; W. Holden, (1998) 
Shellshock, London: Channe14 books; D. Kaufmann, (1999) 'Science as cultural 
practice: psychiatry in the First World War and Weimar Germany', Journal of 
Conlempormy Histoiy, 34, No 1, pp. 125-144; A. Kunk-a, (2001) The init, ard screani: 
shell-shock narratives in tiventieth-cenitay British culture, PhD Thesis: Purdue 
University; E. Leed, (2000) 'Fateful memories: industrialized war and traumatic 
neuroses', Journal of Conteinpormy History, 35, No 1, pp. 85-100; P. Leese, (2002) 
Shell-shock, Trainnatic neurosis and the British soldiers of the First [Vorld [Var, New 
York: Palgrave; P. Lerner, (2000) 'Psychiatry and casualties of war in Germany, 1914- 
2 
volumes have touched on military psychiatry prior to, or after, the First 
World War, nonetheless popular interest remains firmly rooted in shell- 
shock, the disorder which was discovered, established and abandoned 
within the Great War. 
In contrast, military psychiatry in the Second World War remains a 
hugely under-researched area. The scholarship consists mainly of two 
publications written in the 1950s by psychiatrists who had been personally 
involved in military psychiatry during thew. ar' and a recent monograph by 
the historian Ben Shephard5 that describes military psychiatry in the whole 
of the twentieth century, dealing mainly with the British and American 
Armies, but touching also on other European Armies. The histories which 
were written by psychiatrists provide immense information and fascinating 
detail, but are best treated as primary rather than secondary sources; the 
authors were not writing from a perspective of distance and their accounts 
are on the whole very similar to the articles and reports written during the 
war. Ben Shephard's book on the other hand is enormously well researched 
18', Journal of Contempormy History, 35, No 1, pp. 13-28; P. Lerner, (2003), 
Hysterical inen: ivar, psychiatiy, and the politics of trawna in Germany, 1890-1930, 
New York: Ithaca; C. Merridale, (2000) 'The collective mind: trauma and shell-shock in 
twentieth-century Russia', Journal of Contemporary Histoiy, 35, No 1, pp. 39-55; M. 
Micale, & P. Lerner, (eds), (2001), Trazanatic Pasts, History, Psychiany and Trallina in 
the Modern Age, 1870-1930, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; G. Mosse, 
(2000) 'Shell-shock as a social disease', Journal of Contemporary History, 35, No 1, 
pp. 101-108; M. Roudebush, (2000) 'A patient fights back: neurology in the court of 
public opinion in France during the First World War', Journal of Contemporaly 
Histoiy, 35, No 1, pp. 29-38; B. Shephard, (2000) A Mar of Nerves, London: Jonathan 
Cape; J. Winter, (2000) 'Shell-shock and the Cultural History of the Great War', 
Journal of Conteniporary Histoiy, 35, No 1, pp. 7-11. 
4 The official medical history of the Second World War discusses psychiatry mainly in 
two sections. The first section was composed by the Directorate of Army Psychiatry, 
F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1955), 'The army psychiatric service', The Ariny Medical Services,, 
Adininistration, Vol. II, London: HMSO, pp. 467-497; the second was based on the 
memoirs of the G. W. B. James, Consultant in Psychiatry in the Middle East and can be 
found in F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1957), 'The Army Psychiatric Service. The Middle East 
Force 1940-1943', The Ariny Medical Services, Cainpaigns, Vol. 11, London: HMSO, 
pp. 440-513. A similar but more extensive account can be found R. Ahrenfeldt, (1958), 
Psychiatiy in the British Arnzy in the Second Morld Mar, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
5 B. Shephard, (2000). 
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and provides a wealth of information and bibliographical detail but as it 
covers a huge span and is intended mostly for a commercial market it 
necessarily tends to be descriptive and to reproduce the perspectives of the 
main players unchallenged. Other works on this topic tend to be short, 
commercial volumes that span the entire twentieth century 6 or explore very 
specific aspects of military psychiatry only. 7 
The absence of scholarly interest in this field does not mean, 
however, that military psychiatry in this period was an insignificant part of 
military medicine. On the contrary, military psychiatrists were given 
unprecedented new powers that were unheard of in previous conflicts. 
These included powers to revise the recruitment and promotion procedures 
in all three services, and a separate administrative department devoted to 
Army Psychiatry in the Army Medical Department -an honour given only 
8 to three other medical specialties. With regard to actual treatment, an 
elaborate network of forward psychiatric treatment centres was developed, 
the principles of which had been established at the end of the Great War, 
but which were much expanded in the Second World War, while back in 
Britain radical new social treatments were created and put into practice for 
the first time. Nonetheless, psychiatric casualties were huge -psychiatric 
6 Such as A. Babington, (1997), H. Binneveld, (1997), W. Holden (1998). 
7 For example, Sydney Brandon has written about the diagnosis of lack ofinol-alfibre in 
the RAF during the Second World War, S. Brandon (1996) 'LMF in Bomber Command 
193 9-45: diagnosis or denouncement? ', 150 Years of British Psychiatly, Vollune A Tile 
Afterinath, (eds) H. Freeman & G. Berrios, London: Athlone. The psychiatrist Tom 
Harrison has written a book on Northfield military hospital. T. Harrison, (2000), Bion, 
Rickinan, Foulkes and the Noi-thfield Experiments, Advancing on a Different Front, 
London: Jessica Kingsley. The following discuss aspects of personnel selection: J. 
Crang, (2000) The British ariny and the People's Mar, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press; N. Rose, (1989) Govei-ning the Soul, the Shaping of the Private Setf, 
London: Free Association Books; P. E. Vernon & J. B. Parry, (1949) Pei-sonnel Selection 
In The British Forces, London: University of London Press. Joanna Burke discusses 
aspects of the treatment of civilian psychiatric casualties caused by air raids, J. Bourke, 
(1998) 'Disciplining the Emotions, Fear, Psychiatry and the Second World War' in 
JVar, Medicine andModernity (eds) R. Cooter, M. Harrison & S. Sturdy. 
8 The other 3 specialties were Hygiene, Pathology and Dentistry. The importance of this 
point can be illustrated by considering the specialties that did not get their own 
department: for example surgery or infectious diseases. 
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illness remained, throughout the war, the primary cause of medical 
discharge, accounting for between 30 and 40% of all discharges due to 
disease (not wounds). 9 
This dissertation focuses on three major areas: the relationship 
between psychiatrists and the military, the rationalisation of recruitment 
and promotion through psychological techniques and the different forms of 
psychiatric practice in different military settings. 
With regard to the relationship between psychiatry and the military 
this work has found that the evidence from the psychiatric military 
experience gives support to the works of Mark Harrison, David French and 
David Edgerton who have argued that the British Army in the Second 
World War held a doctrine in support of medical, scientific and 
technological innovation. 10 While this doctrine did not translate into 
practice in all fields at the onset of the war, it certainly did in most 
instances by the latter part of the war, especially from 1943 onwards. In the 
field of psychiatry, the primary examples of such developments are the 
psychiatric involvement in the selection of officers and in the testing of 
other ranks and the establishment of forward psychiatry. Some of these 
developments are paralleled in other fields of medicine, which, for 
9 W. Mellor, (1972) Casualties and Medical Statistics, London: HMSO, p. 439. Actual 
figures for the number of psychiatric casualties are difficult to compute, however Mellor 
states that in the years 1943,1944, and 1945 the rate of discharge for mental diseases 
, was 6.24,8.55 and 9.42 per 1000 troops respectively. This computes to approximately 
68000 men having been discharged in the last 3 years of the war from the Army alone. 
In addition, the Repoi-t of an Expen Committee on the ivoi-k of psychologists and 
psychiati-ists in the services states that approximately 118,000 men were discharged 
from all three services between September 1939 and June 1944 (HMSO, 1947), while 
the medical officer H. L'Etang, gives the figure of 109,000 as the number of men 
discharged from the army during the entire war, H. L'Etang, (1951) 'A criticism of 
military psychiatry in the Second World War', Jout-nal of the Royal Army Medical 
Coips, 96, p. 192. Figures between 10% and 20% were generally reported as the 
Vý roportion of Psychiatric casualties to general battle casualties after a battle. 
0 D. French, (2000) Raising Chin-chill's A)-j)iy, - The Bi-itish ai-my and the Mai- against 
Gei-many 1919-1945, Oxford: OUP; M. Harrison, (2004) Medicine and Victoi-y, BI-itish 
Mililwy Medicine in the Second Woi-ld JVa)-, Oxford: Oxford University Press; D. 
Edgerton (forthcoming), Waijai-e State: militai-isin, expei, tise and twentieth cenhuy 
Bi-itain. 
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example, contemporaneously established forward treatment centres. 
Among the reasons for this shift are the therapeutic benefits of early 
treatment but also the reduction of the overall time patients spent away 
from their units, which in turn decreased incentives for malingering. 
Significantly, many new developments were not technical but 
organisational -for example, there were changes in how hygiene 
regulations were enforced which placed the onus on combatant officers, the 
evacuation of the wounded was speeded up, and medical units became 
more flexible and easy to transport. " Such changes, of which there are 
many examples, point to a great degree of cooperation between specialists, 
regimental medical officers and combatant officers, and to an army keen to 
listen to the advice of experts. 
One unique example of what has been shown to be a positive 
relationship between psychiatrists and the military is the involvement of 
psychiatrists and psychologists in the Army's procedures for recruitment 
and promotion. Protected and promoted by the Adjutant-General Ronald 
Adam and his staff, psychiatrists and psychologists established new 
practices organised by the new Directorate for the Selection of Personnel. 
New developments included the IQ testing of all recruits and the posting of 
recruits along the lines indicated by test results, the by-passing of 
commanding officers' opinions about which soldiers would make good 
officers and the re-allocation of this task to psychologically trained officers, 
and entirely new procedures for testing officer cadets which included 
several psychological components. While such measures were not 
uncontroversial or unopposed, the fact that they were established indicates 
the degree to which the military was willing to cooperate with psychiatrists. 
However, this happy relationship indicates also that, while many of these 
changes appeared to run counter to traditional military values, in fact they 
did not really challenge the establishment. In most instances, military 
11 M. Harrison, (2004). 
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psychiatrists and combatant officers shared very similar views about the. 
qualities that made a good soldier and a good officer. For example, there 
was widespread agreement that men of low intelligence caused a series of 
medical and disciplinary problems (a link which had been more or less 
non-existent during the Great War) while high (but not necessarily very 
high) intelligence was a positive quality for an officer. In fact, psychiatrists 
involved in selection demonstrated their ability to select good officers by 
showing that, on the whole, their views agreed with those of regular 
officers. In addition, statistics show that while the new War Office 
Selection Boards (WOSBs) were held up as meritocratic and democratic, 
they still massively favoured the middle and upper classes and in fact were 
less likely to select elementary school boys for Commissions than were 
Commanding Officers and their traditional Unit Selection Boards. 12 
Of course the majority of psychiatrists during the Second World War 
were not involved in personnel selection, but in therapy. Interestingly, 
however, the principles of selection played a very significant role in 
therapy as well, as patients frequently went through a selection procedure 
of sorts before being allocated a tre atment regime. The significance of this 
selection procedure varies in different contexts and was more significant in 
environments where there was the possibility of evacuating patients back to 
base or to Britain and where treatment facilities were limited and therefore 
rationed. This dissertation has examined the therapeutic regimes in one 
civilian and one military hospital in the United Kingdom and the work of 
ten different practitioners in theatres of war. It found that what particular 
psychiatrists regarded as the main task of their work (either therapy or 
separating those who were easily treatable and would return to duty from 
those who had to be evacuated) influenced how much emphasis they placed 
on their patients' family and personal histories at the expense of their 
12 See Chapter Three of this dissertation. Statistics from the following publication 
demonstrate this point. Office of the Adjutant-General, (1943) Selection of Personnel, 
7 
patients' accounts of war time experiences and their symptoms. This 
difference between history-based practice and symptom-based practice 
often resulted in quite different experiences for patients, as symptom-based 
regimes were optimistic and usually more likely to return soldiers to duty 
although in some cases, therapies were also dangerous and coercive. 
Two theoretical issues that need to be clarified here are the positions 
that this work takes with regard to the nature of intelligence and psychiatric 
breakd own. With regard to intelligence, historical scholarship has shown 
that this is a concept that has changed significantly over time. In the early 
twentieth century the view that people had multiple "virtues and talents", or 
a genius for one thing, but not for another, was discarded for what Charles 
Spearman terined g -a theory of general intelligence. ' 3 Thus, in the early 
twentieth century, intelligence obtained ontological validity, and became a 
trait of limitless importance (all abilities and even potential abilities, in 
whatever field were thought to be influenced and to a large degree 
determined by it). In addition, it became an easily measurable trait as 
confidence in intelligence testing abounded. 
This is the perspective that is shared unquestioningly by every early 
twentieth century psychiatrist and psychologist mentioned in this work. 
However, the view taken in this thesis is that there is no need to regard 
intelligence as a physical or cognitive entity, but rather as an historical 
concept. The implication of this is that the way intelligence was 
conceptualised during the Second World War, and the policies that this 
lead to are viewed not as necessary and inevitable but as one possible 
option among many. It is not the aim of this thesis to prove that the policies 
adopted were wrong or inefficient. However, it does not aim to prove that 
they were right or effective either. Instead, this work hopes to show how 
and why they came about and what were some of their consequences. 
p. 14, Liddell Hart Centre, Adam 3/4/2. 
8 
Similarly, in the case of psychiatric breakdown, while this work, 
acknowledges the very real suffering experienced by many of those 
deemed to be having a psychiatric breakdown during the Second World 
War, it does not accept that there are precise demarcations between health 
and breakdown under which soldier-patients can be classified. For 
example, medical and lay descriptions of psychiatric patients during the 
Second World War vary significantly in how they describe the conditions, 
symptoms and suffering of patients. Whereas some descriptions portray 
men who are no longer able to function, others are described as quite 
normal, but very afraid, and others as merely unwilling. Therefore, with no 
widely applicable standards there is no sense in evaluating psychiatric 
treatment in terms of efficacy. The statistics that are on offer were 
compiled by psychiatrists who had different standards about when a man 
was fit for duty and whose standards naturally varied according to the 
pressures under which they and their units served. This difficulty in 
comparing and evaluating practices was acknowledged during the Second 
World War and there was particular concern about the lack of 'relapse' 
statistics, which made evaluating treatment accurately impossible. Overall, 
therefore, the efficacy of psychiatric practices is not a subject within the 
scope of this work. 
Chapter One outlines the history of trauma in civilian and military 
contexts from the 1 9th century until the Second World War. Influenced by 
Allan Young's analysis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 14 it aims to 
provide the reader with an understanding of how psychiatrists and the 
military found themselves in the position of close cooperation and similar 
outlook during the Second World War. This chapter explores how armies 
have previously dealt with the proportion of men who in each war have 
13 j. Carson, (1994) Talents, intelligence, and the consti-itctions of hilmall difference ill 
Fl-ance andAmei-ica, 1750-1920, PhD thesis: Princeton University. 
14 A. Young, (1995) The Harmony of illusions: Inventing Post- Ti-aumatic Sti-ess 
Disoi-dei-, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
9 
been incapacitated yet showed no visible organic lesions. It relates how the 
psychiatric profession came to own these fiinctional disorders and how, in 
order to explain and treat them, psychiatrists hypothesised an alternate 
consciousness in which lay pathogenic, traumatic memories. 
In the First World War,, cooperation between psychiatrists and the 
British Army began in earnest. This meant that debates that had puzzled the 
psychiatric profession for years such as whether particular people are 
predisposed to neurosis, possibly because of a hereditary taint, whether 
neurosis can be prevented by stigmatising or by other means, and where the 
line should be drawn between organic and mental disorders, became issues 
of national importance and the subject of a national enquiry. However, 
ultimately what influenced Second World War psychiatry were not just the 
experiences of the First World War but also the hardening of attitudes 
towards the mentally deficient who were thought of as the root cause of 
every kind of social and medical problem, and a political need for 
promoting meritocracy in all spheres including the Army. 
In Chapter Two, the successes and failures of psychiatrists in 
establishing a power base within the military are discussed. By taking 
advantage of the prevailing mood that supported medical specialisation and 
preventive medicine, psychiatrists succeeded in establishing the Directorate 
of Army Psychiatry in the War Office and an associate Directorate for the 
Selection of Personnel that revised selection methods according to their 
advice. In addition, the numbers of psychiatrists employed by the military 
overseas increased considerably thus making it possible to establish 
forward psychiatric treatment centres. Nonetheless, the Army Council 
resisted the Adjutant-General's proposals to give psychiatrists the Staff 
status, (instead of Consultant/Adviser), that had been given to Hygiene 
specialists, arguing instead that, unlike Hygiene, Psychiatry was part of 
curative rather than preventive medicine. The argument that psychiatrists 
were unable to predict human behaviour and thus prevent mental 
10 
breakdown was also put forward when it was suggested that psychiatrists 
should be removed from the Selection Boards that selected officers for 
regular commissions. 
Overall, the profession's achievements in infiltrating the military at 
the levels of policy, selection and treatment were immense -however their 
success was determined by the extent to which they convinced others that 
psychiatry was the equivalent of mental hygiene and thus, like the Hygiene 
specialty, ought to be part of all medical strategic decisions. 
The new selection procedures are the subject of Chapter Three. In 
this chapter, the aims of the selection methods and the circumstances that 
enabled them to happen are analysed. It is shown that while psychiatrists 
have argued that intelligence testing was recommended by the 
Southborough committee which enquired into the incidence of shellshock 
after the First World War, the reverse is the case, as the Committee 
explicitly stated that such tests were unnecessary -although they did 
recommend that doctors dealing with recruitment should exclude mentally 
deficient people from service. It is argued that what instead enabled the 
introduction of intelligence testing was a social climate in which borderline 
mental deficiency was seen to be the root cause of a number of social 
problems ranging from criminal behaviour to infectious diseases. 
Furthermore, it is argued that while the purpose of these procedures was to 
promote meritocracy they did not contribute to changing the social 
background of officers, as the new procedures were less likely to promote 
boys from elementary schools than would have been promoted if selection 
had been based on the recommendations of commanding officers alone. 
The most likely explanation for this is that emphasis on IQ test results 
precluded those less educated from being accepted. While the Adjutant- 
General argued that this was necessary as a good education was necessary 
for an officer, other officers including an officer responsible for training 
officer cadets, argued that elementary school boys made the best officers. 
Chapter Four is a case study of the civilian hospital Sutton and the 
soldiers who were treated there between 1940-1942. It appears that overall 
the patients who were treated in Sutton were treated like civilians and 
almost three quarters were discharged. In addition, the majority received no 
treatment while they were hospitalised. This was probably because the 
ethos of the hospital dictated that treatment should be reserved for those 
more likely to recover whereas the majority of military patients were 
thought of. as constitutional neurotics. The decision about who to treat was 
guided to some extent the patients symptoms -particularly loss of weight, 
and hysterical loss of function. On the whole, however, the judgment was 
made on the basis of whether the patient had been a worthwhile person 
prior to his breakdown -whether he had a good job record, no family 
history of mental illness, appeared intelligent, industrious and keen to get 
better and whether he had suffered severe mental and physical stress prior 
to breakdown. 
In Chapter Five, different kinds of psychiatric practice in the theatres 
of war are explored. This chapter focuses on several psychiatrists practising 
in Egypt, Tripoli, Algiers, Burma and Italy and examines links between 
approaches to psychiatric aetiology and psychiatric practice. It is shown 
that psychiatrists who believed that in many cases the patients' breakdown 
had been caused by inherent constitutional deficiencies rather than the 
stresses of war or physical exhaustion, did not invest in psychiatric 
treatment but in selection. These psychiatrists published articles explaining 
how they examined the patients' personal and family histories in order to 
establish whether their problems were longstanding. Patients who were 
thought of as constitutionally inadequate (because they had a history of 
unemployment for example) were evacuated back to base or to the UK and 
were downgraded. These psychiatrists promoted the idea that psychiatry's 
main function in wartime was preventive -mental hygiene- and that this 
would have been best achieved by a thorough psychiatric examination at 
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recruitment, which would have stopped men with long-term psychological 
problems from enlisting. On the other hand, psychiatrists who were 
interested in new treatments and published accounts of how they 
experimented with therapy tended to regard all their patients as treatable. 
These psychiatrists placed a lot less emphasis on patients' histories and 
instead focused on the patients' symptoms and morale. So, for example, 
instead of classifying patients according to 'types' they classified them 
according to the symptoms they displayed. 
Chapter Six is a case study of Northfield Military Hospital -the site 
of the most radical contemporary therapies practiced in Britain. The social 
therapies initiated by Wilfred Bion and John Rickman and pursued by 
Michael Foulkes, Tom Main and Harold Bridger have left a lasting legacy 
in psychiatric practice. Interestingly, however, these social therapies did 
not contravene military values but encapsulated them. Therapy in 
Northfield was explicitly based on the principles of duty, high morale and 
unit cohesion -whereas the traditional values of civilian medicine that 
encouraged the medicalisation of emotional problems and the separation 
between patients and doctors wer e rejected. Furthermore, a positive 
relationship between psychiatrists and commanding officers was one of the 
explicit aims of the institution. 
In an appendix, there i's an analysis of 20 questionnaires filled in by 
Northfield patients who give an account of their life and the experiences 
that led to their breakdown. It provides a singular opportunity to examine 
psychiatric breakdown from the perspective of the soldier-patients rather 
than their doctors. 
By covering the subject of military psychiatry from the angles of 
administration, selection and treatment, and exploring a number of different 
settings -War Office, forward psychiatry, a civilian hospital for service 
patients and a military hospital, this dissertation aims to provide a close 
13 
analysis of how the military enlisted psychiatrists to help Britain to victory 
in the Second World War. 
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Chapter 1: Trauma, Psychiatry and the Military c. 1860-1939 
Introduction 
Throughout the twentieth century, psychiatrists and psychologists 
have played an important role in warfare. Although their most important 
task has been to treat psychiatric casualties, psychologists and psychiatrists 
have also contributed in a number of other ways: by advising on how to 
prevent casualties, ýy implementing preventive policies, by examining 
recruits, and by advising the army on how to maintain the morale of the 
troops and destroy the morale of the enemy. However, psychiatrists and 
psychologists have not always had such a wide remit. They have carved out 
this role for themselves over a'number of years and a number of conflicts. 
The most significant starting point for the involvement of 
psychiatrists in warfare is the First World War and the shell-shock 
epidemic. The First World War established that all modern conflicts would 
result in psychiatric casualties which would significantly drain manpower, 
and that the Army needed to make extensive provisions for psychiatric 
casualties, preferably near the front line. Importantly, it also established 
that all men had a breaking point, and while psychiatrists, doctors, army 
officers, ordinary soldiers and the general public, thought that many shell- 
shocked soldiers were 'halfwits', 'criminals', 'cowards', 'homosexuals' or 
simply 'inadequate' men, it was generally accepted that some shell-shocked 
soldiers at least, were brave men with excellent war records who had 
survived unbearable levels of stress. 15 
Psychiatrists at the onset of the Second World War were much more 
prepared than had been their colleagues, 25 years previously. Many, had 
first hand experience of military casualties and the others had relevant 
monographs and case histories from all over the world available to them. 
15 P. Leese, (2002) Shell-shock, Traumatic neurosis and the British soldiers of the First 
World War, New York: Palgrave. 
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However, they also had different experiences and in some cases different 
training than their predecessors, as the fields of psychiatry and psychology 
had changed significantly since the First World War. In addition, the death 
penalty for military offences (apart from treason) had been abolished, and 
inhumane, overtly disciplinary treatment of psychiatric casualties was no 
longer tolerated. Attitudes towards the working class had become more 
benign, and psychiatric diagnoses were no longer as polarised as in the 
First World War in which officers and men were, to a large extent, 
diagnosed with different disorders. Simultaneously, there were efforts to 
end the class prejudice in the selection of officers and democratise rank. 
Other changes were less benevolent: as intelligence became an increasingly 
valued quality, and the technologies which measured it increasingly well 
respected, the position of those thought to be at the bottom of the 
intelligence spectrum became more untenable. Innovations in physical 
treatments that claimed to cure hitherto incurable mental illness encouraged 
the conception of mental illness in biological terms and permitted some 
doctors to practice increasingly experimental, dangerous and unpleasant 
treatments on their patients. Furthermore, the rise of social medicine 
encouraged psychiatrists and psychologists to expand their remit into all 
areas of life: family, education, employment, politics and every other area 
in which government planning was involved. 
In order to elucidate the perspective of psychiatrists who faced the 
Second 'World War, it is important therefore to examine both the 
psychiatric involvement in the First World War and the history of 
institutional psychiatry and academic psychology, which psychiatrists and 
psychologists brought with them and applied to the very different military 
setting. This chapter will begin at the end of the nineteenth century and 
briefly explore five disorders that shaped the views of doctors who in the 
First World War were confronted with shell-shock. These disorders are: 
nostalgia, soldiei-s heai-t (both military disorders), i-ailivay spine (the result 
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of railway accidents), hysteria and neurasthenia (both functional 
disorders). 16 These particular disorders have been selected because they 
highlight questions that are intrinsic to the topic of twentieth century 
military psychiatry: Are dilapidating conditions which are not accompanied 
by any sign of injury or infection, organic or psychosomatic? How should 
the Army deal with soldiers who have not adapted to military conditions 
without wasting manpower? Which people are more vulnerable to mental 
illness? Should mental illness carry a stigma? 
Changes in how these questions have been answered provide an 
insight to the intellectual and practical choices available to military 
psychiatrists and psychologists in the Second World War. Furthermore, this 
medical history highlights the matrix of circumstances that eventually gave 
rise to particular decisions and practices taken by the Armed Forces and the 
psy-professions during the Second Worl. d War. 
Five disorders of the 19"' century 
In the aftermath of the First World War, when shell-shock had been 
accepted as a psychological disorder, the medical histories of the American 
Civil War were revisited with a view to gauge the incidence of shell-shock. 
For example, Dr F. Peterson, writing for a journal specialising in the 
history of medicine described the disorder known in the Civil War as 
ivindage, a disorder caused by the nearby explosion of a shell, which 
without actually impacting on the body could cause paralysis. 17 The 
disorder appears to have enjoyed an ambiguous reception by the medical 
authorities of the civil war, who on the one hand claimed that it was 
impossible that a shell could cause damage without actual contact yet at the 
16 Functional disorders are disorders where the physical symptoms (paralysis, mutism 
etc) cannot be traced to an organic cause. The cause of functional disorders was 
disputed -theories about their cause cited both psychological and neurological 
explanations as well as the possibility that an organic cause did exist but had not yet 
been found. 
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same time explained the mysterious paralyses caused by this disorder in 
terms of invisible injuries to the spine. ' 8 Dr Peterson believed windage to 
be shell-shock and the paralyses to be hysterical. 19 Furthermore, he 
believed the same to be the case of a number of other disorders: 
Scattered throughout these volumes are undoubtedly many cases of 
war-neuroses, to which other names were given at the time. It is 
highly probable that there were some war-neuroses among the 
7200 cases registered as "sunstroke" to judge from reading over a 
few-of the histories. In the discussions on loss of vision, deafness 
and epilepsy there is some suggestion of effects out of proportion 
to the trauma. Very likely most of the cases reported as nostalgia, 
numbering some 5200, were war-neuroses and psychoses, and the 
proportion of cases of epilepsy, some 9,000 cases, or four annually 
per thousand of strength, is extraordinary. As I find among 
abdominal injuries cases referred to that are suspiciously neurotic, 
so I infer that among the 1,213,685 cases reported as malaria there 
must have been a considerable number that we would now-a-days 
classify among the war neuroses. 20 
Of these disorders mentioned, the most significant from the point of 
view of the history of psychiatry in the civil war, is Nostalgia, 21 as this was 
17 F. Peterson, (1919) 'War Neuroses in the civil war', The Pi-oceedings of the Charaka 
Club, vol. V, pp. . 9-15. 18 U. S. War Department, Surgeon-General's Office, Circular No. 6: U. S. Government 
Printing Office: Washington. Repons of the extent and Natia-e of the Materials 
Availablefoi- the Pi-epai-ation of a Medical and Surgical Histoly of the Rebellion, 1865, 
Lippincott: Philadelphia. Cited in F. Peterson, (1919); A. Babington, (1997) Shell- 
shock, A histoiy ofthe ChangingAttitudes to lYai- New-osis, London: Lee Cooper. 
19 In this context, hysterical means psychogenic; i. e. the patient is only paralysed 
because he believes himself to be paralysed. The belief, however, is genuine and the 
patient therefore is not lying or malingering. 
`F. Peterson, (1919) pp. 14-15. A similar outlook is shared by Eric Dean who also 
noted the importance of insanity, Nostalgia, sunstroke, and irritable heart as diagnostic 
categories which stand in for shell-shock and result in discharge. See E. T. Dean, 
(1997), Shook ovei- hell, Post- Ti-ainnatic Sti-ess, Vietnam, and the Civil JYal-, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 116. 
2 'The origins of the word nostalgia, have been traced back to the physician Johannes 
Hofer who in 1678 translated the disorder heiiniveh as nostalgia by combining the Greek 
words nostos meaning the return home and algos meaning pain. Nostalgia was therefore 
originally known as a medical disorder rather than as a sentiment. The disorder Hofer 
described was not particular to soldiers, however over the years it became included in 
treatises of military medicine such as those by De Meyserey and Gerard Van Swieten as 
a disease likely to be found among troops fighting far away from home. J. 'Hofer, 
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a disorder that unlike sunstroke, malaria,, deafness etc, was 
contemporaneously acknowledged as a mental disease. In contrast, if 
soldiers without organic lesions were diagnosed with the aforementioned 
organic disorders this was done under error. 
During the civil war, nostalgia was a recognised medical disorder 
that merited medical discharge. In the Union manual issued to army 
medical officers it is written that: 
Nostalgia is a form of disease which comes more frequently under 
the observation of the military surgeon ... Considered as a mental disease, -and there can be no doubt that the primary phenomena of 
this state are mental, it belongs to the class of Melancholia. ... As Nostalgia is not unfrequently fatal, it is ground for discharge if 
sufficiently decided and pronounced. 22 
In 1863, it was described by Assistant Surgeon-General De Witt C. 
Peters as a 'species of melancholy or a mild type of insanity caused by 
disappointment and continuous longing for home. 23 Thought of as 
particularly likely to affect young soldiers, Nostalgia was according to the 
official medical history of the war, responsible for a total of 5213 cases 
among the white troops of the North during the first year of the war, as well 
(1678) Diss. de Nostalgia, Basel; De Meyeserey, (1754) La Midicine d' Ai-inje, 
Contenaw des Moyens Aisis de Priserver de Maladies, sur Terre and sw- Mer, dans 
Toutes Sortes de Pais, and den guji-ir sans beacoup de Reiizides ni de Dipenses, les 
Gens de Guerre, atid autres de quelque Condition qu'ils soient, vol. 1, Paris: Veuve 
Cavalier; G. van Swieten, (1758) Kurze Beschreibung und Heilungsart der Krankheiten 
welche am 6ftesten in dem Feldlager beobachtet iverden, Vienna, cited in G. Rosen, 
(1975), 'Nostalgia: a 'forgotten' psychological disorder', Psychological Medicine, 5, pp. 
340-354. 
22 A manual of instructionsfoi- enlisting and dischat-ging soldiem, quoted in E. T. Dean 
(1997), p. 129. 
23 De Witt C. Peters, (1863) 'Remarks on the evils of youthful enlistments, Alnel-ican 
Medical Times, 6,75-76, quoted in A. Babington, (1997). 
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as I death in 1862 and 12 deaths in 1863 
24 
and for making the policy of 
evacuating the sick an impossibi 
lity. 25 
One disorder that the aforementioned Dr Peterson did not consider to 
be shell-shock in disguise, is Soldier's Heart. This is because during the 
First World War, Soldier's heart, known also under the names of Da Costa 
Syndi-oine (named after Dr Jacob DaCosta who first identified the 
syndrome), irritable heai-t, disordei-ed action of the heai-t (DAH), and effort 
syndi-oine, forined a category of its own separate from shell-shock and war 
neurosis, and only began to be integrated with war neurosis during the 
Second World War. 26 In 1871, Dr Jacob Da Costa evaluated soldiers 
referred to him for a syndrome principally characterized by shortness of 
breath, palpitations, and sharp or burning chest pain, particularly on 
exertion. Other symptoms included fatigability, headache, diarrhoea, 
dizziness, and disturbed sleep. There was no consistent sign of 
physiological disease, and most patients appeared to be in fair overall 
health. Because symptoms had included diarrhoea and respiratory 
problems, Da Costa concluded that a proportion of patients could be 
suffering the aftermaths of an infectious disease. Da Costa also identified 
hard field service, rheumatism and sunstroke as the chief causal factors in 
some of the cases and furthermore argued that tobacco, and frequent 
24 U. S. War Department, Surgeon-General's Office, Circular No. 6: U. S. Government 
Printing Office: Washington. Reports of the extent and Nature of the Matei-ials 
Availablefor the Preparation of a Medical and Surgical Histoly of the Rebellion, 1865, 
Lippincott: Philadelphia. Cited in G. Rosen, (1975), p. 35 1. 25 P. Boume, (1969) The Psychology and Physiology of Stress, New York: Academic 
Press, quoted in A. Babington, (1997) p. 15. 26 Some psychiatrists now argue that soldier's heart or effort syndrome is the precursor 
to Gulf War syndrome although the disorder also shares similarities with chronic fatigue 
syndrome. See K. C. Hyams, F. Stephen ýWignall, Robert Roswell, (1996) 'War 
Syndromes and Their Evaluation: From the U. S. Civil War to the Persian Gulf War', 
Ann Intern Med, 125,398-405; S. Wessely, 1990, 'Old Wine in New Bottles 
: Neurasthenia and 'ME", Psychological Medicine, pp. 35-53; S. Wessely, C. Nimnuan 
& M. Sharpe (1999) "Functional Somatic Syndromes: One or Many" Lancet, vol. 354, 
pp. 936-39; J. Wheelwright, The irritable Heart, the medical mystely of the GlItf IT"ar, 
New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 
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seminal emissions were likely to aggravate the problem. In terms of a cure, 
27 Da Costa prescribed mainly rest and sometimes drugs such as Digitalis. 
Heart problems among soldiers had been identified 
contemporaneously in Britain, among soldiers attending the newly opened 
Royal Victoria Hospital, Netley, in 1863. A government committee 
appointed to study heart conditions in the Army lay the blame for the 
excessive numbers of heart disease in the Army to the soldier's kit which 
weighed over 60 lb and was therefore thought to restrict the heart's action. 
Other contemporary explanations were that excessive rifle drills obstructed 
cardiac outflow and that uniforms were too restrictive. 28 
Both nostalgia and irritable heart were disorders specifically 
affecting soldiers, particularly the young, but only nostalgia was thought of 
as a mental disorder. As a subcategory of melancholia, nostalgia was 
nonetheless also an organic disorder that took its toll on the body, 
ultimately causing death. Like insanity, (also a cause for medical 
discharge), disorders with mental manifestations were thus considered to be 
organic diseases albeit sometimes with some psychological origins (such as 
feelings of homesickness in the case of nostalgia or enduring a tragedy in 
the case of insanity). The acceptance of these disorders by the military 
authorities as legitimate causes of discharge suggests that armies have for a 
long time found ways of discharging those who failed to adapt to the 
conditions of warfare, but also that this leniency was conceived in the terms 
of life-threatening disease or madness. Furthermore, possibly because both 
soldier's heart and nostalgia were thought to be life-threatening and 
therefore not within the patient's control, neither appears to have carried a 
significant stigma. High incidents of n9stalgia appear to have been blamed 
on the forceful conscription of soldiers sent to fight in a distant land. 
27 J. M. Da Costa, (1871), 'On irritable heart', American Journal of the Medical 
Sciences, 6 1, pp. 17-52. 
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In the same period, a very different disorder was affecting healthy 
people, frequently men, who were the seemingly uninjured victims of 
railway accidents. Raffivay spine sufferers displayed a variety of physical 
disorders, frequently some time after the accident. Symptoms included 
giddiness, loss of memory, pains, local paralysis, and intellectual 
deterioration. '9 Railway spine developed particular significance in the 
second half of the nineteenth century because it became the subject of 
heated debate in the courtroom: victims of railway accidents were suing the 
companies for compensation. When these victims were not able to display 
bums and wounds, but only the more subjective symptoms of Railway 
Spine, the railway companies contested the claims and a controversy with 
regard to the veracity and nature of this disorder ensued. 
The first full-length medical text on railway spine and related 
conditions appeared in 1866 . 
30 Its author was John Erichsen, a well- 
respected surgeon with considerable experience as a medical witness in 
railway compensation cases who generally gave evidence for the plaintiff. 31 
Like the doctors who attempted to explain the symptoms of windage, 
Erichsen argued that the symptoms of railway spine were caused by 
imperceptible damage to the spinal cord, in this case resulting from 
concussion and inflammation during a railway accident. Erichsen's 
formulations on railway spine were based on a twofold strategy: first he 
explained a point through analogy and then he illustrated his case by 
putting forward a number of fascinating case studies: For example, 
28 J. D. Howell, (1998) 'Soldier's heart, the redefinition of heart disease and speciality 
formation in early twentieth century Great Britain' [Vat-, Medicine and Model-nity, (eds 
R. Cooter, M. Harrison, S. Sturdy), Thrupp: Sutton Publishing, pp. 85-87. 29 The Lancet, 8 February 1862, pp. 156-157. Quoted in R. Harrington, (2001) 'The 
Raifway Accident', Trawnatic Pasts: History, psychiatry and tratuna in the tizodern 
age, 1870-1930, (eds) M. S. Micale & P. Lemer, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
30 J. E. Erichsen, (1866) On Railivay and olhej- iiýuries of the nervous systein, London: 
Walton & Maberly. 
31R. Harrington, (2001) p. 43. 
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Erichsen theorised that victims of railway accidents, suffer from nervous 
shock, but he offered no actual causal explanation for this: 
We do not know how it is that when a magnet is struck a heavy 
blow with a hammer, the magnetic force is jarred, shaken, or 
concussed out of the horse-shoe. But we do know that it is so, and 
the iron has lost its magnetic power. So, if the spine is badlyjarred, 
shaken or concussed by a blow or a shock of any kind 
communicated to the body, we find that the nervous force is to a 
certain extent shaken out of the man. 32 
Furthermore, Erichsen explained the fact that seriously injured 
patients rarely suffered from railway spine or any other nervous conditions 
by an analogy with a watch: 
It would appear as if the violation of the shock expended itself in 
the production of the fracture or the dislocation, and that a jar of 
the more delicate nervous structures is thus avoided. I may give a 
familiar illustration of this from an injury to a watch falling on the 
ground. A watchmaker once told me that if the glass was broken, 
the works were rarely damaged; if the glass escapes unbroken, the 
jar of the 
33 
fall will usually be found to have stopped the 
movement. 
Erichsen's claims were supported by his case studies in which the 
most dilapidating illnesses were found to occur in patients with minute 
injuries, such as the case of a woman sufferer who acquired her illness after 
tripping on her way down the stairs, even though she did not actually fall 
over or sustain any injury. 
Erichsen's arguments were refuted in the mid 1880s by Herbert 
Page, a railway company surgeon who asserted that it was very unlikely 
that the spinal cord could be injured without the spinal column showing 
signs of damage. Page rejected the watch analogy, arguing that it was 
irrelevant as the watch possessed no nervous system, and he focused 
32 J. E. Erichsen, (1866), p. 95. 
33 lbid, p. 94. 
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instead on the mind and on the emotions, particularly fear, for his 
explanations. 34 He said: 
Medical literature abounds with cases where the gravest 
disturbances of function, and even death or the annihilation of 
function, have been produced by fright and by fright alone. It is the 
same element of fear which in railway collisions has so great a 
share -in many cases the only share- in inducing immediate 
collapse and in giving rise to those after symptoms which may be 
almost as serious, and are certainly far more troublesome than 
those which we meet with shortly after the accident has occurred. 35 
While Page acknowledged that the nervous disorders associated with 
railway spine may involve some organic change (possibly a chemical one), 
Page saw fear as the primitive causative element and he pointed out that a 
nervous disorder could result from autosuggestion. 36 Page, in fact, equated 
railway spine with hysteria, although he said he used the term 'without a 
shadow of reproach 07 towards the sufferers. Erichsen, however had firmly 
rejected that possibility: 
Hysteria, ... 
is a disease of women rather than of men, of the young 
rather than of the middle-aged and old, of people of an excitable, 
imaginative, or emotional disposition rather than of hard-headed, 
active, practical men of business. ... In those cases 
in which a man 
advanced in life., of energetic business habits, of great mental 
activity and vigour, in no way subject to gusty fits of emotion of 
any kind- a man, in fact, active in mind, accustomed to self- 
control, addicted to business, and healthy in body, suddenly, and 
for the first time in his life, after the infliction of a severe shock to 
the system, finds himself affected by a train of symptoms 
indicative of serious and deep-seated injury to the nervous system 
- is it reasonable to say that such a man has suddenly become 
"hysterical" like a love-sick girl? ... To 
me, I confess, the sight of a 
34 H. Page, (1888) ltýufies of the Spine and Spinal Coi-d u4thout Appai-ent Mechanical 
Lesion, and Nei-i, ous Shock, in theii- Surgical and Medico-Legal Aspects, London: J. & 
A. Churchill. 
35 Ibid, p. 62. 
36 Autosuggestion was thought to be the process by which a person who has 
experienced a situation that could have caused him or herself an injury or infection 
becomes convinced that he or she is indeed suffering from it. 
37 H. Page, (1888) p. 191. 
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man of forty-five, rendered 'hysterical, ' ... would be a novel and a 
melancholy phenomenon ... and could such a condition actually be induced, it would certainly be to my mind an evidence of the most 
serious and disorganising disease of the nervous system. 38 
Page argued further that contrary to Erichsen's views, men did suffer 
from hysteria: 
... even 
if in every-day life women more commonly than men show 
signs of being emotional, excitable and hysterical, it is nevertheless 
true that as a direct outcome of the nervous shock of a railway 
collision men become no less emotional than they. We are much 
inclined to agree with Mr Jordan* that "the frequency of hysteria 
(if such a term may be used) in men is not fully recognised; " but if 
the manifestations thereof, as we may admit, are absent or but 
rarely seen in ordinary men, a condition closely allied to the 
"hysteria" of women is very common, or is commonly developed, 
in men, after the great psychical shock of a railway accident. 39 
Page argued further that the knowledge of the possibility of 
compensation unconsciously caused victims of railway accidents to 
develop or exacerbate symptoms. 40 
The legal situation was that railway companies were obliged to pay 
compensation only to those suffering from a nervous complaint rather than 
a mental one. 41 Interestingly, both Erichsen and Page accepted that railway 
spine affected the nervous system organically in some way -but Page 
thought the organic change had been brought about by the patients' feelings 
of fear. Therefore, both Page and Erichsen would have agreed that the 
symptoms of 'railway spine' were 'nervous'. 42 Arguably, the fact that Page 
accepted that a nervous change had taken place but nonetheless opposed 
38 J. E. Erichsen, (1866), pp. 126-7. 
39 H. Page, (1888) p. 188. Page quoted J. F. Jordan, (1873) Sin-gical Inquiries, London: 
J. & A. Churchill. 
40 A. Young, (1995) The Hai-mony of illusions: Inventing Post- TI-allmatic Sh-ess 
Disoi-dei-, Princeton University Press, p. 17. 
41A. Parsons, (1813) The Liability of Railivay Companies jbi- Negligence toivat-ds 
Passengers, London. Cited in R. Harrington, (2003) 'On the Tracks of Trauma: Railway 
Spine Reconsidered', Social Histoiy ofMedicine, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 213. 
42 R. Harrington, (2003) p. 213. 
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the idea that patients should receive compensation implies that the crux of 
the debate was not the nature of the symptoms but their causation. Page, by 
claiming that the symptoms were psychogenic, argued that they were the 
patients' responsibility. Accordingly, the reason why some of the victims 
of railway accidents developed 'railway spine' while others had not, is that 
they were more susceptible to the effects of fear -and this is what 
disqualified them from compensation. 
The railway spine controversy is frequently seen by historians as the 
precursor to the controversy over the nature of shell-shock as many of the 
arguments postulated are the same: one side was arguing that the illness is 
caused by minute damage to the nervous system and the other that it is in 
fact hysteria caused by fear and fuelled by desire for compensation. In both 
debates, the reputation of the patients involved hang in the balance, as 
hysteria was one of the most stigmatising illnesses. Unlike shell-shock, the 
railway spine debate was not resolved within the lifetime of the participants 
and all sides maintained medical legitimacy as the diagnosis of railway 
spine gradually disappeared in the twentieth century. 
The background to Page's psychological model is the contemporary 
understanding of hysteria. The work of Herbert Page was read and admired 
by Jean-Martin Charcot, the influential director of La Salp&triere; a vast 
asylum housing between five to eight thousand women -one per cent of the 
entire population of Paris . 
43 Charcot is significant to the history of shell- 
shock because he developed the two ideas implicit in Page's writings; that 
hysteria could develop in men as well as women, and that it could be 
caused by autosuggestion after a traumatic experience, the "hyst6rie 
traumatique". Charcot also interpreted i-affivay spine to be hyste4a and 
argued that it was brought about by autohypnosis caused by the extreme 
fear felt at the moment of the accident. Charcot argued that similar 
symptoms to those exhibited by railway accident victims could be induced 
43 L. Appignanesi & J. Forrester, (2000) Freud's Women, London: Penguin Books, p. 63. 
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in his own hysterical patients if they were told under hypnosis that they had 
suffered an injury. 44 
Charcot however believed hysteria could only develop in those 
suffering from hereditary taint. In those cases where the hysteria developed 
after a traumatic event, the trauma was merely the trigger for the illness, 
not the ultimate cause. Furthermore, according to Charcot it was only those 
people who suffered from this hereditary taint that could be hypnotised. 
The state of hypnosis was therefore similar to that of hysteria and could be 
used to add or remove symptoms and had no therapeutic effect. 
In the 1880s, Sigmund Freud began studying under Charcot. From 
this experience, Freud formulated his own views about both the prevalence 
of male hysteria but also about the aetiology of hysteria. With regard to 
treatment, he was at first eclectic, as the Studies on HysteHa show, using 
electrotherapy, hydrotherapy, massage, and the rest cures. 45 In this respect, 
he was no different from other Viennese specialists in the nervous diseases. 
By the end of 1887 however, Freud was becoming an enthusiast for the 
cures produced by hypnotic suggestion. 46 
Furthermore., Freud rejected Charcot's doctrine of hereditarian 
degeneration. Freud did accept that dispositional hysteria did exist, but he 
did not think it applied to most hysterical patients. 47 In its place, Freud, in 
his work with Breuer, elaborated the seduction theory which proposed that 
all instances of psychoneurosis can be traced back to a sexual trauma 
occurring in infancy -the seduction (or what we would now refer to as rape 
or sexual assault) by an older relative, usually the father, nanny or older 
44j. M. Charcot, (18 89) Clinical Lectures on Diseases of the Nei-vous System Delivel-ed 
at the Infirinmy of la SalpOtrib-e: London: New Sydenham Society. Cited in A. Young 
(1995) p. 19. 
45 J. Breuer & S. Freud, (1893-1895) 'Studies on Hysteria', The Complete ivorks of 
Sigmund Frend, Vol. II, (trans & ed. J. Strachey, 1955), London: The Hogarth Press. 
46 L. Appignanesi & J. Forrester (2000) p. 71. 
47 A. Young, (1995) p. 37. 
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sibling. 48 During the early 1890s, Freud had discovered that hysterical and, 
obsessive patients had invariably experienced a sexual seduction before the 
age of eight. In the views he then developed, the experience of a seduction 
became the necessary precondition for the ability to repress, a pathological 
defence mechanism, a process of forgetting which then guided the patients' 
reaction to moderately or mildly traumatic experiences later on in life. 49 
Generally, patients suffering from hysteria had recently experienced some 
mildly traumatic events which had given rise to symbolic, hysterical 
symptoms, as well as a traumatic seduction as young children -and it was 
the memory of the distant sexual experience deep in the unconscious that 
caused their pathological reaction to the recent traumatic events. Their 
pathological, hysterical reaction therefore was not due to hereditary 
degeneration but due to a repressed memory of a seduction that had taken 
place in childhood. Freud argued further that patients suffering from 
obsessional neurosis, had also experienced a similar sexual experience but 
had later on decided to re-enact the experience with another child and had 
thus experienced sexual pleasure precociously, which in turn lead to guilt 
and repression and the symptoms of obsessional neurosis. According to 
Freud what appeared sometimes to be a familial disposition to neurosis was 
in fact a case of widespread abuse; in one example the nanny had seduced a 
little boy who then went on to seduce his sister; the little boy grew up and 
developed obsessional neurosis while the little girl became a hysteric; but 
what appeared as hereditary degeneration was only a cycle of abuse. Freud 
argued further that women were more likely to develop hysteria because 
48j 
. Breuer & S. Freud, (1893-1895); S. Freud, (1896) 'Heredity and the Aetiology of 
the Neuroses', Vol. 111, The Complete ivot-ks of Sigmund Fi-eud (1962); S. Freud, (1896) 
'The Aetiology of Hysteria', Vol. 111, The Complele ij, oi-ks of Signizind Fi-eud (1962); S. 
Freud, (1896) 'Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence', Vol. 111, The 
Complete ivoi-ks qfSignnind Fi-eud (1962). 
49 J. Breuer & S. Freud, (1895); S. Freud, (1896). As Young has so lucidly described, 
the original traumatic experience became thought of as a 'pathogenic secret' which then 
determined the victim's behaviour in all ftiture traumatic experiences, A. Young, (1995) 
pp. 36-37. 
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they were more likely to be seduced as children while men were more 
likely to develop obsessional neurosis because if they were seduced as 
children they were more likely to try and re-enact the seduction. 
Furthermore, Freud insisted that while the reactions of hysterics to mild 
irritations or slights appear to others to be extreme, they are in fact 
perfectly proportional reactions -not to the irritation of the present but to 
the distant trauma the memory of which is reawakened by the current 
50 situation. 
Freud originally procured the memories of sexual seduction by 
hypnosis but this method proved unsatisfactory and so he turned to the 
pressure technique. With this method, patients lay on a couch facing away 
from Freud while he pressed his hand on their forehead while asking 
questions. Patients then mentioned words and thoughts which Freud linked 
into a narrative. Freud made it clear that patients had no memory of the 
experiences of seduction before they began analysis; however, by analysing 
their words and behaviours he demonstrated to the patients what these 
experiences were. Patients did not always agree with Freud that these 
events had taken place, and if they did, they nonetheless frequently did not 
come to i-eineinber them but merely to accept they must have occurred. 51 
The treatment for hysteria, at this stage of Freud's career was 
abreaction -a process by which the patient re-experienced the traumatic 
experience together with its accompanying emotions. This process was 
brought about by hypnosis, narcosis (drug-induced abreaction) or through 
51 persuasion. 
Soon after publishing Studies onlHysteila, Freud's views began to 
change; he rejected the seduction theory and the pressure technique and 
turned to free association and psychoanalysis. He concluded that hysteria 
50 S. Freud, (1896) 'Further Remarks on the Neuro-PsYchoses of Defence'. 
51R. Leys, (2000) Ti-awna, a genealogy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 102- 
103. 
52 A. Young, (1995) p. 37. 
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was not caused by a traumatic sexual experience but by abnormal fixations, 
occurring through the early years of childhood while children go going 
through the oral, anal and phallic stages and resolving the Oedipus 
53 
complex. Abnormalities in these stage were caused by an interplay of 
minor traumas and chance occurrences which may give rise to fantasies of 
seduction with as much force as a genuine experience of seduction, which 
is then repressed. Freud also acknowledged that constitution and heredity 
could play a significant role in the development of hysteria and other 
neuroses 54 although he continued to pay little attention to this issue. 
After 1896, Freud also distinguished between psychoneuroses that 
originate in experiences in early childhood and actual or traumatic neuroses 
that are produced by traumatic events that occur later on in life. However., 
Freud was not particularly interested in traumatic neuroses and would only 
deal with them in the aftermath of the First World War, when there was a 
surge of interest in war neuroses. Even then, however, Freud had no first 
hand experience of treating patients with war neuroses. 55 
53 S. Freud, (1900) 'The Interpretation of Dreams', Vol. IV, The Coniplete ivorks of 
Signuind Freud, (1953); S. Freud, (1905) 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality', 
Vol. VII, The Complete ivorks ofSignizind Freud, (1953). 
54 For example, when discussing the patient 'Dora', Freud wrote: "I do not, it is true, 
adopt the position that heredity is the only actiological factor in hysteria. But, on the 
other hand, - and I say this with particular reference to some of my earlier publications, 
e. g. 'Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses' (I 896a), in which I combated that 
view -1 do not wish to give an impression of underestimating the importance of heredity 
in the aetiology of hysteria or of asserting that it can be dispensed with. In the case of 
the present patient the information I have given about her father and his brother and 
sister indicates a sufficiently heavy taint; and indeed, if the view is taken that 
pathological conditions such as her mother's must also imply a hereditary 
predisposition, the patient's heredity may be regarded a convergent one. To my mind, 
however, there is another factor which is of more significance in the girl's hereditary or, 
properly speaking, constitutional predisposition. I have mentioned that her father had 
contracted syphilis before his marriage. Now a strikingly high percentage of the patients 
I have treated psycho-analytically come of fathers who have suffered from tabes or 
gener4l paralysis ... syphilis in the male parent is a very relevant factor in the actiology 
of the neuropathic constitution of children. " S. Freud, (1905[1901]) 'Fragment of an 
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria', Vol. VII, The Coniplete it, orks of Signizind Freud, 
(1953), pp. 20-2 1, note 1. 
55 A. Young, (1995) p. 37 & p. 78. 
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Freud's ideas developed throughout his life and were themselves re- 
interpreted by Freud's followers. British psychiatrists felt that it was 
possible to mix and match from Freud's theories rather than accept the 
whole Freudian doctrine. Among the ideas that gained popular acceptance 
were the notions of unconscious motivation and the pathogenic effects of 
repressed memories of childhood trauma. Overall, Freud's writings on 
hysteria went some way to remove the stigma from hysteria as Freud 
shifted its aetiology from a biological degeneration to traumatic life 
experiences which to some extent exonerated victims. Furthermore, Freud 
introduced the idea that neurotic symptoms were meaningful 
representationally; paralyses, stammers, tics, and dreams were now the 
patient's way of communicating to the psychiatrist what their innermost 
desires were. 
The fifth disorder that is of relevance is Neurasthenia. Neurasthenia 
was first established in the United States by the neurologist George Miller 
Beard in the late nineteenth century. Meaning literally 'weak nerves' it was 
thought of as an organic disorder caused by a lack of nervous force and 
encompassed many of the symptoms that became associated in the late 
twentieth century with chronic fatigue syndrome. 56 Symptoms Of 
Neurasthenia included anxiety, despair, phobias, sleep disturbances, 
difficulties in concentrating, extreme fatigue, palpitations, migraine, 
indigestion and sexual dysfunction. Beard thought that this depletion of 
nervous force was usually caused by the fast pace of urban life. 
Neurasthenia was generally regarded as an ill-defined disorder, 
encompassing many of the symptoms of the disorders previously known as 
'nervousness' but also 'vapours' or 'spleen'. 57 Nervousness, in the 18 th 
56 M Gijswijt-Hofstra, (2001) 'Introduction: Cultures of Neurasthenia from Beard to the 
First World War, Cultin-es ofNew-astheniaftom Beai-d to the Fh-st Morld Mai- (eds) M 
Gijswijt-Hofstra & R. Porter, Amsterdam: Rodopi 
57 R. Porter, (2001) 'Nervousness, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Style, ' Cultin-es 
of New-asthenia fi-oin Beard to the First Moi-ld [Vai-, p. 3 6. Apparently, 'vapours' was 
generally a disease of women while 'spleen' was the equivalent disease of men. 
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century was frequently regarded as a disease of the well-educated, civilised 
upper classes. In the I 9th century, while neurasthenia was still associated 
with the well-to-do, it became linked to hard work rather than luxurious 
living. 58 
Some historians have argued that neurasthenic patients tended to be 
more affluent than patients diagnosed with hysteria and were more likely to 
59 be men rather than women. Certainly, the formulation of neurasthenia by 
Beard points to the middle-classes as more likely sufferers. However, the 
situation is complicated by the fact that different doctors had different 
notions of neurasthenia and therefore different epidemiological accounts. 
Overall., it seems that neurasthenia affected both men and women, unlike 
hysteria, which affected women almost exclusively. However while men 
were a little more likely than women to be diagnosed with neurasthenia, 
some doctors specialised on female patients and linked neurasthenia to 
gynaecological disorders. In terms of class, in America neurasthenia was 
closely associated with the affluent, but in Britain some doctors went out of 
their way to prove that it affected people of all classes -partly as a way of 
proving the validity of the disease. 60 
Significantly, neurasthenia, unlike hysteria, was not always thought 
of as a hereditary disease but also as an environmental disease -although 
that began to change towards the end of the 1 9th century. While some 
historians have stressed that neurasthenia like nervousness was a stylish 
disease, it could also be an embarrassment, particularly for patients for 
whom it signified that there was nothing really wrong with them 61 
Towards the end of the century, neurasthenia began increasingly to lose its 
location in the body of the patient (the nerves) and began to be treated as a 
58 R. Porter, (2001). 
59 For example E. Shorter, (1992) From Paralysis to Fatigue, A history of 
psychosomatic illness in the modern era, New York: The Free Press pp. 220-227. 
60 A Thomson, (200 1) 'Neurasthenia in Britain', Cultures of Neurastheniaftom Beard 
to the First World War. 
61R. Porter, (2001). 
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mental disorder under the remit of psychiatrists rather than neurologiStS. 
62 
Simultaneously, it was considered in an increasingly negative and 
hereditarian light. 
The most significant treatment for Neurasthenia was the Silas Weir 
Mitchell rest cure. Mitchell originated his cure on soldiers from the civil 
war whose health seemed to improve when due to other injuries they were 
63 forced to rest . The Mitchell cure consisted of complete seclusion and rest, 
a fattening diet, initially composed of milk only, massage and some light 
electrotherapy. The cure took place in a nursing home, away from the 
patient's home, while the patient was forbidden to leave the bed sometimes 
not even to defecate. Patients were not allowed to wash themselves, feed 
themselves, read, sew, or see family and friends. After a period of 
overfeeding once the patient had improved sufficiently more and more 
privileges were permitted until the patient was permitted to return home. 
Hysteria and Neurasthenia later became the main subcategories of 
shell-shock. In other European countries where a term like shell-shock was 
never invented these formed the diagnostic categories of the psychiatric 
casualties of the First World War. 64 
Nostalgia, soldiers' heart, railway spine, hysteria and neurasthenia 
are all disorders which informed the understanding of the psychiatrists who 
in the First World War dealt with shell-shock Also important however is 
the context of institutional psychiatry and academic psychology in which 
the majority of psychiatrists and psychologists were trained and practised. 
This will be explored next. 
62 M. Neve, (2001) 'Public views of Neurasthenia' Cultures of Neurasthenia fi-oin 
Beai-d to the First JVorld Mai-. 
63 T. Lutz, (2001) 'Varieties of Medical Experience: Doctors and Patients, Psyche and 
Soma in America, Cultures ofNew-astheniaftoyn Beai-d to the First JVorld TVar, p. 56. 
64 M. Roudebush, (2001) 'A battle of Nerves: Hysteria and its treatments in France 
during World War P, Ti-aninatic Pasts: Hisloyy, psychiatty and ti, aunia in the niodern 
age, 1870-1930, (eds) M. S. Micale & P. Lemer, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 254. 
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Psychiatry, Psychololly and Social Medicine 1900-1918 
The British mental health service at the turn of the century consisted 
of large asylums with an increasing population where all inmates were 
certified. The process for certification was that established by the Lunacy 
Act 1890 whereby fee-paying patients could be admitted to an asylum or a 
private licensed house on the strength of a magistrate's order and two 
medical certificates or through the poor laws whereby a magistrate's order 
and only one medical certificate was necessary. Treatment for inmates 
consisted of occupational therapy, mild faradisation and baths (the 
technique varied from benign hot baths to extremely unpleasant, successive 
full-length plunges in cold water). More commonly, patients were sedated 
or received no treatment besides the hospital routine. This was a period of 
therapeutic pessimism and mental illness was generally gauged in a 
degenerational, hereditarian way. The main purpose of the mental health 
services was custodial; to protect the sane from the insane rather than to 
cure. 65 
In contrast, general medicine in this period was undergoing a change 
where increasing emphasis was being placed on social medicine. While the 
notion that social science combined with medicine could improve future 
society was well founded in the nineteenth century, 66 during the early part 
of the twentieth century, British medicine became more social and more 
pervasive. David Armstrong has shown that the difference between 
nineteenth and twentieth century social medicine lies in the latter's focus 
on 'interpersonal hygiene' which identified the relations between people 
rather than the relationship between people and the natural environment as 
65 K. Jones, (1993) Asylians and Afte? -, a Revised Histo? y of the Mental Health Sei-vices: 
Fi-oin the Early 18 th Cenhuy to the 1990s, London: The Athlone Press, pp. 112-125. 
66 D. Porter, (1997), 'Introduction, ' Social Medicine and the Medical Sociology in the 
Twentieth Century; Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
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the cause of disease and the locus of medical intervention. 67 Twentieth 
century social medicine, therefore, focused for the first time on the 
psychological and the social rather than the environmental. This intellectual 
climate brought with it an interest in social psychology, sociology and 
preventive medicine. In this period, the British Psychological Society, the 
Eugenics Education Society and the National Council for Mental Hygiene 
were founded, and a number of influential sociological works were 
published. 68 
For the evolution of mental health care, the most significant 
developments of social medicine were the increased interest in preventive 
medicine, the widespread acceptance of eugenic concerns, and the 
development of psychometric psychology. The Eugenics Education 
Society, formed in 1907 by among others, the psychiatrist James Crichton- 
Browne, based its intellectual foundation in the works of Francis Galton 
concerning mental deficiency and national efficiency, which claimed that 
the mental and physical fitness of the nation depended upon the proper 
understanding and management of heredity. 69 Simultaneously, innovations 
in statistical analysis and the application of the new statistical methods in 
psychological testing allowed psychologists to make a significant 
contribution in the measurement of normal psychological functioning, 
particularly intelligence. During the first decade of the twentieth century, 
the Binet intelligence scale, originally to be used in the detection of 'dull' 
children, whose mental age was lower than their chronological age, was 
published. It eventually gave rise to the term Intelligence Quotient or IQ 
(mental age divided by the chronological age). 
The perceived eugenic need to prevent the problem of mental 
deficiency becoming a racial disaster, combined with a widespread belief 
67 D. Armstrong, (1997), 'The Social Space of Illness', Social Medicine and the Medical 
Sociology in the Tiventieth Century; 
68 R. Porter, (1996), 'Two Cheers for Psychiatry! ', 150 Year of British Psychiatly, 
Volume ii, The Aftermath, H. Freeman & G. Berrios (eds) London: Athlone. 
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that intervention would benefit mental defectives as well as society in 
general, and a new technology which was felt could measure intelligence 
accurately and reliably, led to the Mental Deficiency Act (1913). The Act, 
partly responding to the administrative difficulties caused in schools and 
prisons by the 'weakminded' on whom usual disciplinary procedures 
proved unfruitful, put in practice the Eugenic Society's demands for the 
segregation of the mentally deficient. 70 The Act made it the responsibility 
of every local authority to ascertain who were the defectives living within 
their catchment area, whether in the community, workhouses or asylums, 
and house them in specialised institutions. 71 Cyril Burt thus became the 
first educational psychologist to be appointed by a government body in the 
UK when he became the official psychologist of the London County 
Council responsible for the administration and interpretation of mental tests 
in London's schools. For the first time, the entire nation was surveyed for 
mental deficiency and those found to be defective were placed in 
specialised colonies. 72 
In the United States, the Binet intelligence scales had been 
disseminated by Henry Herbert Goddard, an influential psychologist 
working for a small private institution for mentally handicapped children. 
Goddard used the tests in a number of epidemiological studies the results of 
which he felt confirmed their validity and reliability and also made the 
69 R. Porter, (1996). 
70 M. Thomson, (1998) The problem of mental deficiency; Eugenics, Democracy, and 
Social Policy in Britain c. 1870-1959, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
71 M. Thomson, (1996) "'Though ever the subject of psychological medicine": 
psychiatrists and the colony solution for mental defectives' 150 1ears of British 
Psychiatry. 
72 Before this Act, mental defectives could be placed in asylums under the Lunacy Act, 
in poor-law workhouses or in voluntary Idiot Asylums but they could also live in the 
community. See M. Thomson, (1998), p. 130. In practice, the implementation of the Act 
proved difficult as there were insufficient facilities to house all those who were mentally 
deficient and conflicts arose between the priorities of local governments and those of 
the institutions that housed the mentally deficient. See P. Dale, (2003) 'Implementing 
the 1913 Mental deficiency Act: Competing Priorities and Resource Constraint Evident 
in the South West of England before 1948, Social History of Medicine, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
pp. 403-418. 
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public aware of the widespread problem of mental deficiency. According to, 
Goddard, many more children than was previously known were mentally 
deficient and furthermore the majority of these children looked perfectly 
normal; it was only through use of the intelligence tests that their 
73 abnormality could be detected . 
In the 1910s, Goddard expanded his studies from children to adults, 
particularly socially undesirable adults such as paupers, prostitutes and 
criminals. His conclusion was that the problem underlying the majority of 
socially undesirable behaviour was not evil, as had been previously argued, 
but mental deficiency. The majority of the undesirables were people who 
were unable to care for themselves and who had no real awareness of the 
difference between right and wrong, and who therefore became easy prey 
for those wishing to corrupt them. Had these people been raised in a kind, 
specialised institution instead of being left to their own devices, Goddard 
argued, the best use would have been made of whatever skills they did 
have, and they would have grown to have happy, useful, and more 
significantly, childless lives. 74 
However, in Goddard's view, even a specialised education would not 
improve the abilities of the mentally defective by very much; mental defect 
was formulated to be an incurable inborn genetic disorder brought about by 
a single recessive gene. The dysgenic effect caused by the feebleminded, 
who h ad no ability to use contraception nor the morality to restrict 
procreation within marriage was huge. This was demonstrated in 
73 L. Zenderland, (1998) Measuring Minds, Hemy Hei-bet-t Goddai-d and the Oi-igins of 
Amet-ican Intelligence Testing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
74 For example, H. Goddard, (1912) 'Sterilization and Segregation, Bulletin of the 
Amei-ican Academy of Medicine, 13, pp. 210-219; H. Goddard, (1912) Teeble- 
Mindedness and Crime', Pi-oceedings of the American Pi-ison Association, 12, pp. 353- 
357; H. Goddard, (1913)'Feeble-Mindedness as a Source of Prostitution', Vigilance, pp. 
3-11; H. Goddard, (1914) FWble-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences, New 
York: Macmillan. Cited in L. Zenderland, (1998), chapter 6. 
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il 75 Goddard's hugely influential and popular The Kallikakfain Y, in which, 
Goddard and his assistants traced the family of one institutional i sed girl 
back to Martin Kallikak., a young soldier in the independence wars. Martin 
Kallikak came from a good family, but one night, he thoughtlessly slept 
with a feeble-minded tavern girl. She later bore a feebleminded son, from 
whom, a vast progeny of other feebleminded criminals, prostitutes and 
other social inefficients came about causing destruction for the next century 
and a half. By contrast, Martin Kallikak later married an intelligent girl 
from a good family and together they founded a line of good and worthy 
citizens. This 'natural experiment' was thought to prove that the 
uncontrolled breeding of the mentally deficient was responsible for 
bringing about much of society's social problems. 
In the 1910s, Goddard continued his work with intelligence testing 
on incoming immigrants at Ellis Island. The very poor performance of the 
majority of immigrants forced Goddard to reconsider his views and 
question whether a poor environment was to some extent responsible for 
low scores. 76 
This emphasis on mental deficiency as a source of great social 
inefficiency would have long-term implications on how Armies chose to 
prevent a variety of problems ranging from psychiatric casualties to lack of 
discipline. But first, the First World War and the accompanying epidemic 
of shell-shock began. 
Shell-shock 1914-1918 
The story of shell-shock is mostly a British one, since in France and 
Germany the psychiatric disabilities of war were assimilated into the 
existing psychiatric nosology of hysteria and other functional disorders 
75 G. Goddard, (1912) The Kallikak Family: A study in the Heredity of Feeble- 
Mindedness, New York: Macmillan. The name 'Kallikak' was created by Goddard to 
indicate that the family had a good and a bad strand. 
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without the invention of a new term. 77 It is unclear how this term became 
established in Britain 78 but it has been argued that it contributed to (and 
was the result of) a comparatively less stigmatising approach to the 
problem of war neurosis. Shell-shock was originally thought of as a form of 
concussion, and its name gave the illness a distinctive military feel and 
distanced it from the negative and feminising connotations of hysteria 79 . 
Even once the psychological nature of shell-shock had been confirmed, the 
term 'shell-shock' was still preferred amongst troops. For that very reason 
however, the army eventually abolished the term, to replace it with Not Yet 
Diagnosed (Nervous) or NYDN. 
Regardless of the different approaches of the nations involved, 
historians agree that the phenomenon of mass psychiatric casualties took by 
surprise all belligerent armies and preparations to deal with the 
phenomenon were delayed and only fully implemented in the final stages 
of the war. Statistics about the numbers of soldiers affected are very 
inadequate, but historians seem to have settled on the figure of 200,000 for 
each of the main participants Britain, France and Germany. 80 The problem 
was identified as early as December 1914, when an official report stated 
that 7-10 Per cent of all officers, and 3-4 per cent of all men admitted to 
hospitals in Boulogne, were sent home suffering from the effects of 
nervous and mental shock, due to strain, stress and exhaustion. 81 In 1915, 
the psychologist (and qualified doctor although he had not previously 
practiced) Charles Myers, who had already published an article on shell- 
76 G. Goddard, (1917) 'Mental Tests and the Immigrant' Journal of Delinquency, 2, pp. 
243-277. Cited in L. Zenderland, (1998). 
77 For the French case, see M. Roudebush, (2001). 
78 For an interesting interpretation of the term, see P. Leese, (2002). 
79 E. Showalter, (1985) The Feniale Malady, ivoinen, inadness and English Culture, 
1830-1980, New York: Pantheon Books, p. 172. 
80 For example, P. Leese, (2002), M. Roudebush, (2001), P. Lerner, (2001) 'From 
traumatic neurosis to male hysteria: the decline and fall of Hermann Oppenheim', 
Ti-ainnatic Pasts: Histoiy, psychiatty and ti-ainna in the nzodei-n age, 1870-1930. 
39 
shock, was appointed as Specialist in Nervous shock to the British Army in 
France and became responsible for the treatment and prevention of shell- 
shock. 
82 
The psychiatrists who were confronted with shell-shock in the First 
World War were bewildered by it. Their patients' symptoms were 
extremely varied. There were men who were obviously anxious, who could 
not sleep, and were troubled by nightmares as well as men who stammered 
and twitched uncontrollably, men who were paralysed or who could not 
bend their joints, men who could not speak, could not hear or could not feel 
pain. While some of these symptoms seem obviously psychological, others 
seemed quite obviously organic. This soon lead to a controversy over the 
nature of shell-shock and on whether it was an organic disorder -caused by 
the nearby explosion of a shell, or a psychological one -caused by fear and 
anxiety. 
Psychiatrists encountering shell-shock were well aware that there 
was a psychological disorder which could account even for the most 
spectacular of physical symptoms namely Hysteria. In the literature, there 
were numerous case studies of patients exhibiting the most dilapidating 
physical symptoms, for which there was no organic cause. When, in 1915, 
Charles Myers, published the first medical article that used the diagnosis 
shell-shock, he noted: 'The close relation of these cases to those of 
"hysteria" appears fairly certain. ' 83 The patients that Myers described had 
all been blown up by shells and their symptoms were amnesia, impaired 
vision, hearing, smell and taste, severe constipation, and urine retention. 
81 W. Johnson & G. Rows, (1923) 'Neurasthenia and war neuroses', Histoly of the 
Gi-eat Jf, 'ai- based on official documents, Medical Sei-vices Diseases of the 1val-, W. C. 
Macpherson, W. P. Herringham, T. R. Elliott & A. Balfour (eds) Vol. 11, HMSO, pp. 1-2. 
82 B. Shephard, (2000) A Mai- of Nei-ves, London: Jonathan Cape; W. Johnson & R. 
Rows (1923). 
83 C. S. Myers, (1915) 'A contribution to the study of shell-shock. Being an account of 
three cases of loss of memory, vision, smell, and taste admitted into the duchess of 
Westminster's war hospital, Le Touquet', The Lancet, vol. 1, pp. 316-320. 
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These patients were treated by hypnosis and suggestion 84 and gradually 
improved. 
Elaine Showalter has argued by reference to Myers' memoirs 85 that 
Myers was convinced that the cause of shell-shock was organie. 86 
However, a careful reading of the original article suggests instead that 
Myers believed that it was very likely that shell-shock would turn out to be 
hysteria, but was reluctant to say so. 
Back in Britain, the first hospitals for military psychiatric casualties 
opened in late 1914 while concurrently the law changed to permit the 
treatment of service patients without certification. 87 A number of specialist 
hospitals opened during the war however at the same time soldiers were 
also treated in specialist wards of regular military hospitals, such as the 
famous D Block at Netley as well as in regular wards in ordinary non- 
specialist hospitals. 88 
Towards the end of 1915, the Army officially recognised shell-shock 
as a distinct disorder and attempted to assimilate it within the military 
tradition which distinguished between wounds acquired in battle and 
sickness. Reflecting the debate among psychiatrists as to whether shell- 
shock was organic or psychological, shell-shock acquired during battle was 
assumed to have been caused by the enemy's shellfire; and therefore to, be 
organic concussion. Patients diagnosed with (W) shell-shock as it was 
called were able to wear a wound stripe and were eligible for a pension. 
Shell-shock not acquired in the midst of battle on the other hand, was 
I- 
84 Broadly speaking, treatment by suggestion meant that once a doctor was able to 
convince a patient that his symptoms would go away, the symptoms vanished. 
Suggestion is the basic principle on which hypnosis is based. 
85 c. S. Myers, (1940) Shell-Shock in France, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
86 E. Showalter, (1985) pp. 167-168. 
87 The Act permitting this was the Mental Treatment Act 1915. See P. Leese, (2002) p. 
59. 
88 According to Leese, this was the worst alternative for psychiatric patients who were 
ridiculed by the other patients, but a preferred option for the Ministry of Pensions which 
wanted to reduce the 'special' status of the psychiatric casualties and argued that the 
other patients would help 'cheer up' neurasthenic patients, P. Leese, (2002) pp. 64-67. 
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thought of as a mental breakdown and therefore as sickness and although 
the soldier was entitled to treatment he was not eligible for a pension or 
wound stripe. 89 
The problem of shell-shock became particularly acute for the Army 
during the battle of the Somme. According to official figures (generally 
thought to be underestimating the incidence of shell-shock) between 
January and June 1916 there were 3,951 cases of shell-shock, the highest 
figure so far, yet in the following six months the number rose to 16,138.90 
This forced the Army to create even more facilities for treatment including 
the Craiglockhart hospital for officers. After the Battle of the Somme, the 
Army began to take the issue of shell-shock and particularly the manpower 
wastage caused by it more seriously. C. S. Myers was promoted to 
'Consulting Psychologist to the Army' and in that capacity produced a 
memorandum arguing that it was important that special treatment centres 
near the front were created to ensure that treatment was prompt, that the 
environment was such as not to encourage soldiers to think that they have 
found a way out from the horrors of warfare (ideally they should be close 
enough to still hear the noises of fighting), and treatment should consist of 
simple psychotherapy. Possibly helped by the fact that submarine warfare 
had begun constricting the movement of ships across the channel, Myers's 
advice was followed and the specialist treatment centres were set up by the 
Army Medical Services. 91 Unfortunately, for Myers, the Army also 
employed more psychological staff in senior positions and Myers was 
sidelined. He returned to England on sick leave and his work was largely 
taken over by the neurologist Gordon Holmes. 
Soon after the Army recognised shell-shock, medical opinion 
concurred that shell-shock was mainly a psychological disorder and was 
89 C. S. Myers, (1940) Shell-shock in France quoted by B. Shephard (2000) p. 29; W. 
Johnson & G. Rows, (1923) p. 11. 
90 W. Johnson & G. Rows, (1923), p. 4, quoted in P. Leese, (2002) p. 104. 
91 P. Leese, (2002) p. 69. 
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rarely the result of a concussion. The medical advice was that the term 
altogether should be abolished. The Army's response was initially to 
abolish shell-shock (S), and adopt NYDN instead. Furthermore, it was 
decided that the old category of shell-shock (W) had been applied to too 
many soldiers who had not in fact been blown up by a shell. It was decided 
that all shell-shock cases should be accompanied by a new form (AH 3436) 
in which their commanding officers would confirm whether each soldier 
had been blown up by a shell. 
One consequence of including front line officers in the bureaucracy 
of psychiatric treatment was that the treatment which had meant to be 
immediate was much delayed: patients had to wait until their forms caught 
up with them. Secondly, it was shown that the vast majority of cases had 
not been blown up by a shell. Halfway through the Passchendale battles, 
policy was further changed and it was decided that it was no longer 
necessary to send all cases to the special casualty clearing station; if a 
doctor felt that a man was just temporarily shaken he could keep him even 
nearer the front. A lot of the treatment of shell-shock cases fell therefore to 
the regimental medical officers rather than to psychiatrists and 
neurologists. The result of the new procedures, the new powers of 
regimental medical officers and the new treatment centres was that a lot 
fewer psychiatric cases were lost to the Army in Passchendaele than had 
been in the Somme. 92 Of course, it is impossible to tell whether that was a 
clinical or a bureaucratic success; whether soldiers were less likely to 
become sick, or more easily cured or merely more easily persuaded to 
return to the Anny. In any case, in September 1918, shell-shock was 
abolished altogether as a medical diagnosis. 93 
Overall, the majority of shell-shock patients were treated in Britain. 
Most hospitals were segregated by rank, and in the few that were not, 
92 B. Shephard, (2000) pp. 54-55. 
93 Ibid. 
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accommodation for officers and men was always separate. One in fifty of 
all war cases of war neurosis were treated in Maghull -one of the best war- 
time psychiatric hospitals even though conditions were overcrowded and 
uncomfortable and adequate food supply was a constant problem. The most 
distinguished aspect of Maghull was its staff -run by R. G. Rows, Maghull 
attracted at one time nearly all the shell-shock specialists. 94 
Only about 20 per cent of Maghull patients were returned to military 
service. By civilian standards however, Maghull was a model shell-shock 
hospital where soldiers received specialist care from leading experts. It was 
also probably the most humane of the British centres for the other ranks 
with its emphasis on re-education, persuasion and careful attention to the 
individual. Treatment in Maghull was mainly 'the talking cure'. Men were 
encouraged to talk about their experiences in the frontline and were 
absolved from feelings of guilt and shame over their illness. The 
psychiatrists also interpreted the soldiers' dreams and tried to bring back 
forgotten memories but did not hypnotise patients. Towards the end of the 
war, a series of short courses in analytic techniques and abreaction training 
were offered to RAMC officers. 95 
As shell-shock became medically discredited as a nosological 
category, it was replaced with Concussion, Hysteria and Neurasthenia. 
These categories were not wholly distinct however but tended to overlap. 
Concussion was supposed to apply only to patients who were known to 
have received a head injury, but that was something that could not always 
be verified; many patients traced their symptoms to an incident involving 
loss of consciousness, which they related to an injury. Furthermore, while 
hysteria was supposed to apply to cases of functional paralysis and 
neurasthenia to cases of anxiety and nervousness in practise the diagnostic 
process was a lot more complex, and the two disorders were sometimes 
94 P. Leese, (2002). 
95 Ibid. 
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Oust as it had been prior to the war) used interchangeably. During and after 
the war, it was noted that officers were far less likely than the men from the 
ranks to be diagnosed with hysteria. In fact, in the official history, it was 
stated that: "Any soldier above the rank of corporal seemed possessed of 
96 too much dignity to become hysterical". This was compatible with the 
pre-war situation where neurasthenia was more likely to be thought of as 
the disease of the overworked middle classes and just as likely to affect 
men as women. Peter Leese, in his research of clinical case notes from the 
First World War has shown that not only the treatment and the conditions 
of hospitalisation were very different for officers, illness attribution was 
also completely different. 97 Hence, in the case notes of officers, doctors 
highlighted the psychological cost of leadership and prolonged active duty, 
but did not mention family traits or attribute the illness to poor heredity, as 
did doctors treating men from the ranks. 98 Furthermore, the symptoms 
exhibited by officers were described in a vague manner with the aid of 
euphemistic blanket phrases and were rarely described as 'functional'. 99 
Leese argues that it is likely that men and officers genuinely 
developed different symptoms, while Young has argued that in several 
cases officers did develop hysteria-like symptoms that were treated in the 
same way as hysterical symptoms in other ranks, but were nonetheless not 
called hysterical. 100 Young argues that in officers, hysterical symptoms 
were not regarded as representative of their condition, hence it was possible 
for an officer to suffer from neurasthenia yet also exhibit a hysterical 
symptom; while a patient from the ranks with the same symptoms would be 
diagnosed with hysteria. Young argues further that the reason for this 
distinction was that the diagnosis of hysteria implied a necessary link with 
96 W. Johnson & G. Rows, (1923), p. 18. 
97 P. Leese, (2002) pp. 103-116. 
98 Leese states that in his sample of III cases of officers only in I case is the possibility 
of a pre-war origin of the illness discussed, while such explanations are routine in the 
other rank case material, p. I 10. 
99 P. Leese, (2002) p. I 11. 
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an inherent hereditary weakness, while the diagnosis of neurasthenia left 
open the possibility at least that the disorder had been caused by external 
stress alone. Thus, the psychiatrist Millais Culpin described an officer 
patient whom he had treated for functional paralysis as follows: 
... 
in spite of an energetic and self-driving temperament that was 
the opposite to all common conceptions of the hysteric, his 
symptom was hysterical and the result of suggestion. Such a 
diagnosis would have been undoubtedly true but the truth in it was 
negligible. 101 
The treatments however which have dominated the bibliography of 
the First World War are those by WER Rivers, and Lewis Yealland. The 
two have been contrasted since Eric Leed in 1979 represented each as 
emblematic of two forms of psychiatric treatment: the analytic and the 
disciplinary. 10' Since then, a number of authors have used this model 
although more recently the bibliography has been rather critical, arguing 
that neither Yealland nor Rivers were representative of psychiatric 
treatment during the war. 103 These treatments are too well known to need a 
lengthy analysis here. Briefly, Lewis Yealland worked in Queen Square 
hospital on mostly intractable cases of other rank hysterics. 104 Yealland 
essentially used suggestion to cure patients; he persuaded the patients that 
their symptoms were cured through the application of a strong electric 
current to the area of the body which was not functioning. This process had 
a very high success rate according to Yealland's account, but also aroused 
100 A. Young, (1995) p. 62. 
101 M. Culpin, (1940) 'Mode of onset of the Neuroses in War' The TVai- New-oses of 
Mai- (ed) E. Miller, London: Macmillan, p. 37, cited in A. Young, (1995) p. 63. 
102 E. Leed, (1979) No inans land: Combat and Identity in JV61-1d Mal- I, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
103 For example, E. Showalter, (1985); P. Barker, (1991) Regeneration, London: 
Penguin Books. Criticisms of the model have come from A. Young, (1995), B. 
Shephard, (2000) and P. Leese, (2002). 
104 There is evidence that Yealland treated at least one officer patient, see E. Southard, 
(1973) Shell-shock and othei- new-opsychiatric pi-oblems, Neiv Yoi-k. - Ai-no A-ess, p. 782 
case 563. However, the electric current used to treat this patient is described as 
'exceedingly mild'. 
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controversy as the process resembled torture; patients were locked in a 
room with Dr Yealland who applied very strong current to their bodies 
until they were cured of their symptoms. 
Historians have argued that this line of treatment although popular in 
the other belligerent nations was infrequently used in Britain. In France and 
Austria, the ethics of using this kind of treatment was played out in the 
courts. In France, the soldier Baptiste Deschamps hit his doctor Clovis 
Vincent rather than allow the doctor to electrify him. Deschamps was 
brought to trial in August 1916 on the charge of resisting orders and 
assaulting a superior officer. Although most of the medical community 
rallied round Vincent, the trial generated a lot of bad press; Deschamps was 
pardoned and Vincent's reputation effectively destroyed. 105 In Austria, the 
issue came to trial after the war, when an enquiry was held into the 
psychiatric treatment of soldiers. Among those accused was the Professor 
of Psychiatry Julius Wagner-Jauregg who was later credited with the 
malaria treatment for general paralysis of the insane (the tertiary stage of 
syphilis) and won the Nobel Prize. Among those speaking at his trial, was 
Sigmund Frued who issued a cautious defence of the doctor. The enquiry 
exonerated Wagner-Jauregg, who argued that he used only mild electric 
current and only to the peripheral part of the body while his assistant, Dr 
Kozlowski was rebuked for excessive zeal. 10' 
By contrast, it has been argued that in Britain such treatments were 
used only rarely. Peter Leese has pointed out that Yealland and his 
colleague Adrian claim to have treated only 250 cases and that the 
surviving case notes of the other doctors at Queen Square, show doctors 
who were caring towards their patients. Faradisation when used was mild 
and applied for a short time only (compared to the 4 hour marathon 
treatments described by Yealland himself, who describes the current which 
105 M. Roudebush, (2001), pp. 272-273. 
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he uses as varying from 'weak to 'very strong'). 107 However, there is some 
evidence that the use of pain to procure treatment not only for the patient, 
being treated but also for other patients who are observing the treatment 
was more widespread, even in Britain. For example, Yealland described 
how various other treatments had been previously used to cure his patient 
of mutism pi-ioi- to his arrival at Queens' Square hospital, but had all failed: 
Many attempts had been made to cure him. He had been strapped 
down in a chair for twenty minutes at a time, when strong 
electricity was applied to his neck and throat; lighted cigarette ends 
had been applied to the tip of his tongue and "hot plates" had been 
placed at the back of his mouth. 108 
It is not clear where these treatments had been attempted, but they 
indicate that this kind of treatment was not an isolated example. In 
addition, the neurologist Major W. J. Adie, gave this description of his own 
use of such methods: 
Large numbers of men suffered from hysteria during 
convalescence from the various diseases for which they had been 
admitted to hospital. They all received the same sort of treatment 
by rapid -what I might call Queen Square methods. The most 
frequent symptom was aphonia. During one period I used to collect 
these cases once or twice a week and parade them in a surgical 
theatre in a tented portion of the hospital. I have had as many as a 
dozen men on one day. My method was to place the first patient on 
an operating table, and after explaining that his voice would 
certainly come back I gave him a whiff or two of ether. (I had no 
suitable electrical apparatus or I should have used it. ) After a few 
whiffs the man would attempt to remove the mask I then said to 
him '1 shall remove the mask when you say "take it away.. At the 
same time I pricked the skin over the larynx rather vigorously with 
a pin. Very soon the patient said in a tone of disgust: "Oh! take it 
away. " I then asked him for his name, number, regiment, etc., and 
after a short conversation sent him off. 
106 B. Shephard, (2000), pp. 134-138. According to Shephard, Kozlowski applied 
electric current to the patients' testicles and encouraged other patients to watch. 
107 L. Yealland, (1918) Hystei-ical Disorders of [Vaifai-e, London: Macmillan & Co, p. 
14. 
108 lbid, pp. 7-8. 
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This was repeated on the second patient and perhaps on the third. 
By this time the rest of the men, who had heard everything, 
although they could not see what was going on, were easily caused 
to speak without the use of ether. 109 
In contrast to these disciplinary methods, analytic treatments as 
exemplified by WBR Rivers treatment of officer patients in Craiglockhart, 
involved the patients in a consensual treatment. Rivers had adopted some 
Freudian ideas with regard to trauma and centred treatment on reversing the 
pathogenic. effects of repression. Furthermore, Rivers had formulated a 
theory of the aetiology of war neurosis, part of which was applicable to his 
treatment of officers, but which also explained the tendency of officers to 
develop neurasthenia and men from the ranks to develop hysteria. 110 
Rivers had developed an evolutionary theory of hysteria which 
proposed that the mechanism underlying hysteria, suggestibility, had 
developed in human beings in situations of danger because it was 
evolutionary advantageous. Its advantage lay in that it permitted gregarious 
animals to behave in an identical fashion. According to Rivers when a herd 
of animals are in a situation of danger the most advantageous response is 
immobility but this response is only viable if followed by every member of 
the herd. This is possible because gregarious animals are highly suggestible 
and respond intuitively to one another. Furthermore, the paralyses, mutism 
and the other hysterical symptoms developed by soldiers were precisely the 
ones that would be of greater use to a herd of animals trying not to attract 
attention to itself. "' 
109 Major W. J. Adie, MRCP RAMC (Special Reserve); Physician Great Northern 
Central Hospital; Neurologist Min. of Pensions, The Mar OfJi'ce Enquiry into Shell- 
shock, (1922), HMSO. 
110 Although in his explanation Rivers focuses on the different education, culture and 
military training between officers and men from the ranks, he acknowledges the 
possibility of a difference in hereditywhich he argues should not be neglected, but does 
not discuss. W. H. R. Rivers, (1920) 'Appendix IV: War Neurosis and Military 
Training', Instinct and the Unconscious: A contribution to a biological theory of the 
psycho-nein-oses, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 210, fn 1. 
111 W. H. R. Rivers, (1920), chapter XVI, 'Hysteria or Substitution-Neurosis'. 
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Rivers thought that ordinary soldiers were more likely than officers 
to suffer from hysteria adding that "pure cases of this kind are rare among 
officers, who, as a rule, only suffer from this sort of disorder as 
complications of states of anxiety, or when there is some definite, physical 
injury to act as a continuous source of suggestion. " 112 Rivers argued that all 
forms of war neuroses were caused by an underlying conflict between the 
instinct of preservation and social standards of thought and conduct in 
which fear is morally reprehensible. Private soldiers, according to Rivers, 
solved the conflict by developing some form of disability that incapacitated 
them. Officers however, whose mental life was more "complex and 
varied"' 13 were unhappy with this crude solution provided by hysteria. 
Even if they developed hysterical symptoms, these quickly disappeared and 
were replaced by anxiety. The other factor that encouraged soldiers from 
the ranks to develop hysteria was their training, which by forcing them to 
suppress their individuality and behave as aggregate parts of the group 
increased their natural suggestibility. Soldiers in warfare, Rivers argued, 
were in an almost hypnotic state in which they were highly suggestible. 
Repetitious drilling was therefore an important causal factor in the high 
incidence of hysteria among men from the ranks. 114 
The causation of anxiety neurosis (as Rivers called neurasthenia) was 
quite different. The principal mechanism involved was repression. 
Sufferers of anxiety neurosis had not solved the conflict between self- 
preservation and social expectation; the conflict was active causing them 
incapacitating anxiety. In contrast, private soldiers protected themselves 
from anxiety not only by developing hysteria but also by not repressing 
their fear: Rivers argued that the public school education received by most 
officers rendered them incapable of expressing their emotions while the 
private soldiers from the working class backgrounds had no such scruples. 
112 lbid, p. 207. 113 Ibid, p. 209. 
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This tendency was again further encouraged by officer training where 
officers were encouraged to repress their emotions so as not to let the 
soldiers in their command know that they were afraid. Therapy therefore, 
consisted of encouraging officers to give up this repression. Patients were 
encouraged to tell their stories and to spend sometime thinking of their 
experiences in the front-line. Rivers aided this process by focusing the 
patient's mind on a positive aspect of his experience: for example, in the 
case of a patient tormented by the experience of discovering a friend whose 
body had been blown to pieces thus separating his head and limbs from the 
body, Rivers pointed out that the state of his friend's body was certain 
proof that he had died instantly and had been spared the long suffering so 
common in war casualties. According to Rivers, once the patient was able 
to stop banishing from his mind all thoughts relating to his friend, the 
nightmares in which his friend appeared to him eased off, even when his 
friend did appear in his dreams, the patient was no longer terrified. ' 15 
Probably the biggest controversy regarding shell-shock (beginning 
during the war but continuing until today) is whether among the 346 men 
executed for desertion and cowardice there were men suffering from shell- 
shock. Military policy with regard to convictions for desertion and 
cowardice appears to have been that where there was a possibility that 
those accused may have been mentally confused at the time of their offence 
or for some reason not responsible for their actions, sentences should not be 
confirmed and carried out until the accused were examined by a medical 
specialist. This was the view expressed for example, by the under- secretary 
of war in response to a question in parliament' 16 and by witnesses at the 
enquiry into shell-shock after the war. 117 However, historians who have 
looked at the notes of the trials have shown that this is not borne out in 
114 W. H. R. Rivers, (1920) 'Appendix IV: War Neurosis and Military Training'. 
115 W. H. R. Rivers, (1920) 'Appendix III: Repression of War Experience'. 116 11. Leese, (2002) p. 42. 
117 A. Babington, (1997) p. 132. 
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most cases. There were multiple examples of soldiers who claimed to have 
suffered from memory loss and confusion at the time of their actions, or 
others who had only just been returned from Britain where they had 
received treatment for shell-shock and who were nonetheless convicted and 
executed without having been examined by a medical officer. " 8 However, 
the picture is complicated by the fact that the only notes available to 
historians are those of soldiers who were executed. ' 19 While 3 46 men were 
executed during the war, the total number of death sentences passed was 
3,080 -which means only 11% of all sentences were carried out. 
Furthermore, according to the official statistics, the total number of 
desertions in the First World War was 137,773 . 
120 Therefore, although the 
Army appears to have behaved brutally to a few individual soldiers the 
overall picture appears to be one of leniency especially in the face of what 
was obviously a very serious problem. Nonetheless, in 1918, the under- 
secretary for war admitted that on one occasion an officer had been 
wrongly shot -there had been concerns that the officer in question had been 
suffering from shell-shock. 12 1 Apparently, like other issues relating to shell- 
shock or even warfare in general, the fate of soldiers seems to have been 
decided partly by rank, as officers were considerably less likely to be shot 
than men from the ranks. 122 Overall, however, in this like in other 
instances, luck was probably the most significant factor in determining 
whether a shell-shocked soldier would be treated punitively or 
therapeutically. 
118 For example P. Leese, (2002); A. Babington, (1997). 
119 A. Babington, (1997), p. 92. 
120 These figures measure the incidence of desertion rather the number of people 
deserting; hence, soldiers who deserted more than once would be counted each time. R. 
H. Ahrenfeldt, (1948) Psychiauy in the Brilish Arnzy in the Second World Mar, London: 
Kegan & Routledge Paul, Appendix B. 
121 P. Leese, (2002) p. 63. 122 Ibid. 
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Intelli2ence Testing 
When in 1917, the United States joined the First World War, 
American psychologists began a campaign to introduce intelligence testing 
in the Army. They argued that feebleminded soldiers were a major source 
of inefficiency that could be eliminated. A committee comprising 
prestigious psychologists including Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman and 
Robert Yerkes devised two tests: the Army Alpha to test literates and the 
Army Beta to test illiterates. Backed financially by the National Committee 
for Mental Hygiene, psychologists began the testing of 4000 soldiers. The 
testing program soon won official approval from the Army and by 
December 1918, a testing program for all recruits had been established. 
Eventually 1,726,966 men were tested. The stated aim of the testing was: 
"a) To aid in segregating and eliminating the mentally incompetent, b) To 
classify men according to their mental ability, c) To assist in selecting 
competent men for responsible positions. " 123 
The extent to which the American Army actually made use of the 
intelligence scores is open to debate, however the tests had an indubitable 
impact on the discipline of psychology, which had shown itself to be of 
national importance. 124 
Equally important were the findings of the intelligence testers, 
Firstly, levels of illiteracy were surprisingly high; 31% of the soldiers were 
not able to read and write well enough to be tested on Army Alpha, and 
over half of these men were native-born. 125 Secondly, all the scores were 
surprisingly low; the average mental age of the white draft was 13.08 years 
old, a score barely over the 12 year old standard that psychologists had 
been using to define feeblemindedness. Had this standard been applied to 
the Army it would have meant discharging 47% of white soldiers and 89% 
123 F. Samelson, (1977) 'World War I intelligence testing and the development of 
psychology', Jow-nal of the Histwy of the Behavioi-al Sciences, 13, p. 276. 124 Ibid. 
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of black soldiers. 126 Also significant was that the tests correlated strongly. 
with years of schooling. 
The conclusion drawn by psychologists was that the results proved 
that feeblemindedness was far more widespread than had been previously 
known. The Army results seemed to support those who had argued that a 
racial disaster was imminent if mentally deficient people continued to be 
allowed to breed normally, and encouraged oppressive legislation against 
the mentally deficient all over the world. 
The inter-war years 1918-1939 
The First World War produced a number of volumes that discussed 
the aetiology and treatment of war neurosis. 127 These discussed a number of 
possible causes of shell-shock ranging from heredity to military training 
and the emphasis varied according to the ideological convictions of the 
authors. These viewpoints were well surnmarised in a volume published in 
1940 by what was to become known as the 'Tavi' set of psychiatrists from 
the Tavistock clinic, who proved extremely influential in the Second World 
War: 
Three schools of thought can be discerned among the numerous 
aetiological views advanced in the literature of the last war. They 
attributed war neuroses to: (i) anatomical lesions of the nervous 
system, (ii) inborn biological and psychological inferiority, the 
psychopathic constitution, and (iii) psychological reactions to war 
experience in individuals previously sensitised to emotional 
125 R. Yerkes, (192 1) Psychological examining in the United States Army, Washington, 
D. C.: GPO, cited in L. Zenderland, (1998) p. 288. 126 Ibid. 
127 For example, G. Elliott Smith & T. H. Pear, (1917) Shell shock and its lessons, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press; L. Yealland (1918); A. Ldri, (1919) Shell 
shock: commotional and emotional aspects, London: University of London; F. W. Mott, 
(1919) Mar neuroses and shell shock, London: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton; 
E. E. Southard, (1919) Shell-shock and other neuropsychiatric problems presented in 
five hundred and eighty-nine case historiesfi-oin the JVar literature, 1914-1918, Boston: 
W. M. Leonard; W. H. R. Rivers, (1920); C. S. Myers, (1940) Shell shock in France, 
1914-18, Cambridge: The University Press. 
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disturbances subjectively similar although objectively different in 
their nature. 118 
Of these interpretations, the first had become outdated; neurasthenia 
and hysteria were firmly thought of as psychological rather than 
neurological disorders and organic explanations of shell-shock including 
carbon monoxide poisoning or a disruption of the nervous system by tiny 
lesions caused by explosives or concussion had failed to get any support. 
The second and third explanation had a wide following and although both 
located the ultimate cause of war neurosis within the individual soldier 
rather than within warfare, the latter explanation as interpreted by some 
psychiatrists at least allowed for the possibility that war neurosis could 
affect almost anyone. Some authors of the psychoanalytic school such as 
Karl Abraham described those falling victim to war neurosis as narcissistic 
personalities, overwhelmingly concerned with their own safety, lacking 
concern for others, dependent on their wives, weakly potent and suffering 
from latent homosexual tendencies. 129 Other authors however adopted a 
more benevolent attitude as to what may cause such vulnerability, like a 
tendency to repress emotion, to be over- consci enti ou s etc. And while it was 
generally agreed that those who suffered from neurotic symptoms in 
peacetime would find it impossible to adapt to the conditions of warfare, 
Witkkower and Spillane argued that 'some obsessionals, certain types of 
psychopathic personality, and mental defectives often did well as 
128 E. Witkk-ower & JP Spillane, (1940) 'Psychopathology', The Neuroses in War , E. Miller (ed) London: Macmillan, p. 11. The third explanation is an essentially Freudian 
interpretation which says that individuals who have experienced situations in their 
formative years which are symbolically similar to the experiences of warfare will be 
particularly vulnerable to war neurosis. Hence, particular individuals may be susceptible 
to the feelings of guilt, sadism or fear experienced in warfare because these reawaken 
previous traumas experienced in childhood. E. Miller elucidated this point when he 
wrote: 'No soldier came into the war with his mind a clean slate; it had already been 
written over with the story of his past experiences and conflicts. ... In brief, the 
relatively mild analogues of war conflicts had already existed' (1940, p. 115). 
129 K. Abraham, (1921) cited in E. Miller, (1940). 
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soldiers' 130 although they frequently broke down at the end of the war. 
There was even evidence that 'homosexuals proved efficient and enduring 
soldiers. ' 13 1 Finally, Wittkower and Spillane argued that while small 
studies had tended to 'confirm the common belief in family and personal 
predisposition' one large study had shown 'that the preponderance of 
heredity for the mass of neuroses and psychoses is but a trifle more than for 
healthy individuals'. 132 In addition, Ronald Hargreaves contradicted 
psycho analytic dogma by arguing that few war neurotics showed evidence 
of past abnormality and therefore 'In war psychoneurosis ... we may 
have 
to lay most stress on the significance of the situation present when the 
breakdown occurred, rather on the history of the past'. 133 
In some quarters at least therefore, an optimistic viewpoint with 
regard to the nature of those suffering from war neurosis seemed to emerge. 
For example, the psychiatrists Elliot Smith & Tom Pear from Maghull 
concluded: 
The war has shown us one indisputable fact, that a psychoneurosis 
may be produced in almost anyone if only his environment be 
made difficult enough for him. It has warned us that the 
pessimistic, helpless appeal to heredity, so common in cases of 
insanity [is no longer adequate]. In the causation of the 
psychoneuroses, heredity undoubtedly counts, but social and 
material environment count infinitely more. 134 
Furthermore, the official history of the war focused on the conditions 
of warfare for its aetiological explanation: 
These observations serve to emphasize the facts that, although 
much has been written tending to multiply the causes of the 
nervous disorders of war, there were only two factors of 
overwhelming importance, namely, prolonged fighting and heavy 
bombardments, and that these rendered all other aetiological 
130 E. Witkkower & J. P. Spillane, (1940) p. 11. 
13 1 Burchard, (1915) cited in E. Miller, (1940), p. 7. 
132 E. Witkkower & J. P. Spillane, (1940) p. 11. 
133 R. Hargreaves (1940). 
134 G. Elliot Smith & T. H. Pea (1917) pp. 87-88. 
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factors almost negligible. Wherever these acted together the 
incidence of the psycho-neuroses approached its maximum. 135 
The above, however, was later modified by stating that: 'besides the 
influence of the circumstances of war, the temperament of the individual 
soldier doubtless played a large part. ' 136 
General Psychiatry 1918-1939 
The historian Martin Stone has maintained that shell-shock helped 
establish a kinder, sympathetic Freudian outlook in psychiatry. 137 Thomson 
however, has argued that the shell-shock incidence did not influence 
institutional psychiatry. 138 In fact, the immediate effect of the shell-shock 
incident was a wholly negative one, as mental hospitals became 
requisitioned by the army, and staff from the hospitals volunteered for 
military service, causing an increase in overcrowding and deaths from 
tuberculosis. 139 
Probably the most significant consequence of shell-shock was the 
creation of the Tavistock Clinic. Its founder, Hugh Crichton-Miller, had felt 
that the treatment of shell-shocked soldiers with a Freudian inspired 
psychotherapy had been very successful and according to the history of the 
Tavistock Clinic, he founded the clinic,, in order to continue what had been 
achieved in the Army with cases of shell-shock -the treatment of people 
with modest income who would normally be unable to afford to have 
private psychotherapy. 140 
135 W. Johnson & G. Rows (1923) p. 16. 136 Ibid5 P. 17. 
137 M. Stone (1985) 'Shell-shock and the psychologists, ' The Anatomy of Madness, H 
(eds) W. F. Bynum, R. Porter & M. Shepherd, London: Tavistock Publications. 
138 M. Thomson (1998); M. Thomson (1999) 'Status, manpower and mental fitness: 
mental deficiency in the First World War' Mar, Medicine and Modernity, (eds) R. 
Cooter, M. Harrison & S. Sturdy, Thrupp: Sutton Publishing. 
139 K. Jones (1993) pp. 124-5. 
140 H. V. Dicks (1970) Fifty Years of the Tavistock Clinic, London: Routledge, p. 12. 
Also the obituary of Hugh Crighton-Miller Lancet, (1959), i, p. 104. 
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The Tavistock Clinic was an outpatient clinic designed not for the, 
psychotic but for ordinary people who needed help with ordinary problems. 
It followed an eclectic psychoanalytic approach using the ideas of Freud, 
Jung and Adler. It accepted patients independently of their ability to pay 
and was the first British institution to provide psychotherapeutic treatment 
for children. 
Also promoting voluntary treatment for those with insufficient 
means was the new Maudsley hospital. The Maudsley was also a teaching 
hospital and it promoted early treatment and the ideal that psychiatry would 
be brought closer to mainstream medicine. Unlike the Tavistock, the 
Maudsley promoted physical treatments and most of its staff were strict 
opponents of the psychoanalytic movement. 
Rather than the shell-shock episode, probably the most encouraging 
development of the 1920s was the discovery in Vienna of the malaria 
treatment for general paralysis of the insane (GPI). GPI had been proven 
decades earlier, to be caused by syphilis, but none of the treatments for 
syphilis had been effective in its treatment. In 1917, the Austrian 
psychiatrist Wagner-Jauregg who had been experimenting from the late 
19"' century with fever therapies (the rationale being that a high fever is the 
body's way of curing disease) injected nine patients with the blood of a 
soldier infected with malaria. Wagner-Jauregg, claimed that he saw a great 
improvement in his patients, which was effective for many years, and he 
continued to use the same strain of malaria to inoculate patients. As 
Wagner-Jauregg reported more brilliant results, the treatment became 
internationally renowned finally earning Wagner-Jauregg the Nobel Prize 
in 1927. As a result, the GPI story became the paradigm in psychiatry; a 
mental illness which had been proven to have both an infectious origin and 
a physical treatment. In addition, it encouraged a more positive outlook in 
psychiatry as it encouraged hospitals to offer treatment to their patients and 
gave psychiatrists reason to hope that one day the other hitherto incurable 
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mental illness would be treated effectively with medical treatment thus 
bringing psychiatry closer to general medicine. 
Simultaneously with these changes, the 1920s saw a hardening of 
attitudes towards the mentally deficient both in Britain and in America. In 
the US, while some professional opinion was becoming more moderate, 
legislation was becoming more hardline. The Army tests results published 
in 1921 fuelled various alarmist and anti- immigration publications although 
they also. provoked some criticism. 14 1 Nonetheless, 27 states passed laws 
permitting involuntary sterilisation for the mentally deficient, most 
famously resulting in the Buck vs Bell case which reached the US Supreme 
Court where the prosecution used Goddard's work as evidence as to why 
Carrie Buck should be sterilised. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
sterilisation laws ought to be extended, arguing that: 
We have seen that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens 
for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices in order 
to prevent our being swamped with incompetents. 142 
In Britain, the joint committee by the Board of Control and the Board 
of Education reported in 1929 that the number of mental defectives was 
double in absolute terms what it was thought to be in 1908.143 Although the 
report made it clear that most of the increase could be accounted for by 
better methods of surveying, an increased survival of mentally deficient 
babies and the longevity of institutional inmates, the findings nonetheless 
fuelled nationalistic fears. Crucially the report also identified a much larger 
141 C. Gould (1922) Ainerica: A Fainily Mattei-, New York: Scribner; L. Stoddard 
(1922) The i-evolt against civilization, New York: Scribner. 
142 justice Oliver Wendel Holmes, (1927) Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, p. 207. Cited in 
Medico-Legal Notes, Jow-nal ofMental Science (1928), vol. 74, p. 499. 
143 Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee being a Joint Committee q the Bow'd of ýf 
Education and the Boat-d of Control (1929) HMSO, part IV p. 83. The survey on the 
prevalence of mental deficiency was conducted to explain the vast differences in the 
reporting of mental deficiency between different local authorities. 
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group than the mentally deficient who by virtue of poor inheritance formed 
the 'social problem group' a phrase that captured popular imagination: 
Let us assume that we could segregate as a separate community all 
the families in the country containing mental defectives .... 
We 
should find that we had collected among them a most interesting 
social group. It would include as everyone who has extensive 
practical experience of social service would readily admit, a much 
larger proportion of insane persons, epileptics, paupers, criminals 
(especially recidivists), unemployables, habitual slum dwellers, 
prostitutes, inebriates and other social inefficients than would a 
group of families not containing mental defectives. The 
overwhelming majority of the families thus collected will belong to 
that section of the community, which we propose to term the 
"social problem" or "subnormal group". This group comprises 
approximately the lowest 10 per cent. in the social scale of most 
communities. Though the large majority of its members are not so 
low grade mentally that they can be actually certified as mentally 
defective, it is possible that a not inconsiderable number of them 
might prove, if examined by expert and experienced medical 
practitioners, to be certifiable and subject to be placed under care 
and control. 144 
The significance of the 'social problem group' is that by harping 
back to a perception of mental deficiency reminiscent of The Kallikak 
Fain ily, 145 which by this time had been discredited, it identified as a 
problem not just the mentally deficient but also the merely 'dull' whose 
'social and economic failure is primarily due to their poor mental 
endowment' pronouncing that 
If we are to prevent the racial disaster of mental deficiency we 
must deal not merely with mentally defective persons, but with the 
whole subnormal group from which the majority of them come. 146 
The 1930s saw the biggest change in institutional psychiatry. Firstly, 
the Mental Treatment Act 1930 allowed for the first time, patients to 
'44 Ibid, p. 80. 
145 G. Goddard (1912) The Kallikak Family A study in the Hei-edity of Feeble- 
Mindedness, New York: Macmillan. 
146 Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee ... P. M. 
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receive free treatment in a mental hospital on a voluntary basis without the 
safeguards of certification. Henceforth legislation was directed towards 
making psychiatric treatment easily available without stigmatisation; rather 
than towards protecting the liberty of the public by ensuring that only those 
who really needed to be, were shut up in asylums. 147 Furthermore, the Act 
made it clear that boundaries between mental and physical illness were 
meaningless: physical illness had mental aspects and mental illness had 
physic al aspects. 148 The aim of the Act was to improve the rate of 
successful treatment, and it was hoped that early treatment would be the 
key to achieving this. 
Secondly, the 1930s saw a huge expansion in the field of physical 
treatment. Although these treatments would not become commonplace until 
the 1940s and 1950s, their discovery gave a boost to psychiatrists who now 
increasingly began to see mental illness in biological terms, but also as 
potentially curable. In 1933, Austrian psychiatrist Manfred Sakel reported 
his new therapy for schizophrenia, insulin coma therapy. This treatment 
consisted of injecting the patient with insulin every day, gradually 
increasing the dose until it was sufficient to send the patient into a coma, 
after which, the patient was given a sugar solution through a nasogastric 
tube. This procedure was extremely labour-intensive, and required the close 
attention of nurses and doctors to guard against a patient going into an 
irreversible coma. However, this was the first ever treatment for 
schizophrenia and was widely regarded as a miracle cure that had 
transformed mental hospitals from custodial asylums to genuine hospitals 
using active treatment. 
The second radical physical treatment was cardiasol convulsions, 
invented in 1934 by a Hungarian doctor called Ladislas von Meduna. He 
147 This tend was reversed by the Mental Health Act 1983. See C. Unsworth (1987) The 
Politics ofMental Health Legislation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
148 Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disoi-der (1926) Cmd. 2700, 
para. 38; cited in C. Unsworth (1987) p. 113. 
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had noticed that some of his schizophrenic patients who were also. 
epileptic, apparently improved after having a seizure. He concluded that 
epilepsy and schizophrenia were antagonistic towards each other, so he 
injected the drug Cardiasol in patients, in order to induce epileptic fits. This 
new treatment gained wide and rapid acceptance, rivalling that of insulin. 
Compared with insulin, an individual cardiasol treatment was easier to 
administer, required less observation and took up much less time. However, 
in the time period between the injection and the onset of the convulsions 
(when the patient lost consciousness) patients experienced intense fear and 
dread. 149 Secondly, doctors found it almost impossible to control the 
intensity of the convulsions and patients therefore often broke their limbs 
as a result. 
Aware of the success and the shortcomings of cardiasol treatment 
two Italian psychiatrists Ugo Cerletti and Lucio Bini developed in 1936 a 
method to safely induce epileptic fits using electricity. Inspired from 
watching the practices of the slaughterhouse where pigs were given an 
electric shock to stun them before they were killed, Cerletti and Bini began 
to experiment on dogs. However, their original method in which they 
placed one electrode in the dog's mouth and the other one in its anus was 
unsuccessful as the current went through the animal's heart and frequently 
killed it. Cerletti and Bini overcame this problem by placing the electrodes 
on either side of the dog's head. With this improvement, the treqtment 
became safe so in 1938 they started performing this treatment on 
humans. 150 Although Electric Convulsion Treatment (ECT) and Cardiasol 
Therapy both started out as treatment for Schizophrenia and were 
sometimes combined with Insulin Coma therapy, they soon became 
established treatments for Depression. 
149 D. K. Henderson & R. D. Gillespie (1944), 'A Textbook of Psychiahyfor students 
andpractitioners', Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 407. 
150 E. Shorter (1997) A Histog of Psychiatry, New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 218- 
214. 
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Finally, Leucotomy as a treatment for Schizophrenia and Depression 
was invented by Egas Moniz who received the 1949 Nobel Prize for his 
discovery. Several different 'cuts' of the frontal lobes were developed 
which varied in their extensiveness, and although in some cases doctors 
noticed some undesirable side effects such as apathy and childishness, the 
overwhelming reduction in symptomatic behaviour made this a very 
popular treatment. 
Significantly, psychiatric practice, like medical practice, ceased to be 
exclusively concerned with the small group of people who were ill, and 
turned to the whole population; the potentially ill. 151 Psychiatrists extended 
their remit beyond the asylum and into the lives of ordinary people. 152 At 
the same time, out-patient clinics, day hospitals, the 'unlocked door' 
movement, unrestricted visiting and the early discharge policy encouraged 
fluidity between the sane and the insane. 
The context of a social and preventive medicine, also allowed the 
Eugenics Education Society to emerge and expand. The Society attracted 
key figures from the social, political and health landscapes, amongst whom 
were a number of very influential psychiatrists and psychologists, such as 
James Crichton-Browne, Hans Eysenck, C. P. Blacker, Eliot Slater, Edward 
Mapother, Aubrey Lewis, Hugh Crichton Miller and Cyril Burt. The 
Eugenics Society was a broad church; its members belonged to the political 
left as well as to the political right and many acknowledged the importance 
of social and psychological, as well as genetic and hereditary, influences on 
health and personality. ' 53 
151 D. Armstrong, (1983) Political Anatomy of the Body. - Medical KnoWedge in Nitain 
in the Twentieth Centiny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
152 Adolf Meyer's work was particularly influential in this respect as he advocated the 
professional unification of neuroscientists psychiatrists/alienists and psychoanalysts 
tinder the doctrine of psychobiology. See J. Pressman, (1997) The Last Resort, 
Psychosurgeiy and the Limits of Medicine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 
20. 
153 Members of the Society were, for example, the communist biologist J. B. S. Haldane, 
and the social reformers Richard Titmuss and William Beveridge. See R. A. Soloway, 
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It has been argued that the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act represents 
the peak of influence for the Eugenics movement, as the Society's later 
lobbying for the voluntary sterilisation of the mentally deficient in the early 
1930s was unsuccessful. 154 However, the Committee on Sterilisation. 
affirmed that sterilisation. should be available on an optional basis to 
anyone who had cause to think that he or she may be a 'carrier' of 
hereditary disease, and declared itself 
impressed by the dead weight of social inefficiency and individual 
misery which is entailed by the existence in our midst of over a 
quarter of a million mental defectives and of a far larger number of 
persons who without being certifiable defective are mentally 
subnormal. This mass of defectives and subnormals is being 
steadily recruited and is probably growing. 155 
In many ways, the Society's influence was extended during the inter- 
war years when many of its central claims became accepted as 'common 
sense'. This was the result of, and the cause of, a larger and more 
professional membership, which included well-respected physicians, 
researchers, academics, social reformers, philanthropists and politicians. 
Furthermore,, the appointment in 1931, of the Maudsley psychiatrist and 
birth control reformer C. P. Blacker as secretary of the Society was 
particularly significant in changing the society's outlook, raising its status 
as a professional organisation, popularising its views and shedding at least 
partially its image as right-wing and anti-working class. 156 
(1995) Deniography and Degeneration, Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in 
Tiventieth Century Britain, Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press; A. Oakley (1997) 
'Making Medicine Social: The Case of the Two Dog with Bent legs. ' Social Medicine 
and Medical Sociology in the Tiventieth Century, Amsterdam: Clio Medica; Eugenics 
Education Society Papers, The Wellcome Trust, Contemporary Medical Archives 
Centre (CMAC). 
154 For example, R. Porter, (1996) p. 394. 
155 Report of the Departmental Coininiffee on Sterilisation (1934), HMSO, p. 55. The 
Committee's recommendations were rejected in parliament, as there was huge 
opposition to the Bill by the Labour Party and by the Catholic Church. 
1 56 R. A. Soloway, (1995); M. Thomson, (1998). 
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A typical example, which demonstrates the popular acceptance of 
eugenic views in the inter-war period, can be found in the aetiology section 
of the contemporary psychiatric textbook by Henderson and Gillespie. 
Neither of these authors were particularly biologically oriented, but in 1936 
they saw fit to alter the wording in their textbook regarding the aetiology of 
mental illness from the original which existed for the first three editions: 
Too much stress has been laid in the role of heredity in mental 
disorders, although it must be very great. The unvarnished truth is 
that very little even of what is probable is known of the inheritance 
of mental instability, and almost nothing is firmly established. 157 
In all editions since 1936 the text appeared as: 
The role of heredity in mental illness is of fundamental importance 
and demands the closest study and investigation. Few definite 
formulae can as yet be laid down. But there is evidence that every 
civilised nation, owing to the economic and social burden of caring 
for the unfit, is paying more attention to racial qualities. 158 
With the expansion of social medicine, it became acceptable at the 
onset of the Second World War for psychiatrists to adopt not only a 
therapeutic role but also a prophylactic one in dealing with war neurosis. 
The wide acceptance in contemporary psychiatric thinking of the view that 
heredity determined intelligence and to a large extent mental illness 
allowed heredity to dominate most discussions of war neurosis actiology. 
Furthermore, the overwhelming focus by eugenicists on low intelligence as 
a sign of constitutional inferiority, 159 combined with a contemporary ideal 
of an intelligence-based meritocracy, meant that intelligence testing 
157 D. K. Henderson & R. D. Gillespie, (1932)A Textbook of Psychiatiyjbi- students 
andpi-actitioners', Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 26. 
158 D. K. Henderson & R. D. Gillespie, (1936) 'A Textbook of Psychiatjyjbi- students 
andpi-actitionei-s', Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 27 
159 Although a simple Mendelyan formula for mental deficiency was not widely 
accepted. The work of Lionel Penrose is significant in this respect. See for example 
D. C. Watt, (1998) 'Lionel Penrose, F. R. S. (1898-1972) and eugenics' Notes and 
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became the main means through which suitability for army trades and rank, 
as well as the potential to withstand the stresses of war would be measured. 
Simultaneously, the medicalisation of psychiatry required the 
destruction of psychiatry's custodial role. The Mental Treatment Act 
(1930) and the Mental Health Act (1959) both represent the legitimisation 
of psychiatry's role within a much wider population suffering from mental 
health problems together with an attempt to reduce the population of the 
certified chronic wards. Avant-guard mental hospitals of the 1930s, 40s and 
50s sou ght mainly to increase their turn over rate while reducing their 
population; to treat more patients than ever before while providing shelter 
for fewer. 
Conclusion 
Various disparate diseases which in the I 9th century were thought of as 
functional, organic or mental, some of which were prevalent among 
women, and others more likely to be found in soldiers became the building 
blocks for what in the twentieth century would be called shell-shock or war 
neurosis. By the end of the Fir st World War, this disorder was 
overwhelmingly described in psychological terms although constitutional 
factors and heredity factors continued to be thought of as very important, 
particularly in explaining why some soldiers were more susceptible to 
mental disease than others. Increasingly, in the early twentieth century, low 
intelligence also came to be seen as a trait that made people vulnerable to 
mental illness as well as a variety of socially undesirable behaviours. This 
attitude led to the mass intelligence testing of soldiers in the Second World 
War. 
Records of the Royal Society of London, 52, ii. Many thanks to Malcolm Pines for this 
reference. 
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Chapter 2: The Administration of psychiatric services 
Introduction 
During the Second World War, psychiatrists played a very significant role 
in the medical services of the military. While the Army suffered huge 
psychiatric casualties, 160 psychiatrists were invested with the power to 
recommend who should be given a commission, whose duties should be 
downgraded, who should be discharged as mentally unfit and who must not 
be recruited into the Army at all. The psychiatrists' recommendations were 
usually followed: for example, of the 3,788,000 men who served in the 
British Army between September 1939 and August 1945,161 109,000 men 
were discharged from the Army on psychiatric grounds, 162 one quarter of 
whom had served less than one year. 163 Furthermore, a significant number 
of men were downgraded to non-combatant duties. 164 In fact, psychiatric 
160 The psychiatrist T. F. Main reported that 2-30% of all battle casualties were 
psychiatric, T. F. Main, (1946) 'Discussion: forward psychiatry in the Army', 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 39, pp. 140-142. The figure reported in 
the official medical history was 2-20%, F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1955) 'The army psychiatric 
service', The Army Medical Services, Administration, Vol. H, London: HMSO, p. 489. 
161 W. F. Mellor, (1972) Casualties and Medical Statistics, London: HMS 0, p. 829. 
162 In the parliamentary section of the Lancet it is stated that "Replying to a question Mr 
John Freeman stated that approximately 109,000 men were discharged from the Army 
between September, 1939, and VJ-day on psychiatric grounds; 288,000 on account of 
other diseases and accidental injuries; 26,000 on account of injuries due to enemy 
action. " Anon, (1947) 'Psychiatric Cases in the Army', The Lancet, 250, i, p. 728. 
Reference from H. C. J. C. L'Etang, (1951) 'A criticism of military psychiatry in the 
Second World War', Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 97, p. 192. W. F. 
Mellor, states that in the years 1943,1944, and 1945 the rate of discharge for mental 
diseases was 6.24,8.55 and 9.42 per 1000 troops respectively, W. F. Mellor, (1972, 
p. 448). This calculates to approximately 68000 men having been discharged in the last 3 
years of the war. In the Report of an Expert Connnittee on the ivork ofpsychologists and 
psychiatrists in the services, it is stated that approximately 118,000 men were 
discharged from all three services 
lbetween 
September 1939 and June 1944. (HMSO, 
1947, p. 15). 
163 Report of an Expert Connnittee on the ivork ofpsychologists andpsychiatrists in the 
set-vices (1947, p. 15) cited in H. C. J. C. LEtang, (195 1, p. 192). 
164 H. C. J. C. L'Etang has estimated that figure to be over 220,000. From the 
psychiatrists' reports it would appear that between 60-70% of their patients were 
retained for non-combat duties, but figures differ significantly from psychiatrist to 
psychiatrist and from particular theatres of war and from hospitals in Britain. It is also 
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illness remained throughout the war, the No. I cause of medical discharge, 
accounting for between 30 and 41% of all discharges due to disease. 165 
Until very recently, only three historical texts dealt with psychiatry 
during the Second World War. These were a series of lectures written by 
the psychiatrist J. R. Rees during the war, the official medical history of the 
Second World War, which contained several sections on psychiatry written 
by psychiatrists from the War Office, and an independent monograph 
composed by the War Office psychiatrist R. Ahrenfeldt. 166 Within these 
texts psychiatrists promoted the story that psychiatry was a specialty of 
overwhelming value to the war effort but that the effectiveness of the 
psychiatrists' efforts had been repeatedly compromised by the prejudice of 
military and medical administrators who refused to give psychiatrists the 
authority and resources they needed. 167 For example, Ahrenfeldt described 
the position of psychiatrists at the onset of the war as follows: 
Unwelcomed and regarded with suspicion, if not despised, 
psychiatrists -the Cinderellas of Medicine- entered the Army, 
where they had gradually to overcome prejudices, administrative 
resistance and executive inertia ... Thus they had to fight a battle on 
two fronts -against mental disease, and against opposition not only 
from certain military and civil authorities and a section of the 
public, but also not a few members of the medical profession. 168 
In particular, these histories focused their accusations of prejudice on 
civilian, military and medical leaders stationed away from the front line - 
whereas combatant officers and regimental medical officers were usually 
very difficult to estimate how many soldiers were treated/assessed by psychiatrists 
during thewar. 
165 W. F. Mellor, (1972) p. 43 9 
166 Rees, J. R., (1944) The Shaping of Psychiatry by TFar, London: Chapman & Hall; 
F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1955), pp. 467-497; F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1957), 'The Army 
Psychiatric Service. The Middle East Force 1940-1943', The ArIny Medical Services, 
Campaigns, Vol. 11, London: HMSO, pp. 440-513; R. Ahrenfeldt, (1959) Psychiatry in 
the British Army in the Second Morld Mar, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
167 The official medical history is considerably more moderate in this respect than the 
monographs by Ahrenfeldt and Rees. 
168 R. Ahrenfeldt, (195 8) p. 25 1. 
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portrayed as supportive of psychiatrists. 169 So Rees, for example, wrote 
that: 
... we were often told that psychiatrists were the fifth- columnists of 
the Army, and this because they were advising the discharge of 
men who were obviously too dull or too unstable to soldier. The 
administrator who has to produce the 'bodies' and is quite out of 
contact with real live men is critical, and much opprobrium has 
come to Army psychiatrists because there has necessarily been a 
high discharge rate from psychiatric causes. The fighting soldier is 
in no doubt at all as to the kind of man he wishes to have with him. 
The further you get away from the front line the tougher become 
the comments ... It is very striking how few of the really intelligent 
and valuable leaders fail to appreciate the contribution of 
psychiatry... " 170 
This picture of the underdog yet heroic psychiatrists has mostly gone 
unchallenged in the more recent accounts of Second World War 
psychiatry. 171 In this chapter it will be argued that the power that 
psychiatrists yielded during the Second World War was extremely 
significant, and that it was only the overwhelming ambitions of the authors 
and their desire to tell a traditional story in which the heroes overcame 
adversity that lead them to describe military psychiatry in this period as the 
"Cinderella of medicine". 172 While the Army is frequently presumed to be 
the kind of reactionary, and conservative institution that would naturally 
object to all things psychological, the evidence from the Second World 
War is that psychiatry was a well respected and valued specialty. However, 
169 For example, Ahrefeldt argues that COs and RMOs were supportive of personnel 
selection, (1958, p. 36). 
170 J. R. Rees, (1945) pp. 27-28. 
17 1 For example, E. Trist & H. Murray, (eds) (1990), The social engagement of social 
science: a Tavistock anthologv, London: Free Association; J. Crang, (2000) The British 
ariny and the People's War, Manchester: Manchester University Press; T. Harrison, 
(2000), Bion, Riclanan, Foulkes and the Northfield Experivients, Advancing on a 
Different Front, London: Jessica Kingsley. Ben Shephard's War of Nerves (2000) is 
more critical. 
172 Overwhelming ambitions about the role psychiatrists should have in a post-war 
society are elaborately expressed in Rees's monograph, (Rees, 1945, pp. 117-13 9) while 
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this is not simply because psychiatry was overwhelmingly effective, or 
because the Army became a more liberal and progressive institution -but 
because the Amy favoured scientific solutions to problems and 
psychiatrists and psychologists were the acknowledged experts in human 
behaviour. In addition, psychiatrists, medical officers and combatant 
officers shared the same values about the qualities needed in a fighting 
Army. Central to these values was keeping up unit cohesion and morale - 
and the desirability of discharging those who could not or would not fit in 
and thus destroyed cohesion and morale. 
In particular, it will be argued that psychiatrists succeeded in 
increasing their own power, status, and manpower by taking advantage of 
two contemporary medical movements: specialisation and preventive 
medicine. Specifically, the re-invention of psychiatry as mental hygiene 
allowed psychiatrists in many instances to be involved in matters of -policy 
, rather than just therapy and thus extended their remit into many other 
fields, most notably personnel selection, but also discipline, training, 
morale and prevention of infectious diseases. 173 
Prevention and Specialisation in the Army Medical Services 
By the time of the Second World War, two principles guided the 
development and growth of the army medical services. These were firstly a 
move away from general medicine towards specialised fields and secondly 
a move away from clinical medicine towards the prevention of disease. 174 
Psychiatry benefited from the enthusiasm towards both of these principles. 
regret that Army Psychiatry lost its status after the war can be found in R. Ahrenfeldt, 
(1958, pp. 251-252). 
173 For example: T. F. Main, (1943) 'Psychological Problems of troops overseas. Reports 
to the War Office' CMAC, GC 13 5BI (file I of 4); S. A. MacKcith, (1944) 'Psychiatric 
comments on some issues affecting morale' CMAC, GC135 BI (I of 4); E. D. 
Wittkower & J. Cowan, 'Some psychological aspects of sexual promiscuity. Summary 
of an Investigation. ' CMAC GC135 B2 (4 of 4). For more detail See Ahrenfeldt, (1958) 
pp. 196-225. 
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With regard to specialisation, psychiatrists just like the other specialties 
benefited very clearly by an increase in their numbers; in 1923, the Army 
employed only 8 specialists, but by 193 3 it employed 115 175by 1941,1056 
specialists and by 1945 the Army employed approximately 3,000, over a 
quarter of the total medical officers. 176 The psychiatrists' numbers 
increased disproportionately, from 0 to 2 in 1939 to over 300 in 1945 177 and 
may have increased more if it had not been for a perceived shortage of 
qualified psychiatrists. 
Psychiatrists also benefited from the move towards specialisation by 
getting increased administrative control; from 1918 to 1942, four 
specialties, hygiene, pathology, dentistry and psychiatry, were organised in 
specialist directorates under their own directors. This move became 
possible precisely because there was recognition that firstly, increased 
specialisation was desirable, and secondly that with increased 
administrative control, certain specialties could contribute towards the 
prevention of disease. For psychiatrists, having their specialty selected by 
the Director-General Army Medical Services Sir Alexander Hood, for a 
specialist directory was a real victory. 
Contrary to the climate which favoured specialisation during the war, 
psychiatrists developed therapeutic regimes which could be put into 
practice by unspecialised personnel. This was due firstly to the absence of 
resources and personnel required for more specialised techniques and 
secondly due to the belief that most casualties were not actually sick -at 
least not in the same way mental patients in asylums were sick. This 
practice made psychiatric treatment much more transparent and much less 
controversial than it might have been and protected it from accusations of 
174 F. A. E. Crew, (1953) The Ariny Medical Service, Administration, vol. 1, HMSO p. 42 
& 82-85. 
175 A. D. Young, (1968) 'Introduction', Conindssioned Officers in the Medical Services 
of the British Arnzy 1660-1960, (ed. Robert Drew), London: The Wellcome Historical 
Medical Library, p. xiv. 
176 F. A. E. Crew, (1953) p. 149 & p. 152. 
71 
charlatanism. It may have reduced the perceived need for more 
psychiatrists, however it paid off in allowing relations between 
psychiatrists and other medical and combatant personnel to run smoothly. 
With regard to the principle of prevention psychiatrists were 
successful in instituting a number of controversial reforms although not as 
many as they would have liked. It will be shown that the psychiatrists' 
successes and failures in increasing their power within the military machine 
depended largely on the extent to which they succeeded in persuading 
others that psychiatry could be used preventively. The crux point of this 
campaign was persuading the army that psychiatrists could foretell who 
was going to become a psychiatric casualty and who would remain sane -a 
central argument in persuading the Army to use psychological methods in 
selection. 
Morale 
The large-scale employment of psychiatrists during the Second 
World War was partly due to the commanders' experience of shellshock in 
the First World War. In particular, concern over the troops' morale was a 
building block for the employment of psychiatrists. Concern for the troops' 
morale was associated with casualty consciousness, as a major cause for 
low morale amongst troops was the belief that senior officers needlessly 
sacrificed their lives. Casualty consciousness was deeply embedded in the 
thinking of senior British officers during the inter-war period. In 1927, the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff G. F. Milne wrote in one instance that 
'in the war of the future we cannot depend on the man-power that we had in 
the last great war, nor will any nation stand the losses we went through 
177 J. R. Rees, (1958) 'Foreword' in R. A. Ahrenfeldt, (1958). 
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again for another 100 years. ' 178 Furthennore, the Field Service Regulations 
(1929) explained that: 
Troops engaged in close fighting under conditions of modem war 
are soon affected by physical and moral exhaustion; recovery from 
the former is endured by a few hours sleep and suitable food; but 
recovery from the latter is a longer process. ... 
it is important that 
their moral qualities should not be reduced to a point at which 
comparatively speedy recovery is impossible. The individual 
soldier should, therefore, not be engaged to the point of 
exhaustion. 179 
This advice is very similar to that which psychiatrists gave towards 
the end of the First World War and during the Second World War. The 
restorative treatments employed by psychiatrists near the field aimed to 
catch soldiers at the very onset of a breakdown before their symptoms 
became established and harder to shift. The employment of psychiatrists 
was therefore a preventive measure against soldiers being exhausted 
beyond the point of recovery. 
The military solution to maintaining the men's morale was similar to 
that for the other problems that the anny faced; scientific experts with new 
technologies were brought in. As the doctrine of the British Army 
developed in support of having a small but well equipped force, low on 
personnel and high in technology, this included psychiatric techniques. 
However, in the same way that, doctrine aside, the British Army faced the 
onset of war technologically unprepared, 180 the employment of 
psychiatrists was also slow, not reaching full strength until 1943. 
178 Report of the Staff Conference held at the Staff College Cambel-ley, 17-20 Jan. 1927, 
TNA, WO 279/57. Cited in D. French (2000) Raising Churchill's Army the British 
army and the War against Germany 1919-1945, Oxford: OUP p. 14. 
179 General Staff, (1929) Field Set-vice Regulations, iL Operations, London, p. 101. 
Cited in D. French, (2000) p. 24. 
180 D. French, (2000). 
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The Army Medical Department 
In charge of the medical services was the Director- General, Army 
Medical Services, (DGAMS). Under him, several Directors ran individual 
services. Above him was the AdJ utant- General, the top administrative post 
in the Army in whose department fell all issues regarding army personnel. 
This included, apart from the medical services, education of the troops, 
recruitment and selection. 181 The Adjutant-General was the second most 
senior military member of the Army Council, the top military body. The 
other members of the Council were: the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, the Quarter-Master General to the Forces, the Vice Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, the Secretary of State for War, two Parliamentary 
Under- Secretaries of State for War, the Financial Secretary of the War 
Office, the Director-General of Anny Requirements and the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for War. Many decisions were made by the 
Executive Committee of the Army Council (ECAC), which consisted of the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, the Adjutant-General, the Quarter- 
Master General, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the 
Director-General of Army Requirements. 
During the 1914-18 War, there were four Directors operating 
directorates under DGAMS, but none of them was responsible for a 
specific medical specialty. In the aftermath of the war, the Director- General 
created two new (sub) directorates, one for pathology and one for hygiene. 
According to the official history of the medical services, there were two 
related lines of reasoning behind these changes: the first was the growth of 
specialisation; the second was a new emphasis on the prevention of disease. 
Pathology and hygiene were seen to be the branches of medicine most 
likely to prevent wastage from disease thereby justifying the use of greater 
administrative powers than other branches of medicine. 
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Diagram 1: The Adjutant-General's Department. Partially adopted from F. A. E. Crew 
(1953)'Fig. 2. Organisation of A. M. D. December 1942', p. 42. 
18 'In the editorial of The 4riny Quartei-ly it is stated that "The provision, administration 
and care of the human element are the pivotal activities of the Adjutant-General's staff' 
Vol XLVI. No. 2 August, 1943 p. 217. 
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The creation of these two specialist directorates paved the way for. 
other such medical directorates. Although in 1932, the Directorate of 
Pathology was abolished, in the period from 1936 to 1942 seven new 
directorates were formed, including a new Directorate of Pathology 
(A. M. D. 7) bringing the total to twelve. Only five of these directorates, 
hygiene, pathology, dentistry, psychiatry, biological research had their own 
director and of these only the first four could be described as specialist 
medical subjects. 182 This shows that at the highest level within the medical 
services, it was recognised that psychiatrists had a role to play in the Army 
that involved both the prevention of and the specialised treatment of 
psychiatric casualties. 
The Directorate was responsible for the development, control and co- 
ordination of the psychiatric services of the Army at home and overseas, 
and acted in an advisory capacity within the War Office. It had three 
branches with the following functions: 
"A. M. D. II (A) Psychiatric aspects of morale, discipline, 
training and equipment. . A. M. D. II (B) Selection, training and allocation of Army 
psychiatrists. Psychiatric aspects of recruiting, selection, 
grading, allocation and transfer of officers and other ranks. 
Psychiatric liaison with the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service. 
A. M. D. 11(C) Clinical policy and research. Psychiatric 
clinics and hospitals. Psychiatric liaison with the Ministry 
of Pensions, Ministry of Health and Board of Control. 
Psychiatric aspects of discharge and medical boards. 083 
The responsibilities of the Directorate and of its psychiatrists 
included much more therefore than just the clinical responsibilities, which 
182 The directorate for the nursing services was directed by the Matron-in-Chief, a 
osition similar to a Director. 
83 From 'The Army Psychiatric Service', The Ariny Medical Services, Adininisli-ation, 
vol. 11, (1955) (ed) F. A. E Crew, HMSO p. 469. The substance of this account was 
provided to Crew by the Directorate of Army Psychiatry. 
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were covered by AMD II (C). AMD II (B) outlines the Directorate's role 
in personnel in which it cooperated strongly with the Directorate for the 
Selection of Personnel. AMD II (A) however makes it explicit that the 
psychiatrists' remit was more extensive; consequently, psychiatrists 
produced multiple reports on morale, discipline, training and equipment. 184 
It is unclear whether the psychiatrists' recommendations were ever 
implemented; it is entirely conceivable that once submitted to AMD11 
many of these reports were filled without ever having been read by anyone 
outside th e Directorate. One exception is training, where psychiatrists had a 
significant input in what should be taught in battle schools and also 
produced various leaflets for the training medical officers to handle 
psychiatric disorders. 
185 Yet, merely the fact that psychiatrists were 
commissioned to explore such fields is significant because it demonstrates 
that they were perceived by DGAMS and by some of the War Office to be 
more than just clinicians; psychiatrists were experts on all aspects of human 
behaviour. 
In many respects, however, the status of the Directorate of Army 
Psychiatry was not equivalent to the Directorates of Hygiene, Pathology 
and Dentistry. In the War Office the differences were not so stark: the most 
significant point was that the Director of Army Psychiatry appointed by 
DGAMS was not a psychiatrist but a regular RAMC officer with a diploma 
specialising in Hygiene. The D. of A. P. as he was known, H. A. Sandiford, 
had an interest in psychiatry and had delivered educational lectures on the 
subject to RAMC officers, but had no formal qualifications on the 
184 For example, T. F. Main, (1943); S. A. MacKeith, (1944); Anon, (1944) 'Eighth 
Army Morale Report' GC135 BI (4 of 4); E. D. Wittkower & J. Cowan, (1945). See 
also R. Ahrenfeldt (1958) pp. 196-225. 
185 R. Ahrenfeldt, (1958), pp. 196-225; Anon, (1944), 'Psychiatric Technical 
Memorandum No. 1. "Field Psychiatry for Medical Officers" 21 Army Group. ' CMAC, 
GC 135 B2 (I of 4). 
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subject. 186 The other three directorates were of course directed by men who 
were specialists in the respective areas. However, as will be shown later 
this was a situation which did not necessarily hann the interests of 
psychiatrists, and may in fact have aided them by recognising, an essential 
link between psychiatry and hygiene in the form of 'mental hygiene. 
Furthermore, although the Directorate of Army Psychiatry had a 
smaller staff in the War Office than the Directorate of Hygiene it was 
similar to and in some ways larger than the other two specialist 
Directorates. Besides the Director, there were two Assistant Directors of 
Army Psychiatry (ADAPs) and two Deputy Assistant Directors of Army 
Psychiatry (DADAPs). In conjunction with this staff, also worked the 
Consulting Psychiatrist to the British Army, J. R. Rees, and by 1944 also a 
Consulting Psychologist and a Consulting Psychiatrist to the Army at home 
who although working in the war office were officially attached to the 
Royal Anny College. However, the position of the consultants was 
different to that of the director and his assistants. While the director and the 
assistants were staff officers with administrative duties., the consultants 
were mere advisors; they enjoyed military rank equivalent to the Director 
(Brigadier) but had no administrative duties. For the most part the duties of 
the consultants appear to be inspecting military psychiatric establishments 
in Britain and overseas, reporting on their situation and recommending to 
the Director of Army Psychiatry and the Director- General of Army 
Medical Services possible improvements. 
However, the more significant differences between the Directorate of 
Army Psychiatry and the other specialist Directorates were in the medical 
administrations in the various commands at home and abroad. The 
differences in personnel numbers are very complicated. It is very difficult 
to find exact figures, but we know that by the end of the war, over 300 
186 H. A. Sandiford, (1939) 'War Neuroses', Journal of the Royal Anny Medical CoiPs, 
71, pp. 222-235. This lecture was delivered to officers of the RAMC, Aldershot 
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Army psychiatrists, 187 in contrast to 2,100 dentists, were employed. 188 
However, the differences between the numbers of psychiatrists and 
specialists in hygiene and pathology were definitely not as stark as even by 
the end of the war there were only approximately 3000 specialists 
employed by the Army. 189 In addition, psychiatric service patients, in the 
early years of the war, were mainly treated by civilian psychiatrists 
working for emergency medical hospitals in the U. K. who were not 
included in these figures. In comparison to other specialities, psychiatrists 
certainly did very well, for example in 1941 there were only 73 
ophthalmology specialists in the Army-190 
Secondly, in the various commands, specialists in hygiene, pathology 
and dentistry were led by specialists who were assistant directors and 
deputy assistant directors i. e. staff offlicers who were part of the managerial 
structure of the command and not mere 'experts' to be called upon when 
their advice was needed. In contrast, psychiatric services in commands 
were headed by consultants with limited decision-making powers. In this 
situation, army psychiatrists were on a par with consultants from other 
specialties such as ophthalmology, who had not formed their own 
directorate. The situation had arisen originally because consultants had 
been appointed prior to the formation of the directorate of Army 
Psychiatry. Once the Directorate was formed, the consultants, the director 
of army psychiatry, DGAMS and the Adjutant-General all pressed for 
consultant psychiatrists to become staff officers, but the proposals were 
repeatedly turned down by the Executive Committee of the Army Council, 
Command. 
187 J. R. Rees, (1958) 'Foreward' in R. H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Arnzy in 
the Second TVorld War. 
188 Anon, (1948) 'Appreciation for Alexander Hood', Journal of the Royal Army 
Medical Coips, 90, p. 223. 
189 F. A. E. Crew, (1953) p. 152. 
190 F. A. E Crew, (1955) p. 516. This figure may have increased by the end of the war 
but there is no such record. 
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and the Secretary of State on the basis that psychiatry formed part of. 
curative rather than preventive medicine. ' 91 
In the various commands, consultants in psychiatry were based in 
command headquarters and had a role similar to that of the consultant to 
the Army, but on a smaller scale. They visited general hospitals, supervised 
the work of the medical officers with regard to psychiatric cases, lectured 
and conducted some out-patient work. Consultants then reported back to 
the staff officer in charge of the medical services at headquarters (the 
Deputy Director DDMS or the Assistant Director of the Medical Services 
ADMS) with any recommendations that would reduce psychiatric 
casualties and improve the 'return to unit' figures. 
Gradually more psychiatric hospitals were put in place, and the 
psychiatric staff increased to include area psychiatrists, corps psychiatrists, 
and even divisional psychiatrists. 192 In most commands, consultants 
organised a three-tier system for the treatment of psychiatric casualties. The 
corps or divisional psychiatrist operated an 'exhaustion centre' near the 
front line where patients could be treated with restorative measures. Those 
who were thought not likely to be ready to return within a few days were 
sent further back to another psychiatric centre where more elaborate 
treatment could be administered. Those still unable to return to duties were 
sent to the base hospital, and finally, those deemed incurable and 
impossible to use in non-combative tasks were evacuated (either to the UK, 
South Africa or India, depending on the command) for discharge. 
The corps (or divisional) psychiatrist's duties as laid down by the 
War Office in February 1944 can be classified into four categories: 
treatment, selection, discipline and the promotion of mental health. With 
regard to treatment, corps psychiatrists were expected to treat early cases 
and supervise the treatment of psychiatric cases during action. With regard 
191 'Psychiatric Services in Operational Theatres', TNA, W032/11550 . 
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to selection, they had to pick out soldiers who were unfit for duty and, 
attend medical boards where they advised on the medical reclassification 
and posting of these men. In addition, corps psychiatrist had to write 
reports on disciplinary cases, advise "on all matters pertaining to mental 
health", on "the psychiatric aspects of discipline, morale and training", and 
"assist in the promotion of mental health and in preventive psychiatry"... 
"by lectures and informal discussions with officers (staff, regimental and 
medical)". 193 
The tasks of the area psychiatrists were similar to that described 
above: they provided an out-patient service for every area where there were 
troops or military hospitals; they visited units to discuss with R. M. 0s., the 
military value of men who had been referred to them, advised medical and 
administrative officers on a variety of problems arising in units and assisted 
in the selýction procedure. 194 
Consultants in psychiatry had, by the end of the war, a staff of 15-25 
psychiatrists under them. 195 However, because psychiatrists remained mere 
advisers to the DDMS or ADMS, the extent of the psychiatrists' powers 
depended largely on the relationship they forged. In some commands, 
relations between Staff officers and consultants were good and psychiatrists 
felt able to accomplish all they wanted. In other commands, a more 
attritional relationship existed and the psychiatrists' efforts were thwarted, 
particularly when they diverted from clinical practice on to issues regarding 
morale and man management. The psychiatrist P. J. R. Davis made this point 
when he wrote that: 
192 A corps psychiatrist was included in the war establishment of the headquarters of a 
corps in 1943. Divisional psychiatrists were only used in Burma. 
193 From F. A. E Crew, (ed) 'The Army Psychiatric Service', The Army Medical 
Services, Adininistration, vol. 11, (1955) HMSO p. 490. 194 Ibid, p. 468. 
195 Except from Gibraltar, Palestine and West Africa which had a total of 4 
psychiatrists. Commands in Britain also had fewer staff, averaging at about 10 
psychiatrists per command. 
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[The] very high degree of assistance and encouragement which I 
received ... from the Divisional Commanders and ADMS under 
whom I served. ... enabled me to 
function efficiently and to 
improvise 
... In circumstances where this full co-operation is not forthcoming, the position of the Divisional Psychiatrist could be 
extremely difficult, and it is for this reason that I consider that there 
is a strong argument that he should be posted to a Division with the 
status of a Staff Officer, recognised on the establishment of a 
Divisional Headquarters, and officially provided with the medical 
equipment, transport, and staff which he requires if he is to do full 
justice to his job. 196 
The Directorate for the Selection of Personnel 
Although, as it has been shown, psychiatrists had in many ways 
fewer powers than the specialists of other directorates, the situation was 
different in the field of personnel selection. Under the Director for the 
Selection of Personnel Brigadier K. G. MacLean (a professional soldier, 
also in the Adjutant-General's department, independent from the medical 
services), psychologists and psychiatrists worked with the Directorate of 
Army Psychiatry and influenced recruitment. Although psychiatrists did 
not examine every recruit, they produced in conjunction with 
psychologists, intelligence and aptitude tests that from 1942 were given to 
all recruits. Psychiatrists personally interviewed recruits who did badly in 
these tests, approximately 10% of the intake. Furthermore, psychiatrists 
and psychologists became members of the War Office Selection Boards, 
which tested the candidates' suitability for commissions along the line 
psychiatrists and psychologists had suggested. This last privilege however 
196 P. J. R. Davis, (1946) 'Divisional Psychiatry. Report to the War Office', Journal of 
the Royal Army Medical Corps, p. 274. For an example of an attritional relationship 
between psychiatrists and medical officers see the relationship between the psychiatrists 
Wishart and Kenton and the DDMS in Algiers. CMAC GC135 BI (4 of 4). General 
Cantlie however eventually began to approve of psychiatrists, to the extent that he 
spoke in the conference they held in Calcutta 1944 TNA, W032/11550. Another 
famously conflicting situation arose between the psychiatrists W. Bion and J. Rickman 
and the inspecting officers in Northfield Hospital, which cost Bion and Rickman their 
jobs. Ultimately however, the Northfield experiments were continued new personnel. 
This will be discussed further in chapter six. 
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was revoked before the end of the war. The details of the psychiatrists' role 
in selection and recruitment will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
However, when it came to discharging a particular soldier due to a 
medical problem, psychiatrists like other specialties were only able to make 
a recommendation. It was the Officer Commanding a hospital or a medical 
unit who could call a medical board, and only if the medical board agreed, 
could a soldier be discharged. '9' 
Psychiatrists and the Tavistock Clinic 
A number of influential psychiatrists employed by the Army had 
worked previously in the Tavistock Clinic, while many others started 
working there after the war. Some of the more influential were JR. Rees, 
Consultant Psychiatrist to the Army, Ronald Hargreaves, psychiatrist to the 
Northern Command, Assistant Director of Army Psychiatry (ADAP) and 
primary instigator of psychiatric selection, Eric Wittkower, involved in the 
design of the procedures for officer selection, T. F. Rodger also ADAP and 
psychiatrist to Scottish Command. Indeed five out of six of the command 
specialists in the UK, were Tavistock psychiatrists. 198 By contrast, the 
psychiatrists of the very prestigious Maudsley Hospital did not enlist, but 
treated military casualties as they arrived in Britain within the emergency 
medical services framework. 
According to the obituary notice of Hugh Crichton-Miller, founder 
of the Tavistock Clinic, it was he who encouraged his staff to enlist at the 
onset of the war. In the case of the position of Consultant to the Army at 
home (this soon became C onsultant to the Army as a whole), 199 the 
Director of the Tavistock, J. R. Rees was nominated for the position by the 
Royal College of Physicians. Considering that the Tavistock Clinic's 
197 Prior to January 1941 an officer commanding a medical unit would have to go 
through the ADMS twice, both before and after conducting a medical board, in order to 
gt a man discharged. FAE Crew (1953) pp. 439-440. 98 Anon, (1959) 'Obituary', The Lancet, i, p. 104. 
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psychotherapeutic approach was quasi-Freudian, controversial, and at odds 
with both the asylum psychiatrists and the Maudsley Hospital, J. R. Rees 
might be seen as an unusual candidate for what was in 1939 the most 
prestigious psychiatric job in the Army. What was probably of significance 
for this appointment however was firstly that J. R. Rees had spent some 
years working for the Ministry of Pensions as the Neurological Specialist 
and secondly that the Tavistock Clinic had a military tradition of sorts, 
based on the fact that a number of Tavistock psychiatrists had experience 
of treating shell-shock patients during the Great War. For example, Hugh 
Crichton-Miller founded the clinic partly because he had felt that the 
treatment of shell-shocked soldiers with a Freudian inspired psychotherapy 
had been very successful . 
200 The initial staff of the Tavistock also included 
J. A. Hadfield, also a shell-shock psychiatrist, while other psychiatrists who 
made their name through their treatment of shell-shock such as Millais 
Culpin, Bernard Hart and William McDougal were at various times 
members of the Medical Advisory Board and regularly lectured in the 
CliniC201. The link between the Tavistock and the Armed Forces is also 
demonstrated by the appointments Of Field Marshal Haig and Admiral 
Beaty as honorary presidents of the Tavistock Clinic when it opened in 
1920.202 In 1939, the Tavistock organised a series of lectures published as 
The Neuroses in War 203 in which various psychiatrists with war-related 
experience contributed, although Rees's appointment probably preceded 
this. 
199 R. Ahrenfeldt, (1958) p. 16. 
200 H. V. Dicks, (1970) Fifty Years of the Tavistock Clillic, London: Routledge & 
Keegan Paul, pp. 12-13. 
201 Ibid, p. 23. 
202 M, Stone, (1985) 'Shellshock and the psychologists', The Anatoiny of Madness, 11 
(eds) W. F. Bynum, R. Porter & M. Shepherd, London: Tavistock Publications. 
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Psychiatry and Preventive Medicine 
During the Second World War, the relationship between the medical 
services and the military was centred on medicine's ability to conserve 
manpower. 204 Instead of focusing exclusively on treating the wounded, the 
medical services tried to prevent casualties from disease through 
205 improvements in sanitation, vaccinations and other preventive measures. 
In many contemporary texts, it is explicitly stated that prevention of disease 
is a greater priority than the care for the wounded. For example, the 1941 
War Office Manual for medical officers focused on the importance of 
'preserving health, ' arguing that a medical officer's 'main duty' was 'to 
conserve man-power, to maintain the unit at its highest state of physical 
and mental efficiency' adding that 'your professional duties though 
important are only subsidiary to the major responsibility of preserving the 
health of the soldier. 206 In a similar tone, the editorial of the Journalfor 
the Royal Arnzy Medical Corps stated that civilian doctors joining the 
RAMC had to adjust their outlook and learn that the prevention of disease 
was a greater priority than the cure of disease: 
Paragraph 7 of Regulations for the Medical Services of the Army 
lays down in order of priority first, the prevention of disease and, 
secondly, the care and treatment of the sick and wounded. This is a 
completely new aspect of medical practice to most medical men. 
203 E. Miller, (1939) The Neuroses of War, London: Tavistock Press. 
204 See M. Harrison, (1996) 'Medicine and the management of modem warfare', History 
ofScience, 34, pp. 379-410; M. Harrison, (2004) Medicine and Victory, British Military 
Medicine in the Second Morld Mar, Oxford: Oxford University Press; D. French, 
(2000). 
205 Claire Herrick has also described how the medical profession placed the blame for 
the vast casualties from what were seen as preventable diseases during the Boer war, 
with the military administration that refused to place sufficient significance on medical 
advice and reform. During the Russo-Japanese war, the medical profession sought to 
gain support for its reforms by rhetorically equating the Japanese military success with a 
victory against disease and the Russian defeat with the absence of medical reform C. 
Herrick, (1999) 'The Conquest of the Silent Foe: British and American Military 
Medical Reform rhetoric and the Russo-Japanese War', Medicine and Modern [Yarfare, 
55, (eds. R. Cooter, M. Harrison & S. Sturdy), Amsterdam: Clio Medica, pp. 99-130. 
206 The War Office, (1941) 'Self -Training for Medical Officers', CMAC, RAMC 
762/4. 
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Rightly or wrongly most emphasis is laid, both in hospital training 
and in practice, on the treatment of sick people. ... 
But here is the 
primary duty that is laid upon us -the prevention of disease- which 
is only another way of saying economy in man-power in all its 
aspects. 207 
Similar priorities were also set out in an address delivered to the 
Royal Medical Society by Major-General Philip H. Mitchiner, who argued: 
The aim of the existence of the medical profession is primarily to 
benefit the human race and in this respect preventive medicine is 
far more valuable to our patients than the attempts to patch up and 
alleviate their established diseases, though such is the established 
civil practice; in the Services, on the other hand, prophylaxis has 
long held pride of place wherein Service medicine has been greatly 
in advance of civilian. In preventive medicine the war had 
undoubtedly provided an enormous advance. 208 
One of the largest and more powerful medical directorates was that 
of Hygiene. Pervasive of all attempts by psychiatrists and their supporters 
to win greater powers therefore was the comparison between the field of 
psychiatry and that of hygiene. Aided by the fact that the Director of 
Psychiatry himself, was a specialist in hygiene, psychiatrists used the 
preventive/hygiene aspects of psychiatry rhetorically to argue either that 
they must be given similar powers as hygiene specialists or that psychiatry 
needed to be taken a lot more seriously. 
For example, the consultant psychiatrist G. W. B. James compared the 
resistance shown in previous years by army officers to hygienic measures, 
to the resistance he thought they showed currently to psychiatric measures: 
207 Anon, (1944) Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 82, pp. 130-13 1. However, 
the Regulations do not actually state that that the ordering of the duties of the medical 
services is "in order of priority first". Nonetheless, this passage is indicative of the 
perception in the RAMC that prevention of disease is 'the primary duty. ' Anon (1938), 
Regulationsfor the Medical Services of the Army, London: HMSO, p. 2, para. 7. 
208 P. H. Mitchiner, (1946) 'The Aftermath of war in medicine, ' Journal of the Royal 
Army Medical Coips, 87, p. 241. In the same article Mitchiner stated that: 'Psychiatry 
has become firmly established and is undoubtedly of very great use' p. 243. 
86 
... effort will be required to establish mental hygiene as an important feature of the medical officer's training as had to be made 
to demonstrate the value of hygiene. "What does the soldier want 
with soap? " asked a senior officer not so many years ago. One can 
perhaps be permitted to hear his counterpart asking the question 
"What does the soldier want with this 'trick-cycling"P209 
The psychiatrist H. B. Craigie even went as far at to state that 'mental 
hygiene 
... proved 
during the war in many respects more important than 
physical hygiene. ' 210 
Broadly speaking there were three ways in which psychiatry could 
be used preventively: by teaching junior officers 'man-management', by 
picking out men who were on the brink of breakdown and treating them 
with restorative measures and by preventing unsuitable men from 
performing key jobs. With regard to man-management, a memorandum on 
Army Psychiatry stated that it is the duty of Army Psychiatrists to prevent 
psychiatric disabilities by training medical officers on how to maintain 
morale and discipline, discussing with regimental and staff officers the 
psychiatric aspects of morale and its implications for the control and 
administration of units; and by making suggestion to training officers on 
the various aspects of the "mental training of the soldier". 211 Psychiatrists 
therefore were asked to advise other officers, sometimes their superiors, on 
how best to conduct this work. 
The psychiatrists' work in selection and treatment will be discussed 
at length in chapters 3-6. Suffice to say, this work took up most of the 
psychiatrists' time, and involved a high degree of cooperation with army 
and medical officers. 
209 'Trick-cycling' was the semi-affectionate, semi-derogatory popular name for 
psychiatry. G. W. B. James, (1945) 'The Future of Psychiatry in the Army Medical 
Service' Journal of the Royal Army Medical Coips, 84, p. 53. 
2 10 H. B. Craigie, (1945) 'Forward Psychiatry in the Army', Proceedings of the Royal 
Society ofMedicine, p-140. 
211 TNA, W032/11972 
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The identification of psychiatry with hygiene was also a successful 
strategy for diffusing psychiatric methods to non-psychiatrists. For 
example, many non-psychiatrists were convinced that 'man-management, ' 
was an inherent part of hygiene. Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Mansell of the 
RAMC argued in a lecture that there was no distinction: 
Some people will tell you that this is not hygiene, which I am 
supposed to be teaching you, but some other and quite different 
thing, not my job at all. I would then remind them that 
"Hygiene is the study of man rather than matters. The study of the 
development of the soldier is more important than the study of the 
disposal of his faeces. " 212 
Mansell later added: 
Can't you take our hygiene of the field and the barrack room, which 
we have been trying to teach you, or even into the higher spheres of 
civil life, and realise that our "chain of infection" -"source-route- 
destination"- can be applied equally to the social, mental and, if 
you like the word, psychological difficulties of our fellowmen? 213 
In addition, the editorial of the Jow-nal of the RAMC argued after the war: 
One great advance that had been made is in the application of 
psychiatry to military problems. It has long been felt that there 
should be a very close connexion between hygiene and psychiatry 
and this happy state of affairs seems likely to be realized. While the 
psychiatrist must never forget that he is a physician who treats the 
mentally ill he has also a very valuable, indeed essential role as a 
mental hygienist. 214 
However, in the instances where those in authority sought to limit 
the psychiatrists' power and involvement with non-clinical issues, the 
212 R. A. Mansell, (1942) 'Man-management' Jow-nal ofthe Royal Army Medical Colps, 
79, p. 75. Mansell reported that he was quoting J. A. Anderson, (1924) but gives no 
other reference. 
213 lbid, p. 76. 
214 Anon, (1948) 'Editorial Forward', Jow-nal of the Royal Ariny Medical CoiPs, 90, p. 
228. 
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argument was used that psychiatry was part of curative rather than, 
preventive medicine and psychiatrists could not predict future conduct. 
Therefore., while Adam told the ECAC that psychiatrists should become 
staff officers arguing that: 
There is, ... a 
limit to what can be achieved by improved facilities 
for treatment. Preventive measures are essential, and these must 
proceed through administrative channels, with close collaboration 
between general, administrative and medical staff officers. The 
same considerations led to the appointment of hygiene specialists 
as staff officers and to the establishment of a Directorate of 
Hygiene. The status of the officers concerned has a practical 
bearing on the results achieved and it is significant that the high 
standards of physical health maintained during this war has 
followed upon the establishment of hygiene staff officers and the 
establishment of a directorate of Hygiene. Higher standards of 
mental health may be expected to result from a reorganisation of 
psychiatric staffs on similar lines. In operational theatres, 
psychiatrists should be staff officers instead of professional 
advisers. The senior psychiatrists should be deputy and assistant 
directors. 215 
The ECAC's reaction was unfavourable: 
In discussion, it was questioned whether the position of the 
psychiatrist in Army Medicine was a true parallel with that of 
hygiene and whether it was not, perhaps, a retrograde step to 
separate the organisation of psychiatric treatment from the general 
medical organisation ... From this standpoint, it was suggested that hygiene was an aspect of preventive medicine, while psychiatry 
was more a part of curative medicine 216 
... as concerned further wars, it was hoped that the selective 
machinery of the Ministry of Labour would prevent personnel 
prone to psychiatric breakdown being allocated to the Army. 
215 Psychiatric Treatment In Operational Theatres: Status Of Psychiatrists 
(Memorandum By A. G. For Consideration By The Executive Committee Of The Army 
Council At Their 220th Meeting To Be Held On Friday, 29th June, 1945. ) TNA, 
W032/11550. 
216 Underlined in crayon and in margin the word'both! 'is noted. 
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AG said that in view of the importance of the issue at stake, he 
must adhere to the proposals .... and the COMMITTEE invited the Chairman ... to submit for the Secretary of State's decision ... 
217 
The Secretary of State agreed with the ECAC and the AG's suggestion 
was rejected. 
Opposition and Patronage 
From the above discussion, it should be clear that psychiatry was a 
valued specialty in the Army. Psychiatrists may never have attained status 
similar to that of the hygienists, but in comparison to other specialties such 
as ophthalmology or dermatology, which also had wide application in the 
Armed Forces, psychiatry did well. Psychiatrists convinced the Army to 
employ them in considerable numbers, to give them administrative control 
over their staff and patients, and to follow their recommendations regarding 
treatment and personnel selection. On the whole, psychiatrists carried out 
all their own inspections of treatment facilities -and even though their 
reports were addressed to the local Directors of Medical Services, 
psychiatrists essentially monitored themselves. Furthermore, the 
Directorate of Army Psychiatry and the Directorate for the Selection of 
Personnel were developed (albeit under non-psychiatric Directors) and 
established the significance of psychiatry in treatment, selection, morale, 
discipline and the preservation of mental health. The psychiatrists' 
recommendations regarding the discharge of personnel were usually 
followed as can be seen from the fact that psychiatric disability was the 
most significant cause of medical discharge. Finally, psychiatrists 
succeeded in making psychological testing compulsory for all recruits, 
designed the procedures of the War Office Selection Boards (WOSBs) that 
selected candidates for commission and became permanent members of the 
Boards. 
217 32A 'Extract from the minutes of the 220th meeting of the Executive Committee of 
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Psychiatrists also failed in some of their goals. For example, 
psychiatrists would have preferred to have psychiatrists directing the two 
Directorates and they would have liked to have obtained Staff status in 
greater numbers. They also wanted the Army to hire many more 
psychiatrists, at least one for every division, corps, and command, as well 
as one for every WOSB. Finally, towards the end of the war, psychiatrists 
were stopped from interviewing all candidates at WOSBs and after the war, 
they were removed from the Boards as permanent members. 
The successes psychiatrists had must be seen within the context of an 
army that on the whole embraced modernity and saw science and 
technology as the means through which future victories could be ensured. 
The Arrny respected and admired specialists, promoted bureaucracy, and 
most significantly, was willing to divert fairly central power to experts. 
Although the efforts of the British Army were hampered in the first years 
of the war through relatively deficient weapons etc, this was due to 
inadequate funding and the expectation in the inter-war period that Britain 
would not have to fight a first class enemy 21 8. At the level of doctrine 
however., the army favoured a small but highly equipped force. David 
French has recently argued that: 
Far from seeing the army as some king of refuge from the modem 
world, the General Staff regarded war against a first-class power as 
an industrial undertaking. They ... therefore ... tried to guide the development of the army along the same path towards a more 
capital-intensive future as did the managers of British industry. In 
the same way that managers of industry believed that capital- 
intensive technologies would increase the productivity of each 
worker, so senior officers believed that technology would increase 
the productivity of each soldier by enabling fewer soldiers to kill 
more of the enemy and at less cost to their own side. 219 
the Army Council held on Friday, 29th June, 1945. ' TNA W032/11550. 
218 D. French, (2000). 
219 Ibid, p. 276. 
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Relations between psychiatrists and the armed forces can be viewed, 
in the same context. For example, psychiatrists attempted to infiltrate and 
evaluate procedures in recruitment and promotion that had up until then 
been outside the scope of doctors and scientists. Although in their own 
histories psychiatrists maintained that they were opposed by the military, 
the fact remains that they were largely successful in their overhaul. The 
psychiatrists' success was dependent on convincing a number of people in 
-authority 
that their approach was the rational, scientific and democratic 
one, and that the opposition was backward-looking traditional and 
blimpish. The opponents of psychiatry (many of whom were doctors) 
dismissed psychiatrists as charlatans and as unscientiji'c. 
For all its success, psychiatry did face some vociferous opponents 
among politicians, medical officers and combatant officers. In the book In 
My Fashion, written immediately before his death, the eminent physician to 
Winston Churchill., H. M. Moran, included a contemptuous account of the 
psychiatric contribution to the Armed Forces. Within this account, Moran 
argued that psychiatric interference had resulted in manpower wastage, but 
that the medical service had been unable to control them: 
The heads of our medical service, while often resenting the waste 
of men at a time when our manpower had become a burning 
question, were not prepared to stand up against the solid phalanx of 
psychiatrists, who were known to be backed by a very powerful 
non-medical authority. 220 
This very powerful authority was none other than the Adjutant- 
General, Ronald Adam. He was not alone, however, in protecting the 
psychiatrists. J. R. Rees, Consultant Psychiatrist to the British Army, 
thanked two more non-psychiatrists in his book: Li eutenant- General Sir 
Alexander Hood (DGAMS), and Brigadier Hugh Sandiford, Director of 
220 H. M. Moran, (1946) In My Fashion, London: Peter Davies, p. 142. 
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Army Psychiatry. "' To this list, Brigadier FH Vinden, Assistant Adjutant-, 
General to the War Office should be added. The most important and 
powerful of these men, the Adjutant-General, Ronald Adam (in conjunction 
with his staff) instigated psychiatric involvement in recruitment, attempted 
to establish a pro-psychiatric 'independent' committee to assess the work 
of the Psychiatrists when such a committee was demanded and tried to give 
psychiatric consultants and advisers the role of staff officers. Alexander 
Hood established the Directorate of Army Psychiatry. Hugh Sandiford 
defended his Directorate against all charges of manpower wastage and 
charlatanism and also attempted to secure staff status for the leading 
psychiatrists. 
Ronald Adam was undoubtedly a moderniser. He supported greater 
education of the troops and introduced compulsory group discussions of 
current affairs. In his memoirs, he wrote condemning the state of education 
and argued for its improvement. He supported the social sciences writing 
that: 
If we devoted even a quarter of the resources that are devoted to 
research into the natural sciences in carrying out research into the 
social sciences, we could make Great Britain into a much happier 
place for our young people and save much delinquency. 
With regard to Army education, Adam recommended the education 
of officers in civilian universities in order to broaden their horizons: 
I would, ... have liked to see all officers trained at the universities 
taking appropriate degree courses. It is most important that the 
future leaders of the Army should complete their education with 
civil servants, scientists, etc. with whom they will work in time of 
war and that they should broaden their minds which are bound to 
be narrowed in a military institution. 222 
221 J. R. Rees, (1944), The Shaping ofPsychiaig by Mar, p. 11. 
222 R. Adam, (1960) 'Various Administrative Aspects of the Second World War', 
Liddell Hart Centre Adam papers, 3/13, p. 3. 
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Finally, Adam and his staff defended psychiatrists, particularly the 
'introduction of scientific methods of selection' and stereotyped their 
oPponents as ignorant: 223 
It was difficult to persuade the Army that psychiatry and 
psychology were not new inventions made by some medical 
officers and being tried out on the unfortunate Army thus enabling 
a number of men to escape their duties in the fighting line. 
There was also considerable criticism of the use of these specialists 
not only from Army officers, but from some politicians and even 
from a few eminent medical men. 
This was due to ignorance, fear of now ideas and ... superstition 
that mental sickness was the work of the devil and should be 
224 ignored 
. 
Until 1943, psychiatrists were increasingly gaining more powers. 
Although they continued to increase in numbers until the end of the war, 
other powers were curbed. The move partly originated with Winston 
Churchill who in this often quoted passage wrote to the Lord Privy Seal in 
December 1942: 
... 
it would be sensible to restrict as much as possible the work of 
these gentlemen, who are capable of doing an immense amount of 
harm with what may very easily degenerate into charlatanry. The 
tightest hand should be kept over them and they should not be 
allowed to quarter themselves upon the Fighting services at the 
public expense. There are, no doubt, easily recognizable cases 
which may benefit from treatment of this kind, but it is very wrong 
to disturb large numbers of healthy, normal men and women by 
asking the kind of odd questions in which the psychiatrists 
specialise. There are quite enough hangers-on and camp followers 
already. 225 
223 F. H. Vinden, (1977)JVar&Societ Vol. 11, (eds)B. Bond& 1. Roy London: Croom Y, 
Helm, p. 122 224 R. Adam, '(1960) p. 5 
225 W. Churchill, (195 1) History of the Second TY67-1d Mar, voL 4 quoted in B. Shephard 
(2000) p. 195. These comments should be seen in the context of Churchill's impatience 
towards all non-combative troops in an army whose proportion of combatants was 
constantly diminishing. When the war started 50% of the Army were in infantry units, 
and this proportion rose to about 60% after Dunkirk. By the middle of the war however, 
infantry units formed only 20% of the Army while 25% of the Army soldiers worked as 
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Similar sentiments were also expressed a few months earlier in the 
War Cabinet. With Adam's interference however, psychiatrists remained 
sheltered. On the 16 th of June 1942 it is minuted that: 
reference was made to the fairly extensive use now being made of 
psychologists and psychiatrists in the Services. The main purpose 
for which they were employed was in order to discover the aptitude 
of recruits in particular occupations. It was represented, however, 
that there might be a tendency to use the psycho-analytical 
technique too extensively; and, moreover, that, if univisely handled 
it nzight encourage the veiy . tendencies it ivas hoped to conibat. 226 
In that meeting it was decided that the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford 
Cripps would investigate the matter. Cripps asked for information and 
Adam provided two memoranda by DGAMS and the Director for the 
Selection of Personnel. Cripps suggested that it was best to appoint an 
'independent medical man who is not connected with any of the services' 
to investigate the matter. 227 Adam had severe objections. He responded: 
I am frightened by this proposal. There are two types of medical 
men and neither of them are independent. The older school dislike 
psychologists and will do anything to stop their use. The younger 
school on the other hand., are mostly psychologists themselves to 
some extent .... We are all sceptics about psychiatry and 
have only 
adopted any particular methods after great trial and experiment. ... 
[handwritten] If we must have a medical man, ... I trust 
it will not 
be the "prosecutor. " 
The 'Prosecutor' referred to was Lord Moran who it was assumed was 
behind Churchill's dislike for psychiatrists. In the event, Cripps 
investigated and wrote the report himself. He exonerated psychologists and 
skilled tradesmen. According to Adam, Churchill 'was always attacking the Army 
because of the large tail compared with the fighting arms which he called teeth'. R. 
Adam (1960), p. 7- 
226 My italics. TNA, W032/11972 'Use of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the 
Services - Enquiry by Lord Privy Seal. ' 
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psychiatrists, concluding 'that there was no substance in the criticisms 
which had been made of the use of psychologists and psychiatrists in the 
Army', 228but also recommending that an expert committee was formed to 
coordinate their work. 
With regard to the Expert committee, Adam intervened again 
repeatedly in order to ensure that its members were people who would be 
likely to agree with the Army psychiatrists. He tried for example to exclude 
the psychiatrist Aubrey Lewis from the Maudsley saying that he 'was the 
great rival to our Consultant in Psychiatry, Colonel Rees'. In this instance, 
it appears Cripps refused to negotiate changes to the committee. 229 
Nonetheless, when the report was published it proved complimentary to the 
work of psychiatrists attributing any inadequacies to the insufficient 
numbers of psychiatrists employed rather than to psychiatric methods. 230 
In 1943 however, the Secretary of State for war, Sir James Grigg 
suggested to the ECAC that the role of the psychiatrists during selection 
needed to be limited: 
... The Secretary of State has received representations from C. -in- C., Home Forces, with regard to the very high proportion of 
rejections of candidates for permanent commissions following their 
examination by psychiatrists; and from cases ... the Secretary of State considered that the somewhat dominating position which 
psychiatric selection had attained in the Army selection machinery 
must be reviewed and limited. While the Secretary of State agreed 
that psychiatric examinations served a useful purpose in diagnosing 
abnormal conditions and suggesting the remedy, he had 
considerable doubt of its usefulness in the appraiseinent of an 
individual's likely cout-se of fittia-e conduct, as a factor in 
determining, for example, the suitability of a candidate for a 
permanent commission in the Army. 
227 TNA, W032/11972 'Use of Psychologists ... .' 6A 24 June 1942. Letter from Cripps 
to James Grigg. On the paper it is handwritten 'AG what about it? Signed James Grigg. 
228 TNA, W032/11972 18A 'Extract from the conclusions of the 103rd (42) Meeting of 
the War Cabinet held on 4th August, 1942. ' 229 TNA, W032/11972 (3 Oth August 1942). 
230 B. Shephard, (2000) p. 195. 
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The Secretary of State therefore desired that DAG (B), acting for 
AG in his absence, should reconsider the question of the part 
played by psychiatry in the personnel selection machinery in the 
Army and should provide for some review in particular for those 
candidates for Regular Commissions who had been rejected. The 
Secretary of State also had it in mind to invite Lord Moran to give 
him the benefit of his advice on this question of psychiatry in the 
Army. 231 
Again it was the psychiatrists ability to predict future behaviour 
which was being questioned and which provided the argument for their 
removal. Soon afterwards, psychiatrists were removed, first from the 
selection boards for permanent commissions and eventually from the 
WOSBs. 
Besides Ronald Adam, how did other military people view 
psychiatrists? In The 4rnzy Quarterly and The Fighting Services, 
psychiatrists were mentioned infrequently, but not usually in negative 
terms. The Selection of Personnel received pretty good press in the 
Quarterly, which also published material from the Directorate for the 
Selection of Personnel. In the Services, a fictional story regarding 
psychiatrists was published in 1942 in which two officers discussed how 
the 'trickcyclist' got rid of 'old Blimp' by asking him tricky questions and 
catching him out. In the story, it is stated that 'superficial smartness did not 
delude the psychological sleuth' who is mainly after 'office wallahs' rather 
than fighting men. The story concluded with the two officers drinking to 
the psychiatrist's success saying 'A catfish in the tank keeps the rest of us 
fish on the jump and in good fettle -besides he got rid of old Blimp for 
US! 1232 
There are other examples of psychiatrists being positively perceived 
by Army staff. As in the above story whether a psychiatrist was positively 
23 1 54A 'Extract from the minutes of the 108th meeting of the Executive Committee of 
the Army Council held on Friday, 30th April, 1943. ' TNA, W032/11972. 
232 F. Ambroso, (1942) 'The Trick-cyclist' The Fighting Services Vol XIX No. 3 
pp. 156-158. 
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or negatively perceived seemed to depend on whether he had similar 
objectives and shared the same views with regard to the value of the 
soldiers as the other staff. A case that exemplifies that point is that of Major 
P. J. R. Davis, a military doctor who had recently qualified as a specialist 
psychiatrist. He wrote that he received every help and encouragement from 
the Divisional Commanders and ADMSS. 233 Knowing that the troops would 
go into action in a couple of months he decided that his first priority was to 
decide which soldiers were not good enough and discharge them. At that 
point, 'My ADMS was extremely helpful, encouraged me to go straight 
ahead and work on my own initiative'. 234 As soon as he started work: 
it at once became evident that the Division, and in particular the 
Infantry Battalions, contained a very considerable number of men 
in whom the officers had little or no confidence, and of whom they 
would be only too glad to dispose ... large numbers of dullards, 
psychoneurotics, and a few psychopaths and psychotics were 
unearthed. Combatant officers proved to be extremely enthusiastic 
at the idea of getting rid of these men -more so, in fact, than the 
medical officers, who in some cases had a valuable sobering effect 
on too high a degree of enthusiasm- and were quick to appreciate 
the fact that such men in a battle would not only be a liability to 
themselves, but also might be a positive danger to others, and 
would certainly have an adverse effect on the general morale of the 
Unit. 
The procedure I adopted was to ask the Company or Platoon 
Commander to write a relevant report on the man, and to state 
whether his retention was desired or not. I gave the men the 
Progressive Matrices to do, followed by an interview, and in the 
light of all the information available, decided on their disposal. 235 
In this example the psychiatrist worked to the wishes of the 
Commanding Officers who in return cooperated fully: 
I think it is not out of place to stress once again how very alive to 
the importance of selection work the Division proved to be. I came 
233 P. J. R. Davis, (1946) p. 256 234 Ibid, p. 259 235 Ibid. 
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across practically no examples of the attitude of "they are trying to 
get away with it"-an attitude which in my experience, becomes 
more and more prevalent among officers the farther away from the 
front line they are, and perhaps reaches its acme amongst some 
Medical Officers at Base Hospitals. The Combatant Officer, who 
knows his troops, has learnt from bitter experience that certain 
types of men are constitutionally unable to make the grade and that 
there is nothing that can be done about it. Perhaps the more 
pertinent criticism came good-humouredly from the CO of a 
Battalion who asked me: "Why should I send these men to you so 
that they will survive the war and go home and breed like rabbits, 
whilst all my finest men are going to risk being killed? " To which I 
could only reply that, be that as it might, he had referred more men 
from his Unit than I had seen from any other! 236 
Such eugenic concerns were in fact a recurring theme with regard to 
selection. Furthermore, other psychiatrists complained that it was in fact 
the most bitter opponents of psychiatry that tended to make greatest use of 
their services, and that psychiatrists had become 'invaliding officers'. 237 
After the war, the psychiatrist Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Pozner wrote that: 
It is axiomatic that the degree of suspected mental illness in a 
soldier is directly related to the amount of administrative 
inconvenience he is likely to cause his officers. ... officers who 
unhesitatingly label their regimental misfits as "mental cases" ... are 
often the most vociferous in private in their criticisms of psychiatry 
as a suspect form of medicine. 238 
Cnnehivinn 
After the First World War, it became established that casualties from 
disease and particularly mental disorder, were one of the most significant 
causes of manpower wastage. Furthermore, it was accepted that after the 
236 lbid, p. 260. Eric Leed has also argued that the psychiatric diagnosis had a function 
for military authorities but he argues this was to prevent disgruntled men from 
mutincering. E. Leed, (1979), No wan's land; Conibat and Identity in World War I, 
Cambridge: CUP 
237 H. Pozner, (1961) 'Common Sense and military psychiatry', Journal of the Royal 
Arnly Medical Corps, 107, p. 155. 238 lbid, pp. 155-156. 
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huge fatalities of that war, the soldiers' morale in any future conflict would, 
be vulnerable. In line with these views, the Army during the Second World 
War invested in psychiatric prophylaxis, which aimed to reduce casualties, 
maintain morale and remove the mentally unfit and the 'misfits'. In practice, 
although, psychiatrists could only recommend action, in the majority of 
cases their proposals were followed. The effectiveness of the psychiatrists 
was largely dependent upon the relationship each had with his boss, the 
Assistant or Deputy Director Medical Services, but it appears that in the 
majority of time there was effective cooperation between medical directors 
and psychiatrists. 
This investment in psychiatric expertise was consistent with the 
Army's approach of relying on experts and technology. However, as with 
other scientific innovations, the Army was with regard to psychiatry, 
relatively unprepared at the onset of the war and its staff did not reach full 
strength until 1942-1943. 
In comparison to the other medical specialties in the Army, 
psychiatrists were offered significant administrative powers; albeit less 
than those of the hygienists, who were at the heart of preventive medicine. 
In fact, the psychiatrists' ability to prevent casualties and predict behaviour 
appears to have been the crux of their negotiations with the Army. 
Psychiatrists and their supporters, particularly the Adjutant-General argued 
that these were the key ways in which psychiatrists would support the 
Army and that psychiatrists therefore required greater administrative 
powers such as those of their hygienist colleagues. Their opponents on the 
other hand argued that psychiatry was part of curative medicine and there 
was no argument for a special case. This argument was used also to 
gradually remove psychiatrists from the selection boards for permanent 
commissions. 
Finally, one of the most important ways through which psychiatrists 
contributed to preventive medicine and to the Army itself during the war, 
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was through the psychiatric testing of personnel. The following chapter will 
discuss this. 
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Chapter 3: Selection of Personnel 
, 
Introduction 
During the Second World War, all three armed services used some 
form of intelligence testing to select recruits and officers. Psychologists and 
psychiatrists, under the remit of the Directorate for the Selection of 
Personnel, were invited to devise the tests, administer them and train 
military. personnel in their use. The purpose of the tests was ostensibly to 
increase efficiency and promote equality of opportunity. Psychiatrists also 
argued that by eliminating the 'dull and backward' the tests would also 
help improve hygiene, discipline and morale and reduce psychiatric 
casualties. Furthermore, it was claimed, that by instituting scientific 
methods for the selection of officers-cadets, not only the quality but also 
the quantity of officers would improve as more men would be willing to 
put themselves forward for commission once they realised that the new 
system was egalitarian and no longer favoured the upper and middle 
classes. 239 To increase numbers further, the system of recommendation 
which was based on commanding officers picking out men for 
commissions from their own units was by-passed, and psychologically 
trained regimental officers were able to put forward men whom they 
thought were suitable for commissions at the point of entry into the Armed 
Forces. 
It will be argued here that the introduction of intelligence testing was 
not inevitable or progressive, but was accepted partly because the use of 
239 For example, the Adjutant-General stated in his memoirs that the fact that candidates 
felt that the traditional boards did not give them "a fair chance" had led to "a decline in 
volunteers for commissions". R. Adam, (1960) 'Various Administrative Aspects of the 
Second World War', Chapter 2, p. 7, Liddell Hart Centre, Adam papers, 3/13. This 
account was originally written in 1949. Cited in J. Crang, (2000) Tile British arnly and 
the People's Mar, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 29. This problem was 
compounded by the fact that Commanding Officers seemed unable to put forward for 
commission a sufficient number of candidates because of the perceived low quality of 
the troops. 
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such tests had for some years been spreading to British industry and foreign 
armieS240 and partly because in this period, people with low IQ were being 
stigmatised as a 'social problem group'. 24 1 Furthermore, while the scientific 
selection of officers was probably successful to some extent in convincing 
the public that commissions were offered fairly, it nonetheless continued 
overwhelmingly to promote those educated at public and secondary 
schools. As to whether the men selected by the new methods were actually 
better officers than those who would have been selected by the previous 
methods, it is impossi ble to discover. While there are some statistics that 
show that the new methods had a better success rate at the level of training, 
any number of reasons could account for this difference and even if taken 
at face value, this does not prove that they were better officers in the field 
too. What seems more probable, is that the officers selected by the new 
methods were more or less the same people as would have been selected by 
the old methods -the only difference being that as the new methods were 
longer and more thorough the same criteria were applied more reliably. 
Psychologists and psychiatrists succeeded in gaining this 
considerable influence in the Armed Forces because they were able to 
convince military authorities of a link between efficiency, meritocracY, 
intelligence, and science and ultimately link these with psychology. The 
argument went as follows: In order to improve efficiency men must be 
selected to jobs according to merit -the essence of merit is intelligence, and 
the only people who can assess that scientifically are psychologists and 
psychiatrists. In the selection of both officers and men from the ranks, 
240 The American Army had been using intelligence tests since the First World War and 
the German Army since 1927. Privy Council Office, (1947), Report of an expert 
connnittee on the ivork ofpsychologists andpsychiatrists in the services, HMSO. British 
Library, B. S. 32/10. 
24 1 There was no organised policy of stigmatisation that would make the situation in 
Britain remotely comparable with that of Nazi Germany. What is argued for here is that 
people of low intelligence and to some extent their genetic relatives were perceived in 
both scientific and popular environments as a problem that required a solution. See M. 
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inte igence was thus promoted as the one factor of overwhelming. 
significance that could only be assessed by technical personnel. In the 
selection of officers, the assessment of personality also mattered 
significantly, nevertheless an intelligence score significantly higher than 
that perceived to be the average for the men in the ranks became a 
prerequisite for commission. 
Current historiollrap 
Until a few years ago, the only texts that described the work of 
psychiatrists and psychologists in the selection of 'other ranks' during the 
war had been written by men who had been personally involved in the 
process. 242 These accounts invariably tended to be uncritical; within them, 
the use of intelligence tests in the Army was presumed to be a good thing, 
an assertion treated as obvious and as easily verifiable by a number of 
quoted studies correlating low intelligence with a propensity to mental and 
physical disease and an inclination towards committing military 
offences. 243 The introduction of officer selection tests were particularly 
admired. This enthusiasm crossed over to historians thus leading Shelford 
Bidwell to declare that one of these tests was "probably as important to the 
country's war effort as the 25-pounder gun and the Bailey Bridge. ". 244 
Recently, other works have been published by both historians and 
psychiatrists. 245 However, they too have tended to rely on autobiographical 
Thomson, (1998) The problein of inental deficiency; Eugenics, Denlocracy, and Social 
Policy in Britain c. 18 70-1959, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
242 R. Ahrenfeldt, (1958) Psychiatry in the British Ariny in the Second World [Var, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; F. A. E. Crew, (1955) 'The Army Psychiatric 
Service, ' The Arnzy Medical Services, Vol. Il., HMSO; J. R. Rees, (1945) The Shaping of 
Psychiatty by War, Men, York JV JY Norton & Co; P. E. Vernon, & J. B. Parry, (1949) 
Personnel Selection In The British Forces, London: University of London Press. 
243 For example, R. Ahrenfeldt, (195 8) chap IV. 
244 S. Bidwell, (1973) Modern Waijare, A study of inen, iveapons and theories, Allen 
Lane, p. 118. 
245 For example, J. Crang, (2000); T. Harrison, (2000), Bion, Rickinan, Foulkes and the 
Northfield Experinients, Advancing on a Different Front, London: Jessica Kingsley; B. 
Shephard, (2000) A War of Nerves London: Jonathan Cape; E. Trist & H. Murray, (eds) 
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accounts and with regard to selection frequently concur with the opinion 
expressed in the 1940s; that selection was necessary because not 'every 
soldier carries a field marshal's baton. ' 246 Even David French, in his 
otherwise brilliant account of the war-time British Army, treats the concept 
of 'intelligence' as an unproblematic entity to be as easily determined as the 
recruits' weight or height. He is therefore uncritical of the sources that 
attribute the Army's problems prior to 1942 to the recruits' low intelligence 
or even to the psychiatrists who link low intelligence and psychiatric 
breakdown. 247 On the whole, therefore, the historiography has assumed 
that the introduction of intelligence tests was an inevitable, progressive 
step, following on the work done in America, and that this move had no 
ideological content beside a desire to increase efficiency and meritocracy. 
Standing out from these accounts is Nikolas Rose's book, Govei-ning 
the S0111.248 Rose identifies the psychological technologies used in the 
Second World War, including intelligence testing, as the starting point for 
the study of subjectivity (what is usually known as the study of individual 
differences), which he argues had a profound influence in the post-war 
(1990) The social engagement of social science: a Tavistock anthology, London: Free 
Association. This criticism applies to the issue of intelligence testing only and does not 
detract from the excellent work in these volumes. 
246 The Napoleonic line that 'every soldier carries a field marshal's baton in his 
knapsack' was rhetorically dismissed by the consulting psychiatrist J. R. Rees, (1945, 
p. 25). For an example of how those writing secondary material sometimes have very 
similar perspectives with 1940s psychiatrists see T. Harrison, (2000) pp. 87-89. 
Harrison explains that the opposition to psychological selection was completely 
unreasonable. Using the above quote, he proclaims: "This romantic fantasy, widely 
current in the British Army, kept alive the notion that it was possible for every man to 
achieve the highest rank if they just worked at it ... The resilience of this idea, in the 
teeth of the evidence, is quite remarkable in retrospect. " (p. 88. ) 
247 D. French, (2000) Raising Churchill's A"ny, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
chapter 2. Although French conceded that to ascribe the wartime army's problem to its 
failure to attract sufficient men of high intelligence "is misleading and oversimplistic", 
his account appears to concur with the views from the Directorate for the Selection of 
Personnel which argue that men recruited into the Army were of low intelligence and 
were hence more likely to break down. In addition, the fact that nearly 30 per cent of 
recruits were apparently of below average intelligence is lamented while this is a rather 
good result and similarly the statistics quoted by French himself show that army recruits 
were better educated than the rest of the population (pp. 65-66). 
248 N. Rose, (1989) Governing the Soul, London: Free Association books. 
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world by helping construct a new concept of the self, which is 'desiring, 
relating actualising'. 249 Rose is particularly interested in the other 
psychological technologies used in wartime particularly in America: the 
surveys of public opinion, the studies of group dynamics, the construction 
of attitude scales; aspects more obviously dealing with the personality or 
the psyche of the subject. Nonetheless, Rose identifies the significance of 
testing in allowing for the first time a mechanised system of job allocation, 
the Hollerith machine which matched the soldiers' intelligence and aptitude 
with military occupations. 
More relevant for the account that will be presented here, has been 
the extensive literature on the history of intelligence testing and the 
eugenics movement. While between the 1960s and the early 1980s, most of 
this literature was written with the specific purpose of showing that those 
who had regarded intelligence as a quantifiable and mainly heritable entity 
were wrong, 250 the more recent literature has presented more nuanced 
accounts focusing on the politically complex background to both the 
eugenics movement and intelligence testing. Much of this literature focuses 
on America, 251 however works by Mathew Thomson, Adrian Wooldridge 
and Richard Soloway have focused on Britain. 252 These works have 
succeeded in weaving together the subtle yet pervasive effect of the 
249 N. Rose, (1999) Governing the Soul, London: Free Association books, pp. xxx, 1-55. 
250 For example, S. J. Gould (198 1) The Misineasure of Man, New York: W. W. Norton 
&Co; L. J. Kamin, (1974) The Science and Politics ofIQ, Maryland: Lawrence Erlbaurn 
Associates. 
25 1 For example, J. Carson, (1993) 'Army Alpha, Army Brass, and the Search for Army 
Intelligence', ISIS, 84, pp. 278-309; D. Kevels, (1985) In the naine of Eugenics, 
Genetics and the Uses of Human Hei-edily, New York: Knopf; J. Trent, (1994) 
Inventing the Feeble Min& A hisimy of Mental Retai-dation in the United States, 
Berkley: University of California Press; L. Zenderland, (1998) Measin-ing Minds: Henry 
Hei-bert Goddard and the origins of Ainerican Intelligence Testing, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
252 M. Thomson, (1998) The problein of mental deficiency, - Eugenics, Democracy, and 
Social Policy in Britain c. 1870-1959, Oxford: Clarendon Press; R. Soloway, (1990) 
Denzography and Degeneration, eugenics and the declining bil-thrate in tit, entieth- 
centwy Bfitain, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press; A. Wooldridge, 
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eugenics movement on government policy, educational psychology and the 
treatment of the mentally defective during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, they have been instrumental in showing the political 
complexities of the period, showing for example, how faith in intelligence 
testing is simultaneously compatible with left wing progressivism, 
meritocratic ideals and eugenic attitudes. This chapter builds on this work 
by showing that reforms that took place in the selection of recruits during 
the Second World War have a complex background; besides being the 
result of efforts to improve efficiency, reduce medical casualties and 
military offences and increase the opportunities for those from poorer 
backgrounds (which are the explanation for the reforms provided by those 
who took part in their implementation) they are also the result of a culture 
that had identified the mentally defective as a problem in society at large. 
Section 1: Men in the Ranks 
The introduction of new selection procedures 
At the onset of the Second World War, there was no selection 
procedure for men who wanted to enter the Army and all men who passed 
the medical fitness tests were admitted. The Navy and the Air Force, which' 
were seen to be the elite services, received many more applications than 
they had places and consequently candidates were selected by a short 
interview, after which many were rejected. By 1941 however, all three 
services had adopted some kind of intelligence testing. Initially, the Army 
rejected proposals to carry out selection, but some military psychiatrists 
carried out their own experiments using intelligence tests. Then the Army 
Council, in discussions with the Industrial Health Research Council agreed 
to have an intelligence test given experimentally in military training units, 
(1994) Measitfing the Mind, Education and psychology in England c. 1860-c. 1990, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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under the direction of a small group of civilian psychologists. At the same 
time, Professor Bartlett of Cambridge University was asked to provide tests 
for selecting Anti-Aircraft specialists. 
By 1942, the system of recruitment had changed beyond recognition. 
In the Army, Ronald Adam had become the Adjutant-General, which is the 
most powerful administrative position in the British Army. 253 Adam 
believed strongly that the Army needed to become scientific in order to 
become efficient, and he welcomed technical expertise. Having been 
impressed by the intelligence tests the psychiatrist Ronald Hargreaves had 
carried out under his command, Adam helped institute a nation-wide 
selection mechanism. A new Directorate for the Selection of Personnel was 
set up in the War Office, which employed 19 psychologists, 31 officers 
with some psychological training, and approximately 1300 non-technical 
officers and NCOs. About 20% of the total staff were women, more in the 
case of the qualified psychologists. The Director, however, was a regular 
soldier not a psychologist. 
Under the new system, men were no longer accepted into the Army 
until they had received a period of basic training where they were subjected 
to a series of intelligence tests. The most important of these tests was the 
progressive matrices designed by J. C. Raven. This was a pattern 
completion test, which was thought to measure 'native', inborn intelligence 
rather than the education. A recruit's score on the progressive matrices 
determined the Selection Group in which he would be placed. These ranged 
from SG 1,2,3+, 3-, 4 and 5, where each group was meant to correspond 
to 20% of the population, apart from the very top and bottom groups, which 
corresponded to 10%. The selection group of a recruit would then 
determine the suitability of the recruit for any military job. 
253 R. Bowyer, (1999) Dictionmy of Mifitaiy Terms, Teddington: Peter Collin 
Publishing, p. 4. 
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In many ways, the progressive matrices test exemplified the 
meritocratic element of selection -that the purpose of selection was to 
measure innate ability rather than educational differences determined by 
class. However, by 1943, follow up results on soldiers who had undergone 
training courses, revealed that the progressive matrices were not able to 
predict success in training as efficiently as did measures of education or the 
intelligence tests with a high educational component. From 1943, selection 
group was determined by a range of five tests, which included as well as 
the matrices, a verbal intelligence test, a mathematics test, a test measuring 
the ability to follow written instructions and a mechanical comprehension 
te St. 254 
As well as having their intelligence measured, recruits also filled in a 
biographical questionnaire outlining their work experience and underwent a 
short interview by a Personnel Selection Officer (PSO). PSOs were 
regimental officers who had undergone three weeks psychological training 
in order to be able to assess the men's suitability for particular jobs, their 
potential leadership qualities, mental stability, and combat temperament. 
Recruits marked as unstable, of low combat temperament, as well as those 
in the lowest intelligence group were re-assessed by a psychiatrist, while 
those marked as potential officers had their commanding officers informed 
of the fact. Finally, PSOs made three broad trade recommendations about 
the type of employment each man was suited for, such as signaller, or 
driver, each job having a minimum standard of intelligence. The training 
recommendations and the age, medical category and Selection Group of 
recruits were sent back to the Directorate for Selection of Personnel where 
254 B. Ungerson, (1953) Personnel Selection, War Office, p. 53, TNA, W0277/19. 
Progressive matrices were found to be particularly unreliable in identifying those with 
low intelligence, causing concern among testers that the test scores did not match the 
intelligence of the subjects. The tests were more reliable at the top end of the scale. See 
J. A. Fraser Roberts "Further observations on the efficiency of the Progressive Matrices 
Test", TNA, CAB 98/28, P. P. (SC)(43)(24). 
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a match between the trade recommendations with the Army needs was 
attempted. 
Similar personnel selection systems were formed in the Navy the 
RAF and in the ATS. In the Navy, interestingly, once the Senior 
Psychologist's Department was established in the Admiralty, nearly all the 
staff (both the sergeant testers and the Personnel Selection Officers) were 
women. Although they were supervised by a male psychologist, it was 
women who made all the initial decisions that could impact on the men's 
career: they classified the men's intelligence, they made recommendations 
with regard to what job each recruit should be given, whether he should be 
examined by a psychiatrist and whether he had potential officer qualities. 
In the Air Force as well, women were given a role in personnel selection 
although it usually involved administering tests rather than interviewing 
and making decisions. In total, women played a very significant part in 
selection for the duration of the war, although their jobs were discontinued 
once the war ended. 255 
Although the selection process took into account other traits besides 
intelligence such as work record, prior education and mental stability, as 
defined by the interviewing psychiatrist, intelligence tests were the 
dominant selection tool. The selection group in which recruits were placed 
remained on their records for their entire military career and was an 
important factor in all future postings. Some men with very low 
intelligence were excluded from the Armed Forces altogether, but the 
majority of men in the lowest selection group were placed in the labouring 
corps The Pioneei-s. Low intelligence excluded candidates from various 
army jobs, and barred them from getting a commission and to some extent 
even from getting a promotion of any kind. 
255 For a more elaborate description of selection in the Armed Forces, see R. Ahrenfeldt, 
(195 8); P. E. Vernon, & J. B. Pan-y (1949). 
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Nonetheless, as intelligence tests only became established in 1942, 
many men recruited prior to that had not been tested. For this reason, 
intelligence testing was introduced at other points in the men's career. 
Mainly it took place when a soldier applied for a new job or was rejected 
from his own Arm or had his medical category reduced significantly (this 
included many men who were recovered psychiatric casualties). These men 
were sent to Army Selection Centres were they were tested and re-allocated 
into jobs considered more suitable. In addition, all men whom it was 
thought would eventually take part in the liberation of Europe were tested 
from September 1943 onwards. The rationale for this was that as the army 
was expected to suffer large casualties and there would be no facilities in 
which to undertake the tests once combat had began, it was essential that 
the potential of all the soldiers had been assessed so that decisions about 
how casualties could be replaced could be made quickly and efficiently. 256 
The corollary to the principle of placing men into jobs according to 
their levels of intelligence was that some jobs required less intelligence 
than others. Since a particular concern had been that men with low 
intelligence were incapable of handling complex equipment, many men 
with low test scores were placed in the infantry while infantry men with 
higher test scores were removed. This policy was reported to have an 
adverse effect on the morale of Infantry Commanding Officers, who 
reportedly complained that "the ever increasing tendency to remove from 
the infantry all who show any intelligence is felt to have reached the danger 
point. , 257 
The Purpose of Personnel Selection 
The aims of personnel selection were multiple. Mainly, the purpose of 
the tests was to increase efficiency by placing the right man in the right job. 
256 B. Ungerson, (1953) p. 88. 
257 Mot-ale Report (February 1942) TNA, W063/88, p. 2. 
The reasoning was that it was right that officers were more intelligent than 
the men they led and that therefore promotions should be based on 
objective criteria like intelligence tests. The move was also seen to be 
meritocratic; it seemed to end the favouritism for those with a public school 
and university education. Of course, in reality, intelligence tests strongly 
favoured the better educated and probably served to biologise the perceived 
superiority of the upper classes. Nonetheless, this process appeared to make 
better use of personnel; skilled men and easily trainable men became 
tradesmen, while men with the lowest intelligence became labourers; 
everyone fitted their place. 258 
However, in the majority of accounts given by psychiatrists and 
military men, the purpose of intelligence testing was more specifically to 
identify 'dull and inadequate men' who are a liability in numerous ways. 259 
The main reasoning was that warfare had become technologically more 
advanced, and that men with low intelligence could not acquire the 
technical skills required even for an infantry private. The use of 
intelligence tests therefore, confinned the view that the war was a highly 
scientific and technological affair in which only those with an at least 
average level of intelligence could be expected to cope. However, these 
'dull' men were also pcrceived as overwhelmingly likely to contract 
disease, suffer a nervous breakdown and commit military offences. In the 
official medical history of the Army Psychiatric Service these points were 
reiterated: 
258 It is very difficult to know whether the selection methods improved the quality of 
either the officers or the tradesmen as there is no possibility of a scientific comparison. 
However, judging from the discussions regarding selection in The Army Quarterly it is 
true that the majority of the soldiers and the general public seemed to have believed that 
selection worked. Furthermore, the results of the testing were not always adhered to; 
according to David French, by the second half of 1943, the infantry was so short of men 
that Ronald Gladman, who was conscripted in June 1943, remembered that when he 
was undergoing his intelligence tests 'It had been made clear, ... that at this stage of the 
war everyone would be posted to the infantry no matter what trade had been followed in 
civilian life. (D. French, 2000 p. 70. ) 
259 R. Ahrenfeldt, (1958) chap. IV. 
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There had been in the past a popular tradition that the dull man 
made a good soldier. The stresses and increased tempo of modem 
warfare, and the duties of the modem infantryman, which 
demanded a technical knowledge of a number of specialised 
weapons, required, however, an average degree of intelligence, and 
presented a difficult task to the dullard. Whereas he might have 
been capable of carrying out some simple job in a restricted, 
protected environment in civil life, the dullard, placed among men 
of relatively higher intelligence in the Army, often became 
m aladjusted and developed feelings of inferiority and anxiety. 
Mental defect was a frequent cause of military delinquency, 
particularly of absenteism, and the dullard often became a 
disciplinary problem in his unit through failure to understand the 
nature of regulations and the reason for them. Investigations also 
seemed to show that there was a positive correlation between 
mental dullness and proneness to venereal disease, and to scabies 
and pediculosis. It was clear, therefore, that the misplaced dullard 
in modem war was a general liability to the Army. 260 
On a similar note, the Adj utant- General wrote in his memoirs this 
account of intelligence testing in the ATS, which focused on the link 
between nits and intelligence: 
Conscription started and numbers of young women from the poorer 
quarters of our industrial cities came into the reception camps. The 
officers and NCOs were horrified to find that they had to spend the 
first days scrubbing or supervising the scrubbing of heads to get rid 
of nits.... 
I knew something of intelligence gradings at this time and I went 
to see Mr Bevin to. ask if he would agree to raise the minimum 
intelligence grade of acceptance by one grade. After considerable 
argument he agreed. He liked the Army, but I felt he thought we 
could take any man or woman and turn them into good soldiers and 
auxiliaries. 
The result of raising intelligence standards was that the need for 
head washing was immediately reduced ... 
261 
What is evident from this statement is that while Adam was dubbed 
260 F. A. E. Crew, (1955) p. 475. 
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"the Army's No. I Democrat 11262 and was responsible for a number of liberal 
reforms particularly in the field of Army education he had little time for the 
notion that poverty itself caused disease and low scores on intelligence 
tests. Similarly to the majority of reformers in this period, Adam's concern 
was mainly with providing opportunities for inherently bright young men 
and women born into the working classes. Adam's comment on Ernest 
Bevin, the trade unionist Minister of Labour and National Service, also 
highlights an important ideological conflict. The crux of this conflict rested 
on the idea that human beings have an abundance of potential which they 
may fulfil given the right circumstances. This was a notion that 
contemporary psychologists and psychiatrists routinely dismissed as a 
romantic myth. 263 
Alternative accounts by other Army psychiatrists suggest that 
intelligence was perceived to have multiple effects and manifestations. 
Some psychiatrists claimed that an average intelligence was necessary in 
British soldiers because it enabled them to comprehend the values for 
which the war was being fought. They argued further that intelligence 
testing did not have to be used in the examination of Indian soldiers 
because Indians were a military race at case with the state of war and hence 
did not need to understand such values. During a Conference on Psychiatry 
in Forward Areas held in Calcutta in August 1944, it was remarked that due 
to the lack of appropriate intelligence tests it was difficult to assess the 
intelligence of I. O. Rs. [Indian Other Ranks] but that this was not so 
important: 
To determine the intellectual level of the I. O. R is less important 
261 R. Adam, (1960) 'Various Administrative Aspects of the Second World War', 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London, Adam papers, 3/13 
'Introduction' P. 3. This account was originally written in 1949. 
262 Leicestei- Evening Mail, 27 th April 1946, Adam Papers, 2/6/1, Liddell Hart Centre, 
p. 3. Cited in M. Harrison, (2004) Medicine and Victory, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 182. 
263 For example, J. R. Rees, (1945) p. 25 
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than the B. O. R. [British Other Rank] In the B. O. R. the dull and 
backward break down in action. In the hardships and dangers of 
active service he has nothing to support him except a vague desire 
to do his bit. Sentiments such as patriotism, appreciation of the 
alternative to winning the war, tradition, and other complex ideas 
which keep up the morale of the average man, are beyond his 
grasp. In addition, he has been brought up with one set of ideas 
which can be summarised as the Christian attitude, and he lacks the 
capacity to adjust to what is in many respects, the antithesis of this 
attitude. The I. O. R. however, is accustomed to a lower standard of 
living and he finds the hardships less onerous ... And most important of all, the I. O. R. infantry soldier comes from a martial 
264 race and being at war requires no reorientation of attitude. 
So for this psychiatrist, an average intelligence is necessary only in 
British men and then it was for the maintenance of morale, rather than for 
learning how to use weapons or for keeping free of disease. Although 
psychiatrists did agree therefore that a reasonably high intelligence was an 
important quality in British soldiers, there was not always unanimity about 
what precisely this quality allowed them to achieve. Nonetheless, this 
tentative consensus ensured that intelligence testing would dominate 
personnel selection. 
The Report of the British War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell 
Shock(1922) 
During the First World War, the issue of mentally deficient soldiers 
was not considered a problem by the Armed Forces. Prior to 1918, there 
was virtually no attempt to detect mental deficiency among British recruits, 
although the examinations did become more thorough towards the end of 
the war. Mathew Thomson argues that while at the end of the war the 
re . ection rate on the grounds of mental deficiency was around 0.3%, it was j 
264 Report of a Conference on Psychiany in ForivardAreas, held at Calculla in Ang. 8- 
10.1944, TNA, WO 32/11550. 
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aimost certainly much lower during the early stages of the war. "' Thomson 
argues further that there is plenty of evidence that many mentally deficient 
men did enlist, although much of his evidence comes from psychiatrists 
who reported after the war that a high proportion of their shell-shocked 
266 cases were mentally deficient . According to Thomson, 
it was only after 
the war that mental deficiency among soldiers began retrospectively to be 
considered a problem and began to be linked with the incidence of 
shellshock. 
Touching on this new link between mental deficiency and psychiatric 
instability, psychiatrists writing on the subject of selection during or after 
the Second World War, frequently mentioned as their starting point, the 
1922 Report of the British War Office Coininittee of Enquily into Shell 
Shock. 267 This report, commissioned to investigate the high incidence of 
shellshock, had highlighted it was argued, the need for better selection to 
ensure that the army did not recruit men who were not of 'normal mental 
stability' 268 further adding that 'all cases of mental dullness or deficiency 
should be sent home for invaliding. 269However, a closer reading of the 
report shows that, any link between low intelligence and vulnerability to 
psychiatric breakdown, was far from an accepted fact according to the 
testimonies found in the report. Within the report a number of causes of 
shell-shock were cited by witnesses: low morale, poor discipline, lack of 
4man management' skills in officers, personal or family history of mental 
or other diseases, physical exhaustion, financial worries etc. Only three 
witnesses expressed the opinion that men with low intelligence were 
particularly vulnerable to shellshock. They were all doctors and 
265 A Thomson, (1999) 'Status, manpower and mental fitness: mental deficiency in the 
First World War' [Vat-, Medicine and Modernity, (eds) R. Cooter, M. Harrison & S. 
Sturdy, Thrupp: Sutton Publishing, p. 152. 
266 A Thomson, (1999) pp. 152-155. 
267 R. Ahrenfeldt, (195 8); J. Rees, (1944). 
268 Report of the British JVar Office Coininittee of Enquily into Shell Shock, (1922) 
HMSO. p. 169 cited in J. Rees, (1945) p. 55. 
269Reporl, (1922) p. 13 5 cited in J. Rees (1945) p. 56. 
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psychiatrists: the psychiatrist Edward Mapother, Medical Superintendent of 
the Maudsley Hospital, Professor G. Roussy, late Consultant in Neurology 
to the French Army and Dr J. Dunn, Regimental Medical Officer. In 
contrast, the Lieutenant-Colonel E. Hewlett, and Dr W. Johnson argued 
that in some cases low intelligence protected soldiers against shellshock. 
Furthermore, Major-General Sir Alfred Bayly, Dr A. F. Hurst, and Major 
Pritchard Taylor said that shellshock was unrelated to intelligence while Sir 
James Galloway stated that he had read 'of the exceedingly elaborate 
methods put into operation by our colleagues in the United States' but 
'from experience of what did happen to the American troops, I do not think 
it did much good. 1 do not think their casualties so far as "Shell-shock" was 
concerned were much minimised by this elaborate examination. 270 Typical 
of the witnesses with regard to selection as a means of preventing future 
casualties was the testimony of Lieutenant-General Sir John Goodwin, 
Director-General of the Army Medical Services during the First World 
War. He argued that 'actual war' was, 'the real, final and crucial test of 
nervous instability in a soldier', and he said he considered it very difficult 
to say at a recruit's examination whether he would eventually become a 
good soldier or not. 
This sentiment was repeated time and time again by various doctors 
and military officers who warned that it was impossible to foretell who 
would break down in battle. They suggested that the best ways to prevent 
shell-shock were to not give the disorder a name, not let the soldiers think 
that it provided an honourable means of leaving the Army and to look after 
the men well so they are physically comfortable and know that their 
officers care for them, thus keeping their morale high. In terms of the 
administration of the Armed Forces, it was said firstly that the period of 
training was too short for men to establish esprit de corps and secondly that 
270 Report, (1922) p. 182. 
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soldiers were kept for too long in situations where they had to fight , 
extremely hard. 
The conclusions of the Committee were somewhat contradictory. On 
the one hand they stated that: "Any type of individual may suffer from one 
or other form of neurosis ... it is extremely difficult to say beforehand what 
type of man is most likely to break down, the only certain test being 
exposure to battle conditions ... " while at the same time summarising the 
witnesses evidence as "... it was admitted that there are certain individuals 
who are unlikely ever to become efficient fighting soldiers. No general 
characteristics were given. " Although 'no general characteristics were 
given', the Committee stated that: "All cases of mental Dullness or 
Deficiency should be sent home for invaliding". Nonetheless, the report 
clearly stated: 
We do not regard the specific efficiency tests (such as Binet) as 
suitable for the purpose of general recruiting, nor do we think that 
consultant advice need be provided except in cases in which it is 
specifically asked for, and the circumstances are such that it is practicable 
to provide it 271 
In fact what the Committee suggested was that medical officers 
should examine recruits -more carefully than in the past and that they should 
discharge anyone who has at anytime been insane or has a serious mental 
defect. The mental defect would have to be severe enough to be apparent to 
any doctor performing a 15 minute examination and would only 
occasionally require a second opinion and then not necessarily from an 
expert. Put another way, it was not the 'dull' men falling in the bottom 10 
per cent of the intelligence spectrum that were the cause for concern but the 
'idiot', 'imbecile' and 'feebleminded' men in the bottom 0.1-1.0% of men 
who were supposed to belong to specialized institutions. 
27 1 Repon, (1922) p. 170. The 'efficiency tests' referred to here are intelligence tests e. g. 
Binel-Simon Measuring Scale ofIntelligence (1908). 
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Psychiatrists however seized upon the report as a recommendation 
for their own involvement in a selection procedure that excluded those with 
limited intelligence. Selection became the central method of preventing 
psychiatric casualties, a decision that contrary to the evidence provided by 
many medical and military witnesses who had argued that no one could 
predict who was going to break down. While in the First World War men 
of low intelligence had been welcomed into an Army which accepted all 
but the. most extreme cases as fit, 272 by the Second World war the same 
men had been identified as a source of inefficiency. "The dullard" argued 
the consulting psychiatrist to the army, JR Rees, "becomes ... in modem 
war a consumer of manpower rather than a contributor". 273 
Factors that facilitated the adoption of intelligence tests 
Without a doubt, psychiatrists and psychologists promoted the use of 
intelligence tests partly because they wanted to promote themselves; any 
elaborate selection technique meant more jobs and prestige. As some made 
clear, psychological selection in the Armed Forces was going to be only the 
first step; soon such techniques would be used in recruitment 
everywhere. 274 Intelligence tests, in particular, had added advantages in 
comparison to other psychological techniques, in that they were easy to 
use, transparent in how they worked and fitted with the new technocratic, 
efficient and intelligent image the Armed Forces were trying to create. 
However, these considerations alone would not have been sufficient to 
make the tests acceptable, either politically or militarily as their 
introduction did result in some net loss of manpower and in some loss of 
organizational control by the Armed Forces. The tests became accepted 
because at least some members in high administrative positions in the 
Armed Forces became convinced that they would indeed help reduce 
272 M. Thomson, (1999). 
273 J. Rees, (1945) p. 43. 
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inefficiency. This psychological coup succeeded because of a number of 
events that occurred in the previous 30 years. 
One of the most significant of these events was the use of 
intelligence tests by the American Army during the First World War and by 
275 the German Army since 1927 . 
Also of the essence was the use of 
intelligence tests in education and in industry. The British state had 
accepted the value of intelligence testing since 1913 when Cyril Burt, 
became the first educational psychologist to be appointed by a government 
body as the official psychologist of the London County Council. 276 In 
addition, the prestigious National Institute of Industrial Psychology, which 
was run by the shellshock psychiatrist and psychologist C. S. Myers, had 
been using such tests as part of its work of improving the efficiency of 
industry through psychology in the 1920s and 193 OS. 277 Cyril Burt and C. S. 
Myers were both members of the advisory committee who in 1941 
persuaded the Adjutant-General, Ronald Adam, that he must employ 
intelligence tests in the Army. Adam became convinced that intelligence 
testing was modern, efficient, ' and consistent with the 
ideals of scientific 
management. He persuaded his superiors that the Army should use 
psychometric technology by advocating that the British Army, as Britain's 
largest- employer, ought to use the tests which have modernised industry, 
and by arguing that the British Army should not lag behind other modern 
armies. 278 
Part of what made intelligence testing acceptable to the Armed 
Forces was that it ratified a link between a variety of problems (psychiatric 
breakdown, disease, lack of discipline, low morale) and an abnormality 
residing within the soldier rather than inherent in warfare. With regard to 
274 J. Rees, (1945). 
275 Repon ofan Expen Committee- , (1947), p. 11. 276 For the best analysis of Cyril Burt's work, see A. Wooldridge, (1994). 
277 Welch, H. J. & C. S. Myers, (1932) Teti Yeai-s of Industi-ial Psychology: An Account 
of the Fh-st Decade of the NaHO17al Institute ofIndustHal Psychology, London: Sir Isaac 
Pitman & Sons, LTD. 
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psyc iatric reakdown in particular, although in the Second World War it 
had become accepted that any man may break down given sufficient stress, 
treating all psychiatric casualties as war casualties, it was feared, would 
lead to huge difficulties. Financially, the problem was that all war 
casualties were eligible for life long incapacity pensions, but even worse, in 
terms of discipline, such a policy would have stopped men feeling ashamed 
to go sick with a mental disorder, thus creating an epidemic. 279 
Psychiatrists therefore tended to think of psychiatric breakdown in terms of 
predispo sition and constitution in all cases except those of men with a 
proven track record of bravery and battle experience. "Dullness" readily fit 
the model as one predisposing cause that rendered men vulnerable to 
breakdown. 280 
On a very different note, what politically encouraged the use of 
intelligence tests in the Armed Forces, was the perception of low 
intelligence as a national problem. The significance given to low 
intelligence during this period mirrors to some extent the process taking 
place in the conceptualisation of mental illness. As interest towards the 
major psychoses gave way in the 1920s and 1930s to an interest in neurosis 
278 R. Ahrenfeldt, (1958); Adam, (1960), cited in J. Crang, (2000), pp. 8-10. 
279 That sympathy from relatives and the prospect of a pension encouraged men to fall 
sick with a psychological disorder was discussed in the War Office enquily into shell- 
shock (1922) and later at a psychiatric conference held prior to the war. TNA, PIN 
15/2401. See B. Shephard, (1999) ... Pitiless Psychology": The role of prevention in 
British military psychiatry in the Second World War', History of Psychiatly, 10, pp. 
491-524. 
280 There were of course many other perceived predisposing causes to breakdown that 
centred on the personality of the soldier. While some psychiatrists perceived personality 
as almost entirely genetically determined, others thought early life experiences played a 
more significant role. In both instances however, the cause of the breakdown was found 
to lie within the soldier rather than with warfare. Evidence of an inadequate personality 
was usually gauged from an examination of childhood problems and the adult 
employment records. For a discussion of predisposing causes to breakdown see chapters 
4&5; F. Crew, (1957) 'The Army Psychiatric Service. The Middle East Force 1940- 
1943', The Ariny Medical Services, Campaigns, vol. IL HMSO., p. 506; H. D. Hunter, 
(1944) Eighth Army Memorandum No. 1, (Ref. Hdh/l 10/8/44), Psychiatric Casualties in 
Battle, CMAC. GC135, BI (4 of 4). 
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and in the mental health problems of ordinary, sane, people 281 so concern 
with mental defect shifted from the 'imbeciles' and 'idiots' to the 'high- 
grade feebleminded' and the 'dull and backward'. 282 
During this period, journals such as the Lancet, the BMJ and the 
Journal of Mental Science published relatively few articles on the subject 
of mental deficiency -it was not a fashionable subjeCt283 . However, as 
mentioned in chapter 1, a national debate on the problem of mental 
deficiency was going on: two statutory committees reported on the 
incidence of mental deficiency and on the benefits of voluntary sterilisation 
of the mentally deficient while the Eugenics Society organised a wide- 
ranging campaign for sterilisation. The joint committee of the Board of 
Control and the Board of Education reported that the absolute number of 
mental defectives was double what it was thought to be in 1908,284 but 
crucially it also identified a much larger group than the mentally deficient 
who by virtue of poor inheritance formed a 'social problem group'. This 
group was composed of the families of the mentally defective and 
comprised 10% of the population and included a large proportion of the 
insane, epileptics, criminals, prostitutes and alcoholics. 285 The significance 
of this 'soCial problem group' is that it identified as a problem not just the 
281 R. Porter, (1996) 'Two cheers for psychiatry', in H. Freeman & G. Berrios (eds), 150 
Years ofBritish Psychiatry, Volume H. - The Aftermath, pp. 383-406. London: Athlone. 
282This is exemplified in the work of the most famous British psychologist, Cyril Burt 
who estimated that approximately 10% of city children and 20% of rural children within 
the normal school system (i. e. excluding the mentally defective) were backward. He 
found backward children more interesting than mentally defective children because: 
'Backward children are seven times as numerous as the mentally defective ... as their 
subsequent life-histories show, it is from their ranks, rather than from those of the 
mentally defective, that the bulk of our criminals, paupers, and neer-do-wells are 
eventually drawn. ' C. Burt, (1937) The Backivard Child, London: University of London 
Press, p. 88. 
283 For a more elaborate discussion of the low status of mental deficiency work, see M. 
Thomson, (1998) pp. 125-127. 
284 This survey on the prevalence of mental deficiency was conducted to explain the vast 
differences in the reporting of mental deficiency between different local authorities, 
(Report, of the Mental Deficiency Connnittee being a Joint Conlinittee of the Board of 
Education and the Board of Control, (1929) HMSO, part IV, 1929, p. 83). 
2851bid, p. 80. 
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mentally deficient but also the merely 'dull' whose 'social and economic 
failure was primarily due to their poor mental endowment' and pronounced 
that in order "to prevent the racial disaster of mental deficiency" this entire 
subgroup must somehow be dealt with. 286 Professional concern during the 
interwar period about the problems caused by a significant 'dull' minority 
anticipated, therefore, the importance that would be placed on intelligence 
during. wartime. This conceptualisation of the 'dull and backward' as a 
national problem paved the way for the attribution of the various problems 
of military inefficiency to those with a lower IQ. 
The final and determining event for the introduction of intelligence 
tests was the report in August 1941 of the Select Committee on National 
Expenditure. 287 This committee, proposed radical changes including not 
only the introduction of intelligence testing to all potential recruits prior to 
enlistment but also the posting of recruits according to their scores to A 
depots for the more intelligent and B depots for the less intelligent. The 
reasons offered as to why such testing was necessary included the high 
standard of intelligence required for mechanised forces "since valuable 
weapons and equipment are wasted if put into the hands of unintelligent 
and therefore unskilled users" and that men of "poor mentality" break down 
under the stress of military discipline . 
288 The Committee also suggested 
that officers should be selected exclusively from a pool of men whose 
intelligence scores were above a particular level and that all men who fell 
into that category should be considered. Thus while admitting that high 
intelligence was not the most important quality in an officer it was agreed 
that it was an essential requirement. 
286 lbid, p. 8 1. 
287 Tiventy-Second Repoi-t foi- the Select Connniftee on National Expenditure (1940- 
1941) Parliamentary Papers, vol. 3 p. 3. 
288 Tiventy-Second Report (1940-194 1) p. 3. 
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Section 2: The Officers 
Selection 
Personnel selection focused not only on the testing of recruits but 
also on the selection of officers. The shortage of officers had been a 
problem in the British Army long before the Second World War, and in the 
late 1930s, Leslie Hore-Belisha, then Secretary of State for war, had 
introduced various reforms intended to increase recruitment and open 
c ommissions to pupils from secondary schools by improving pay thus 
making it a sustainable profession for those without a private income. Such 
reforms were not universally liked -one senior officer in discussing the 
proposed reforms stated that "Whilst ... 
it may be ... necessary for political 
reasons to open entry into the Army to Secondary School boys, it would 
prove very unfortunate for the Army in general if such an entry were at all 
large. " Among the reasons for this were that such men would not be 
respected by the rank and file and that their recruitment would have the 
effect of reducing recruitment from the upper classes presumably because 
the overall image of the Army would be tainted. 289 
During the war, the pressure to increase the numbers of officers 
became acute. While repeated instructions were given to Commanding 
Officers to suggest candidates for commission, the number of candidates 
remained low and the failure rate at the Officer Cadets Training Units 
(OCTU) was high. Among the suggestions to remedy the situation was one 
that originated with the Tavistock psychiatrist, Wilfred Bion. He 
recommended that soldiers should be asked to nominate members of their 
company whom they regarded as good potential officers in a secret ballot. 
Commanding Officers would not be bound by the results of the ballot for 
their recommendations, but would examine the results to see which soldiers 
had good all round support -not just from the rank and file but also from 
289 TNA, W032/4461, DGTA'ID The Willingdon Committee Report', dated 19/01/38. 
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the non-commissioned and commissioned officers. The Adjutant-General 
liked the scheme and implemented it experimentally in the Scottish 
Command where it did help in increasing the supply of officers, but when 
he suggested the scheme to the Army Council, it was rejected . 
290 The 
scheme had some support, and it was noted in the minutes that the Civil 
Member said "he saw nothing dangerous in the scheme as presented, which 
had the hall-mark of success. "291 However, the majority of the Army 
Council opposed it. It was suggested that the scheme would lead men to 
believe that they had the right to select their own officers, and in turn, this 
would mean that commanding officers would be pressured into 
recommending the candidates most popular to the men. Furthermore, the 
system could become corrupt with men being bribed into voting for 
particular candidates, and the whole scheme would be impossible to repeal 
once introduced. It was suggested that instead a system of quotas should be 
imposed in units to encourage Commanding Officers to put forth more 
292 candidates. 
At the same time, changes were taking place in the methods of 
selecting candidates for commission from the batches of soldiers 
recommended by Unit Selection Boards. According to Edward Grigg, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, who described the new 
procedures in parliament, candidates were watched over for a-couple of 
days by the President of the Board and given intelligence tests. The rest of 
the tests are described below: 
The second test is for alertness and quick reaction to events. The 
third test is of personality, the power to inspire confidence. The 
29() Adam later said that the experiment had also showed that the men in the sub unit 
were the best selectors and the senior NCOs were the worst, R. Adam, (1960) chapter 11, 
Army Council Minutes AC/M(42)5,29 October, 1942, 'Regimental Nominations of 
Candidates to Commanding Officers, p. 7, TNA WO 163/51. See also J. Crang, (2000) 
pp. 26-27. 
2q2 TNA, WO 163/5 1. 
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fourth test, the hardest of all, is a test of toughness of fibre, moral 
and physical, and it is being carried out by trained psychologists. 293 
This description, although flattering to psychologists was misleading 
as the actual tests included only what contemporaries acknowledged to be 
the most tentative tests for personality and no test of alertness or toughness. 
A more informed account was later offered by the Assistant Adjutant- 
General, F. H. Vinden, responsible for the provision of officers. 294 
According to Vinden, he was inspired to experiment with the methods of 
interviewing candidates after talking to the psychiatrist and German 
immigrant, Eric Wittkower, who at the time was translating a German 
document obtained by the Americans, which outlined German methods of 
officer selection. Vinden commissioned experiments that used the German 
methods of selections. In later accounts, many of the tests were ridiculed as 
inappropriate for British soldiers -the tests famously included spying on 
soldiers to see what their political preferences were and watching their 
facial expressions as they pulled on a spring coil from which an electric 
current electrocuted the candidates. 295 Nevertheless, the essential points of 
the German methods were retained. These included increasing the' 
assessment to a 48-hour period, and introducing intelligence tests and a 
psychiatric interview. 296 (In the German scheme, psychologists rather than 
psychiatrists interviewed the candidates, but unsurprisingly considering 
that it was mainly psychiatrists that put together the British scheme, this 
role was given to psychiatrists). Initially, the British scheme, like the 
German, also involved a medical examination -later this was dropped as 
293 Commons Debate, 5'h Series, 377,19'h Feb 1942, pp. 1989-1990. 
294 F. H. Vinden, (1977) 'The Introduction of War Office Selection Boards in the British 
An-ny: A Personal Recollection', lVar and Society, a yeai-book of militaq history, B. 
Bond & I.. Roy, (eds. ), London: Croom Helm. 
295 F. H. Vinden, (1977). Edward Grigg's justification in parliament as to why the British 
had been so slow in implementing the tests that were already been used in the German 
and American Armies was that "we are not Germans or Americans, and we were not 
sure that tests of other nations might prove applicable to our own people. " Commons 
Debate, 5'h Series, 377,19'h Feb 1942, p. 1990. 
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unnecessary, which meant that the psychiatrist became the only doctor 
involved in the process. The British scheme also introduced a variety of 
military tasks and psychological tests, essentially, however, the scheme 
relied on intelligence tests to measure intelligence, and on the psychiatric 
interview to assess personality. 
The final make up of these new War Office Selection Boards 
(WOSBs) came to include a President who was a senior officer, a 
psychiatrist, a psychologist and a number of other military officers who 
were in charge of the military testing. All officers reported to the President 
who also interviewed the candidates, saw their performance on the tests 
and made the ultimate decision. Gradually the job of the psychologist 
developed so that in addition to intelligence tests he administered a number 
of projection tests which it was thought would provide an indication as to 
the personality of the candidate and thus allow some candidates to be 
interviewed more briefly by the psychiatrist, as he would have some idea 
what he was looking for. A number of projection tests were used including 
the Word Association test, originally devised by Carl Jung, in which 
soldiers were shown in rapid succession, a series of cards, each with a word 
printed on it, and asked to write their immediate reaction. The responses 
were then scrutinised by the psychologist. Simon Gillman, Senior 
Psychiatrist in the Middle East Selection Board, wrote: 
... from the answers to certain key words such as Mother, Afraid, Home, Worry, he can distinguish the anxious, spoiled, homesick 
youth from the stable well-balanced man. Again, a number of 
words can be interpreted either in a war or non-war sense-Butt, 
Barrel, Desert, Arm, Front. The man who is war-minded tends to 
seize on the military meaning and reject the other. All these points 
are valuable clues to personality. 297 
After the war, it was acknowledged by psychologists that the 
296 P. E. Vernon & J. B. Parry, (1949) pp. 21-23. 
297 S. Gillman, (1947) 'Methods of Officer Selection in the Army', The Journal of 
Mental Science, p. 104. 
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'ambiguous words' had not been at all effective in picking out military 
minded men. 298 
The other test was the Thematic Apperception Test where each 
candidate was shown a picture depicting an ambiguous social situation, 
which he was told to use as an illustration in a story. He was then given 
three and a half minutes to write a relevant story. The candidate, it was 
assumed, projected himself on the principal character. The argument went 
like this: 
If all the stories end happily, with the hero overcoming his 
difficulties, it is likely that the writer is well balanced and 
energetic. On the other hand, where the hero is helpless, victim of 
his circumstances, and passive, there is a strong suspicion that the 
writer himself is an ineffectual person with little drive. 299 
By assessing the tests psychologists were supposed to come up with 
C personality pointers' that the psychiatrist would use for his interview. 
Projection tests soon became the most controversial part of the 
procedure. This was partly because it became apparent that there were not 
enough psychologists in the Armed Forces to service all the War Office 
Selection Boards. This task therefore became allocated to Personnel 
Selection Officers who had had only a few weeks training in interpreting 
the tests. Furthermore, psychologists had difficulty in proving that the tests 
had any validity or even that the scoring of different testers was completely 
reliable. 300 
The military tests were originally devised as tests for military 
competence and according to psychologists were introduced as a cover plan 
-they would impress the Army while allowing psychiatrists and 
psychologists to get on with selection. 
301 Soon however, psychiatrists 
became involved in these tests too. In 1943, Wilfred Bion developed the 
298 p. E. Vernon & J. B. Parry, (1949) p. 57. 
299 S. Gillman, (1947) p. 105 
300 P. E. Vernon & J. B. Parry, (1949) pp. 57-58. 
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tests into what were later called the 'leaderless group tests'. The idea was 
that a group of candidates would be given a task to do that involved 
cooperating with each other as a group. Testing officers then picked out the 
men who naturally took the lead in a situation where no leader had been 
appointed and also the men who were capable of sublimating their own 
desire to show themselves to do well for the sake of doing what is best for 
the group. The tests were observed by the military testing officers, the 
psychiatrist and the President. These tests had face-validity and became the 
most successful element of selection as far as the military was concerned 
although psychologists placed much more emphasis on the written tests, 
because the assessment of the leaderless groups was subjective and 
unreliable. 302 
Meanwhile for all the assertion that the WOSBs contributed to a 
large increase in the numbers of soldiers willing to put themselves forward 
for commission 303 in October 1942, there was still a perceived shortage as 
shown by the discussion on nominations discussed earlier. In 1943, the 
solution reached was that all those earmarked for commission by PSOs 
upon entering the Army would be automatically sent to a WOSB 
irrespective of the opinion of their commanding officers. 
By the end of the war, some 140,000 candidates had been through 
the new procedure, of whom about 60,000 passed. 
17-m 1 wrl ý +i*i d-ilrit 
There were several attempts to validate the WOSBs and more 
specifically the psychiatric input to the WOSBs. The WOSBs' overall 
procedure was validated through a comparison between candidates 
produced by the old boards and the new as judged by training officers at 
OCTU. This research showed that candidates from the new boards were 
301 lbid, p. 60. 
302 P. E. Vemon & J. B. Parry, (1949), p. 63. 
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rated higher. 304 Other research showed however that correlation between 
WOSBs was not particularly high. 305 More interestingly, the psychiatric 
interviews were validated by comparing the assessment of candidates by 
psychiatrists (who had had access to intelligence testing results and 
interviewed the offic er-candi dates for an hour) to those made by training 
officers who had trained the candidates for a period of five weeks and also 
had information of their track records from their previous regiments. In 
both of these experiments, the degree of agreement was between 80 and 
90%. 306 While the way in which this high degree of consistency was 
achieved was somewhat biased -the psychiatrist and the officer decided 
together to what extent their opinion converged and the psychiatrist at least 
had a vested interest in this convergence being high -this also demonstrates 
that the values that psychiatrists brought to the Army were not different 
from those of the Army officers. 
In the few cases where there were differences of opinion between 
psychiatrists and officers, these were mainly due to differences in the 
perception of the candidates' intelligence (in most cases officers rated the 
candidates' intelligence as higher than that measured by the tests). In a few 
other cases, there were differences in the assessment of the candidates' 
personalities -sometimes because the psychiatrist had judged that there was 
some psychiatric disability. Some of these differences were reconciled after 
further discussion, particularly when the officer accepted the psychiatrist's 
judgment on the candidate's intelligence. In a few cases however, the 
officer stated either the tests were wrong and did not reflect the candidate's 
true intelligence or that the lack of intelligence was not as important as the 
303 J. Crang, (2000) p. 34. 304 p. Vernon, (1942) p. 124. 
305 This meant that of candidates passed any one board, 21.5% were deferred or rejected 
bý another. P. Vernon, (1942) p. 125. 36 (6 The first experiment was conducted by Lt. -Col. T. F. Roger and Major E. Wittkower, 
in 1941 and the second by the Directorate of Army Psychiatry. TNA, CAB98/28 P. P. 
(S. C. ) (43 )35.13 th August 1943; 'The Reliability And Consistency Of Psychiatric 
Opinions On Officer Quality', CMAC, GC/135 BI (I of 4). 
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psychiatrist thought because the candidate's other qualities that made up f6r 
it. 307 
Overall, however, these experiments with validation show that a 
primary reason for the psychiatrists' success in their involvement with 
military selection was that they did not bring into the procedures principles 
that clashed with the establishment. While the psychiatrists' and 
psychologists' obsession with the primacy of intelligence above all other 
traits contrasted to some extent with military views, overall most values 
about what constituted a good officer were shared. 
Meritocracy? 
The introduction of the WOSBs had as its primary aim to increase 
the quantity and quality of officers. A corollary of this aim was that the 
new boards would be meritocratic and would therefore draw talent from all 
social classes. This was an important political point and several questions 
had been asked in parliament regarding the social background of officers. 
In December 1939, prior to the new selection methods, the Liberal MP 
Geoffrey Mander asked the Secretary of State for War for the number of 
officers who had been educated at elementary schools, adding that this 
information would be "extremely interesting as showing the democratic 
character of officers in the Army". He received the answer that such 
information would require great labour to obtain and was therefore not 
available but that "Everybody knows that the system for provision of 
officers for the Army could hardly be more democratic than it iS. 008 In 
1942, Edward Grigg gave an update to the House of the new selection 
methods making the point that "the Army is not in the least concerned with 
the origins of the candidates who come up for commissions" that 
"everyone, whatever his background, starts at once with an equal 
307 TNA, CAB98/28 P. P. (S. C. ) (43) 35 p. 1 1. 
308 Commons Debates, 5"' series, 355,12, December 1939, pp. 1005-1006. 
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opportunity for promotion". In particular, he stated that the intelligence 
tests which were used were tests of general intelligence and not educational 
achievement in order to counter the point made previously by the Labour 
MP Jack Lawson that "candidates were being selected because they had 
been to secondary schools or universities. 009 
Under the WOSB system, the majority of officers were drawn from 
those who had been to a secondary rather than a public school. Most 
figures show that approximately 25% of successful candidates at OCTU 
were from public schools whereas around 60% were from secondary 
schools and 15% from elementary schoolS. 31 0 This in itself indicates that 
whereas the social background of officers was far more mixed than it had 
been during the inter-war period, it was still far from representative. In a 
regular Army intake, only 25% were educated in secondary schools, 311 
while in the country at large, only 7% of children attended public schools 
in 1937-3 g. 312 More significantly, the WOSBs were less inclined to accept 
elementary school boys for commissions, than were Commanding Officers 
and the Unit Selection Boards. Figures published by the office of the 
Adjutant-General show that for a period of six weeks late in 1942, out of 
the candidates at WOSB (who therefore had had the recommendation of 
their CO and had passed the Unit Selection Board) 15% were from public 
schools,, 61% from secondary schools and 24% from elementary schools. 
309 Commons Debates, 5 th series, 377,19 February 1942, pp. 1987-1990. The 
industrialist MP Austin Hopkinson (Independent) responded to Grigg's distinction 
between educational achievement and intelligence by asking: "Surely if a high level of 
education does not accompany a correspondingly high level of intelligence, it is time to 
scrap our educational system? ". Grigg responded: "That is not a question for the War 
Office". 
310 In this period, elementary schools educated pupils until the age of 14. A system of 
exemptions meant that that those educated prior to 1921 would have been able to leave 
school as young as 12 or 13. R. McKibbin, (1998) Classes and Cultures, England 1918- 
1951, Oxford: Oxford university Press, p. 207. 
31 'Also, in a regular Army intake 5.8% of recruits had a school certificate. B. Ungerson 
(1953) p. 47 & 95. 
312 In the 1910s and 1920s when most of the men who fought in the Second World War 
were educated, this figure was probably even smaller. B. Simon (1991) Education and 
the social oi-dei- 1940-1990, London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 25. 
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However, the success rate at WOSB was 70% for public school boys, 59% 
for Secondary School boys and only 40% for elementary school boys. This, 
in turn changed the final results so that from the successful candidates 19% 
were from public schools, 63% from secondary schools and 18% from 
elementary schools. 313 Nonetheless, these figures were particularly 'good' as 
far as the proportion of elementary school boys was concerned. Adam in 
his memoirs mentioned that these figures changed throughout the war and 
frequently the proportion of elementary school boys went down and the 
. proportion of public school boys went up. 314 So while the WOSBs had been 
formed partly to counter the problem of Commanding Officers being 
unable to judge men who were of a different social class to themselves 315 
and according to one psychiatrist "completely restored soldiers' faith in 
selection" and "enabled the Army finally to shake off the charge of being 
Blimpish and class-ridden 016 in reality they probably promoted fewer 
working class men that would have been promoted by the previous 
techniques. 
In all likelihood, the main reason why boys with only elementary 
education were so much less likely to pass the WOSBs was the 
introduction of intelligence tests, as these strongly favoured the better 
educated. Th 
, 
is is supported by the fact that once the system changed so that 
all those marked as potential officers by Personnel Selection Officers 
during initial recruitment were sent to WOSBs independently of their 
Commanding' Officer, the supply of candidates (and so presumably the 
supply of officers) became even more socially stratified. According to the 
Chief Psychologist, 96% of those recommended by PSOs were 'above 
normal elementary school standard' (i. e. secondary and public school boys) 
313 Liddell Hart Centre, Adam 3/4/2, Office of the Adjutant-General (1943) 'Selection of 
Personnel'p. 14. 
314 Liddell Hart Centre, Adam 3/13 'Selection of Men and Leadersp. 11. 
3 15 This claim was originally made in J. Rees (1945) p. 64 and has been subsequently 
3 
peated in all the relevant literature, e. g. J. Crang (2000) p. 28. re 
Interview with John Bowlby cited in B. Shephard. (2000) p. 192. 
133 
and 60% had obtained a school certificate. 317 This means that 60% of 
candidates were selected from 5.8% of the population, 36% from 19.2% of 
the population and 4% from the remainder .3 
18 The PSOs had considerable 
less information on candidates than the WOSBs and the most significant 
information they had was the intelligence test results. So ironically the 
reform which was supposed to be most meritocratic in that it recognised 
ability in any walk of life was precisely what stopped working class men 
getting co mmissions. 
Adam argued in his memoirs that this injustice was the fault of 
society which did not provide a good education for all and the Army had no 
choice but to pick its officers among the better educated for "an officer in 
modem war must have a certain standard of education if he is to train and 
lead men. 0 19 However, this view was not shared by everyone. For 
example, Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchison argued that whereas public school 
boys had the advantage of a better diet and physical education, boys 
educated in elementary schools were better trained in the psychological and 
sociological spheres as they had a better understanding of how the world 
worked, had had the opportunity to work and specialise from a young age 
and did not suffer the disadvantages of an education based on cramming 
and social isolation. 320 Even more persuasively, F. Warhurst who trained 
officer cadets in an OCTU during the war, had statistical results about the 
quality of the cadets in which he showed that boys from elementary schools 
did better than boys from public and secondary schools. 321 Of course 
Warhurst acknowledged that doing well in an OCTU was very different 
from doing well in the field, and he conceded that the younger public 
317 B. Ungerson, (1953) p. 47. 
318 In a regular Army intake only 5.8% of recruits had a school certificate and 25% were 
educated in secondary and public schools. B. Ungerson, (1953) pp. 47 & 95. 
3 19 Adam 3/13, p. 11, Liddell Hart Centre. 
320 G. S. Hutchison, (1941) 'Selection and education of an officer', The Arnzy Quarterly, 
Vol XLII, No. 2, pp. 66-74. 
321 F. Warhurst, (1946)'Training Army Officers, An analysis of some results obtained in 
war', The Ariiiy Quarterly, Vol. LII, No. 2, pp. 252-26 1. 
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schoolboys might do better than their colleagues, once they acquired 
experience and maturity. Nonetheless, he concluded that 'an elementary 
school education was an adequate background provided that the required 
inherent characteristics were present'. 322 
Others disagreed. The argument was put forward that only upper 
class men had the right skills to lead men. Famously, Colonel Bingham 
who also worked in an OCTU, was sacked for breaking the rules for 
publishing without permission a letter to The Thnes arguing that officers 
who were not upper class could not lead men because they had not grown 
up with servants and therefore did not know what it was like to be 
responsible for the lives of others. Instead, the argument went, these new 
officers had 'been reared in an atmosphere where the State spoon feeds 
everyone from cradle to grave, and no one feels any responsibility for his 
, 323 fellow men. Nonetheless, according to Warhurst, the men with best 
man-management skills were not public school boys raised with servants, 
but men with experience of being employers'. 
A number of sources which criticised Army Officers reserved their 
greatest contempt not for working class officers but those from the middle 
class who were presented as pale imitations of the real upper class. So in 
the satirical publication 'Bless 'em All', the upper class author sang the 
praises of the traditional -public school officer even while claiming that 
such men were not very intelligent. 324 He argued that such officers should 
be supplemented not by middle class men who imitated them but by men 
selected for "their brains, their scientific ability, their business experience 
or their bad moral characters. 025 The socialist William Shebbeare who 
argued that many upper class officers were ineffective because they had no 
322 F. Warhurst, (194 6) p. 25S. 
323 Col. Bingham, The Thnes, 15 th January 1941, p. 5. 
324 The author describes the qualities of the upper class officer as follows: "Patriotism 
yes: Breeding, yes: Courage, yes: Noblese oblige, yes: Espi-if de Col-ps, yes, yes, yes: 
Intelligence, No. " Boomerang (1942) Bless Enz 411: An Analysis of the Mo)-ale, 
Efficiency, and Leadership of the British Army, London: Seeker & Warburg, p. 49. 
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understanding of the lives of their men, also condemned middle class 
'imitations' -instead, he argued, men with experience of leadership from the 
trade unions should have been selected. 326 Nevertheless, it was middle class 
men educated in secondary schools that emulated the public schools, who 
formed the majority of the officer ranks of the Army of the Second World 
War. 
Psycholoizical Defeat? 
From as early as 1943, some of the powers vested in psychiatrists 
and psychologists began to be removed. As seen in chapter two, 
psychiatrists were removed from Boards selecting candidates for 
permanent commissions and an expert commission was set up to judge 
their work. In practice, the expert committee which consisted of doctors, 
psychiatrists and psychologists, including the Director- Generals of the 
medical services of each'Service proved no threat to the psychiatrists and 
psychologists. Service psychiatrists and psychologists attended most 
meeting and their overall conclusions were extremely positive. The only 
potential threat -Lord Moran, physician to Churchill, and primary advocate 
against psychiatry did not attend. In 1946, however, Adam was replaced by 
a new Adju tant-General, and two more committees were set up -and this 
time the members were -not doctors but senior officers. Like the expert 
committee before them part of their remit was explicitly to judge whether 
too much use was being made of psychiatrists and psychologists. The 
Ritchie Committee which dealt with permanent commissions recommended 
the removal of psychologists as well as psychiatrists and the removal of the 
intelligence tests. 327 The report argued that psychiatric assessment was not 
necessary as the candidates for permanent commissions had already passed 
325 Boomerang, (1942) p. 53. 
326 Captain X, (1944) A soldiei- looks ahead, London: The Labour Book Service, pp. 55- 
57. 
327 TNA, W032/12133 
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through WOSBs and had proved themselves in the field. The Crocker 
report was more moderate and argued that as there was a severe shortage of 
service psychiatrists and psychologists since demobilisation had began, and 
most WOSBs operated without their help anyway and so it would be more 
profitable if the few remaining staff were detached from particular WOSBs 
and were used instead in a research capacity where they could improve and 
validate the tests. 328 Furthermore, it suggested that the projection tests 
should be removed as without a psychiatrist to interpret these properly their 
results would be misleading. Finally, it argued that PSOs should no longer 
have the authority to send new recruits to WOSBs but merely to suggest to 
the candidate and his commanding officer, that the man had the potential to 
become an officer. Nevertheless, the Crocker report acknowledged that "the 
general opinion held by DSP, Presidents and members of WOSBs is that 
they [psychiatrists] are of great value as members of Boards. 029 
The Director of Army Psychiatry and the Director of Army Medical 
Services both put forward a robust defence of the psychiatric methods. 
However, all the recommendations were accepted with the exception of the 
suggestion to remove intelligence tests from the permanent commission 
boards, which was opposed by Presidents of Boards and rejected by the 
Director of Selection of Personnel. In December 1946, a parliamentary 
question was asked about why psychiatrists and psychologists had been 
removed from selection boards "in view of the fact that these experts 
devised the successful techniques now in use". The response merely cited 
the shortage of technical personnel and the recommendations of the 
Crocker and Ritchie reports rather than offering any objection to the 
continued presence of psychiatrists and psychologists. 330 
328 TNA, W032/12134 
329 TNA, W032/12134 Report of the Crockei- Committee p. 14. 
330 Tuesday I oth December 1946, TNA, W032/12134 
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psychiatric input did result in a particular emphasis on the importance of 
high intelligence as an essential officer quality, but this was one of the least 
controversial aspects of the new selection methods and was as such 
maintained after the war. 
In addition, this chapter has also shown that psychiatric input into the 
methods of officer selection was immense and demonstrates not only that 
psychiatrists enjoyed great patronage under Ronald Adam and his staff, but 
also that psychiatrists and Army officers in general, had essentially similar 
values and this permitted them to cooperate successfully. After the war, 
once the post of Adjutant-General was refilled, psychiatrists and 
psychologists did lose many of their powers -however this was to a large 
extent inevitable as conscription ended and the Army had once again the 
option of selecting their officers almost exclusively from the public 
schools. The fact that the intelligence tests, the leaderless group tests and 
the 2-day selection procedure were maintained as well as that some 
psychiatrists and psychologists were retained in a research capacity is a 
sign that psychiatrists did have a large impact on selection procedures. To 
retain psychiatrists and psychologists in peacetime in their prominent 
wartime positions would- have been unrealistic, as the Army no longer 
needed to pick its officers from unwilling civilians with no military 
experience nor was the danger of psychiatric casualties as imminent. In 
total, peacetime offered far fewer opportunities for preventive psychiatry so 
the value and status of military psychiatry was inevitably reduced. 
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Chapter 4: Sutton Emergency Hospital 1940-1942 
Introduction 
Prior to the Second World War, the authorities had expected that any 
conflict that involved the aerial bombardment of British cities would lead 
to massive casualties. While the estimates of the civilian dead run as high 
as 35,000 a day, estimates of the psychiatric casualties run even higher - 
psychiatrists had warned that for every physical casualty up to three 
332 psychiatric casualties could be expected. In order to deal with the 
expected casualties, civilian hospitals in Britain became organised under 
the authority of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS). In EMS hospitals, 
the medical staff were not conscripted but each unit had a military registrar 
and some military staff 333 
In the first few months of the war, it became apparent that civilian 
casualties from aerial bombardment would be much lower than expected. 
EMS hospitals were under-used and so when the Dunkirk evacuation took 
place many casualties were treated in EMS rather than military hospitals. In 
particular, military psychiatric facilities in the UK were scarce and catered 
mainly for psychotic patients. In June 1940, there were three units for 
psychotic patients but only one for neurotic patients. 334 This was partly 
because it had been hoped that the majority of patients would be treated 
near the front line and not evacuated to the UK. 335 
332 B. Shephard, (2000) A IVar of Nerves, London: Jonathan Cape, pp. 174-175; T. 
Harrison (1976) Living through the Blitz, London: Collins; R. M. Titmuss, (1950) 
Problems ofSocial Policy, London, HMSO. 
333 W. Sargant, (1967) The Unquiet Mind, The Autobiography of a Physician in 
Psychological Medicine, London: Pan Books, p. 1] 4. The Unquiet Mind and Sargant's 
earlier best-selling book Battle for the Mind were written in collaboration with Robert 
Graves who edited the scripts and earned a third of the royalties. See CMAC PP/WWS, 
Box 3 A. 21 & A. 22. 
334 F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1955), 'The army psychiatric service', The Army Medical 
Services, Administration, Vol, II, London: HMSO, pp. 470-474. 
335 Questions were asked in parliament by Dr Howitt and Mr Freemantle in February 
1940 about why psychoneurotic patients were being evacuated to England and treated in 
general hospitals contrary to the 1922 committee recommendations. The Secretary of 
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Soldiers evacuated to EMS hospitals were, on the whole, treated as if 
they were civilian patients. This chapter will explore the psychiatric 
treatment of military patients in one such unit where the medical records of 
the patients are available. It will show how in the pressurised conditions 
that arose, the doctors' priorities were mostly to discharge patients rather 
than return them to their units. This attitude was facilitated by the belief 
that most of the patients were constitutionally inadequate and hence 
incurable and unlikely to be of much further use to the military. In addition, 
the shortage of available treatment facilities meant that treatment was 
rationed and only those most likely to benefit were treated. The decision on 
who to treat was reached after examining the patients' personal histories 
when an assessment was made of the extent to which each patient had 
adapted to the responsibilities and lifestyle appropriate for a contemporary 
young man. However, at the same time, elaborate and experimental 
treatments were being used on civilian patients where they were thought 
likely to benefit from them. 
In London, the Maudsley psychiatric hospital became part of the 
EMS and was evacuated to two different locations, one in Mill Hill, North 
London and the other in Sutton, South London. This chapter will be 
concerned with Sutton, the unit that was developed by psychiatrists 
interested in physical therapies. The clinical director of Sutton was Eliot 
Slater, a committed advocate of genetic explanations for mental illness, 
intellectual differences and personality and a keen member (later a Fellow) 
of the Eugenics Society. The Deputy Director was William Sargant who 
was also a proponent of constitutional explanations for mental illness but 
who nonetheless viewed mental illness as identical to physical illness and 
therefore capable of striking anyone at anytime. In later years, Sargant 
state for war responded that a psychiatric centre and convalescent depots had been set 
up in France for this purpose but that inevitably some patients had to be evacuated. 
Later, the Dunkirk evacuation made treatment in the UK inevitable. Commons Debate, 
5 th Series, 357,20t" Feb 1940, p. 1 137-1138; 27 th Feb 1940, p. 1918. 
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became renowned for his hostility to psychoanalysis and for the - 
experimental and dangerous treatments that he practised. 
Sutton 1940-1942 
In the summer of 1940, Sutton was flooded with service patients 
from Dunkirk. Sargant described the situation in his autobiography: 
I shall never forget the arrival of these Dunkirk soldiers in their'tin 
hats', and filthy uniforms, some of them wounded, many in states of 
total and abject neurotic collapse, slouching along, mixed up with 
Belgian and French civilians who had scrambled aboard the boats 
at the last minute. What the papers termed a great British 
achievement seemed to us at the time nothing better than a 
defeated and defeatist rout. Men swarmed into the hospital, some 
raging mutinously against their officers for having deserted them in 
a panic and others swearing that they would never fight again. 336 
During the Blitz, the hospital was subject to repeat bombings that 
caused multiple casualties. In the following passage, Sargant described how 
life proceeded at the hospital: 
In September, ... the main hospital building caught a direct hit ... We dug patients out unconscious but still alive after perhaps 
trampling on their faces in our rescue efforts. We found many 
others blown into pieces. Sixteen patients were found killed, and 
many of the survivors were badly injured. Heroic feats were 
performed that night by patients who had hitherto seemed 
hopelessly incapacitated neurotics, and most of whom relapsed as 
soon as the crisis ended. ... During -the long Blitz, several very normal members of the 
hospital staff showed signs of breaking down ... When a bomb dropped near the hospital, a frightened patient might lose the use of 
his limbs before the ward doctor's very eyes ... As soon as the sirens sounded, soldiers and civil defence patients 
would rush madly out to some supposedly safer sheltering place. 
Those whose nerves had originally broken down while they were 
sheltered by a house, would make for the open and often stay out 
all night, returning almost frozen in the morning. Those, on the 
other hand, who had been bombed and broken down in the open, 
336 W. Sargant, (1967) p. 114. 
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would take cover in buildings. Some men even made a habit of 
going two or three miles every night to find a safe shelter. 337 
In July 1940, Sargant and Slater published their first article on their 
experience of soldiers suffering from acute war neurosiS. 338 In this article 
they put across the somewhat counterintuitive theory that the less severe 
the strain that caused a man to break down the less likely it was that he 
would recover. They argued that: "... prognosis will to some extent depend 
on the severity of the strain; if it was not very severe it is probable that the 
patient is constitutionally not entirely stable, and therefore unfitted for the 
most arduous military duty. " In Sargant and Slater's practice, prognosis 
(and the decision whether a patient should be discharged from the Army or 
be returned to his unit) was linked to constitutional fitness and this was 
determined by a number of factors of which the severity of the stressor was 
one but which also included the patient's personal history, IQ score etc. The 
men evacuated from Dunkirk were generally judged to be considerably less 
constitutionally damaged than either peace-time civilian patients or the men 
who had broken down "under the comparatively trivial stresses of life 
abroad under army conditions, without any of the severe strains entailed in 
actual fighting". Nevertheless even in the Dunkirk cases, constitutional 
factors were thought to be . 
important as "compared to an average 
population, they would almost certainly show an excessive proportion of 
men who had suffered from nervous troubles in earlier life, and an 
excessive frequency of psychiatric disorder in the nearer blood relatives". 
Overall., the prognoses of these men was not optimistic. Sargant and 
Slater believed that "A history of previous neurotic illnesses or symptoms 
in civil life" must exclude patients "from duties that will be the equivalent 
of front-line service". 339 In addition, many of the patients "expressed a 
conviction that they could never go through such an experience again 
337 W. Sargant, (1967) pp. 129-133. 
338 W. Sargant & E. Slater, (1940) 'Acute War Neuroses, The Lancet, ii, pp. 1-2. 
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without breaking down at once. " No statistics about the proportion of men 
who returned to their units was provided at this stage but it seems unlikely 
that it was high. 
Two years later Eliot Slater reported that from the 2,000 military 
patients sent to Sutton, (including the evacuees from Dunkirk) only 26% 
had returned to duty 340 and it is very unlikely that any of these men would 
be involved in front-line duty. Sargant explained the rationale: 
Our experiences after Dunkirk taught us the folly of trying to patch 
up soldiers and expect them to face again the stresses that had 
caused their breakdown ... we 
found that if these soldiers were sent 
back to full duty, fresh battle stresses would at once reproduce the 
former symptoms. So we decided to avoid the terrible chronic 
neuroses from World War I by arranging for nervously unstable 
patients to be discharged from the Army, hoping they would make 
some sort of success in civil life. In less severe cases, we 
recommended that they should be kept on base-line Army duties; 
and many of these rehabilitated themselves without further 
breakdown. 341 
Slater also provided statistics on treatment in Sutton -actual 
psychiatric treatment was relatively infrequent and reserved for the patients 
who were deemed more likely to benefit from it: 
Nearly 60 per cent. of the patients received no specific treatment 
other than that provided by the usual hospital routine, physical 
training, occupational therapy, etc., and perhaps a few short 
therapeutic interviews. ... The possibilities of treatment were 
limited on the one hand by the frequency of a rather low 
intelligence and firmly anchored constitutional instability, and on 
the other hand by working conditions. There was a great pressure 
on beds and a rapid turn over ... 
342 
339 lbid, p. 2. 
340 E. Slater, (1943) 'The Neurotic constitution, A statistical study of Two Thousand 
Soldiers', The Journal offeurology and Psychia1g, p. 12 
341 W. Sargant, (1967) p. 117. 
342 E. Slater, (1943) 'The Neurotic constitution, A statistical study of Two Thousand 
Soldiers', The Journal offeurology andPsychiatry, 6, Nos I&2, p. 9. 
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Treatment in Sutton was guided partly by the patients' symptoms. In 
particular, loss of weight was treated by modified insulin therapy where 
patients were injected with insulin at sub-coma levels and fed large 
amounts of boiled potatoes. 
343 Hysterical loss of function (amnesia, 
paralysis, mutism etc) was treated with chemical abreaction. The 
psychiatrist injected the patient with sodium amytal, which induced a 
hypnotic-like state. Then the psychiatrist encouraged the patient to relive 
traumatic events he had recently experienced. William Sargant understood 
this treatment in a behavioural way and so felt that its curative aspect lay 
exclusively in the discharge of emotion rather than in the content of the 
forgotten event. Following Pavlov, Sargant believed that soldiers were 
conditioned through the war, into a constant state of anxiety, and that a new 
stressor would break the conditioning. Sargant tried to artificially create 
such a stressor for his patients by making them relive horrifying situations, 
and if a patient had not experienced a suitably terrifying event Sargant 
invented one. 344 In his book "Battle for the Mind" Sargant recalls: 
Much better results could often ... be obtained by stirring up 
emotions about ... imaginary happenings. For example it might be 
suggested, under drugs, to a patient who had broken down as a 
result of a tank battle, that he was trapped in a burning tank and 
must fight his way out. ... a falsely implanted memory might 
create a larger emotional discharge than the real and induce the 
physiological effects needed for psychological relief. A technique 
of deliberately stimulating anger or fear under drugs, until the 
patient collapses in temporary emotional exhaustion was finally 
345 perfected with the help of Pavlov's findings ... 
343 This treatment was developed by William Sargant as an adaptation to the standard 
insulin coma therapy for Schizophrenia invented by Manfred Sakel in which patients 
entered a coma and were revived by intravenous sugar solution. Sargant's method was 
safer because it did not induce a coma and more convenient in war-time when sugar was 
rationed. W. S argant (1967) pp. 119-12 0. 
344 For a good discussion of Sargant's abreactive methods, see R. Leys, (2000), D-awna, 
A Genealogy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ' 
345 W. Sargant, (195 7) Battle of the Mind, London: Heinmann, p. xxi 
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Sargant recorded that in one case: "treatment done in open ward 
behind screens and therefore difficult to press for details owing to his 
shouted reply heard by other patients". 346 
However, although these treatments were ostensibly therapies for 
specific symptoms, in practice the decision on whether or not to treat a 
patient depended on a lot more than just his symptoms. For example, in a 
sample of 334 cases treated by Sargant, in which 105 patients were 
classified as having lost weight, only 60 patients were treated with insulin 
while 6 others were treated with other treatments. Also treated with insulin 
were 32 other patients who had not lost weight (including one patient who 
had gained weight during service). So while patients who had lost weight 
were considerably more likely to be treated than those who had not, (the 
average was around 38%) therapy was not very specifically targeted. 
What seems probable is that Sargant was more likely to treat patients 
who had lost weight, not because he needed to remedy the symptom, but 
because he believed that patients who broke down after enduring some kind 
of physical deterioration were more likely to be constitutionally sound than 
the men who broke down for purely emotional reasons. 347 Some men who 
had lost weight were not judged to be constitutionally sound, so they were 
not treated. The judgment on whether a patient was constitutionally 
adequate or not depended on a number of factors. One such factor, as 
mentioned earlier was military stress and Eliot Slater's statistical 
information shows that patients who had endured severe stress before 
breaking down were far more likely be treated, particularly by the more 
respected physical treatments. Although in Slater's categorisation, the 
majority of patients are classified as having received "non-specific 
treatment". in practice, as mentioned earlier, this meant that they received 
346CMAC, PP/WWS, Box 10, E. 3/1. 
347 W. Sargant & E. Slater, (1944) Physical Methods of Ti-eatlyient in Psychially, 
Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone. 
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no actual treatment beside the benefits of a hospital environment and an 
assessment by a psychiatrist. 
Treatment Military Stress undergone 
Severe % Moderate % Trifling % 
Non-Specific 30.2 52.1 64.8 
Physical Measures 43.9 30.1 16.3 
Psychotherapy 25.9 17.8 18.9 
Table 1: The relationship between receiving treatment and having undergone military 
stress. Extracted from E. Slater, (1943) p. 13, table 11. 
Another criterion that determined whether a patient would receive 
treatment in Sutton was his family history. Only 59 patients were recorded 
as having a negative family history, which meant that all their relatives 
were mentally healthy. However, 32 of them were treated which is 
considerably higher than the average. Intelligence also mattered: out of the 
85 patients who were described as having a low intelligence (either 
impressionistically or based on an IQ test) only 19 were treated. 
What also determined whether a soldier was constitutionally 
vulnerable was his pre-morbid personality. Sargant's patients were far less 
likely to receive treatment if Sargant felt that they had always been 
inadequate, neurotic people whose symptoms were merely aggravated by 
the war. Out of the 101 patients of whom it can be said that they were seen 
to have a poor pre-morbid personality, only 18 were treated. 
One way of conceptualising which patients became classified as 
having a poor personality is in terms of the male gender role. Hospitalised 
soldiers had already failed at the occupation that was the pinnacle of male 
virility and Sargant searched in the men's past for compounding evidence 
of emasculation. When he found it, patients were often classified as 
constitutionally inadequate. For example, one area in which Sargant was 
particularly interested in was the patients' work record. Most of Sargant's 
patients had good work records but for those. who did not, their chances of 
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receiving treatment were bleak: out of the 41 patients who had very poor 
work records only 8 were treated and from the 83 patients who had fairly 
poor work records only 22 were treated -considerably less than the 
average. 
Other manifestations of manliness Sargant and the other Sutton 
psychiatrists were interested in were sexual functioning and athletic 
appearance. For example, Eliot Slater made the following observation 
about service patients: 
The number of men in whom sexual relations began at a late age, 
occurred with unusual rarity and were associated with little interest 
or satisfaction was so high as to attract attention... an inhibited sex 
life is especially frequent among mental defectives and 
psychopaths ... It is clearly a quality of deep biological 
significance, and it may be that it is genetically associated with the 
factors that make for inferiority of intelligence and temperament. 348 
Slater inferred that "inferiority of intelligence and temperament" 
were genetically linked to a low sex drive; nature's way of assuring inferior 
men would be unlikely to reproduce. 349 Slater also found a correlation 
between low sex drive, non-athletic physique, and poor clinical outcome. 
Predictably, he thought this correlation suggested an overall genetic 
inferiority. When Eliot Slater conducted a factor analysis on the negative 
traits exhibited by soldiers, he found that poor intelligence was mostly 
associated with poor work record, and that poor work record correlated 
strongly with all negative traits. Since patients' intelligence was assessed 
by the overall impression a patient made, (actual intelligence tests were 
conducted on only a small proportion of patients); it is possible to infer that 
a poor earning capacity led psychiatrists to infer that a patient was 
348 E. Slater, (1943) p. 4, 
349 In this respect, Slater's views are markedly different from those of other members of 
the Eugenics Society who were particularly concerned with the supposed superfecundity 
of dull men and women. 
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unintelligent, had a constitutional vulnerability to mental illness and was 
unlikely to get better. 
As none of the military patients who were treated in Sutton were 
officers, it is difficult to infer his attitude to rank or class. However, the 
medical notes give the impression that middle class soldiers would have 
only been more likely to be treated if they were hard working and 
ambitious not if they were intellectuals or men of leisure. For example, 
, 350 'Bill 9 who broke down after a bombardment where he was buried under 
debris for several hours was described by Sargant as "an artistic, 
intellectual type" with "many feminine characteristics". According to 
Sargant, Bill had "been spoilt all his life", was "highly strung", and tended 
"to whine". Bill's mother came from "a musical family" and was 
"excitable, artistic [and] erratic". Sargant concluded: "[Bill] still claims that 
symptoms are entirely due to bombing. In my view, present condition is the 
effect of bombing on a constitutionally anxious and hysterical person with 
poor heredity ... Not a good case for a pension". According to his medical 
notes, Bill received no treatment even though he stayed in the hospital for 
over 6 weeks. He was finally boarded out of the Army. 
Another patient, 23-year-old 'Charles' 351 was admitted to hospital 
after having been mute for five months. Sargant treated him with 
abreaction, which was the standard cure for all hysterical symptoms. 
Nonetheless, Sargant regarded Charles as a poor personality. As Charles 
could not speak, the information was elicited in writing: 
Personal History 
... 
Since leaving school has been a shop assistant, in the same 
job-never earned more than 25/- a week. Gives poor reasons for 
not leaving to get higher wages. No affairs with girls. Occupies 
spare time with music and piano playing. 
Present State 
350 CMAC, PP/WWS, Box 10, E. 3/1. All names are fictional. 
351 Ibid. 
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... Past history shows that he is a poor personality with a bad family history. 
19.8.41 (after treatment) 
Talks in a high squeaky voice. Is actually singing in ward concert 
as a woman. 
These patients' perceived femininity, interest in the Arts and absence 
of a successful career or sufficient interest in the opposite sex lead to their 
classification as poor personalities with poor heredity. 352 
When treatment results were poor, patients' constitutions were often 
blamed and their personalities retrospectively reclassified as inadequate. 
Eliot's 353 medical notes show how a good patient could become a bad 
patient through the course of their stay in hospital, if treatment failed. Eliot 
suffered from anxiety, lack of energy, and being upset by the sounds of 
guns. He was originally described on the II th November 1940 as follows: 
Apparently a very hard worker. Doing up to 14 hours a day in his 
own business... 
Gives excellent impression -seems a good personality and I do not 
lay much store by his history of previous worrying. He seems to 
have been very conscientious and hard working ... Quite 
frank 
about his troubles which are alien to his nature. Only too anxious 
to get wel [sic] and return to his [unit] which may be going abroad 
again ... [there 
is] no real psychological cause for his illness. It 
seems that reason may well be found in physical state. 
On the 14th of November, Eliot was physically examined and no 
physical condition was found. From this point, Sargant's view of the 
patient changed. On the 12 th of December, Sargant wrote: 
352 Only one of Sargant's patients was overtly described as a homosexual. This man was 
thought by Sargant to have a high IQ, to have "really done his best against heredity 
odds" and to be "genuinely upset by his conflicts and would give anything to be 
normal". However, he also had a history of nervous instability, which stood in the way 
of his career as an actor. He was not treated. 353 CMAC, PP/WWS, Box 10, E. 3/1. 
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I am increasingly doubtful about this case. The more you see and 
talk to him the more one thinks that this condition is of long 
standing. Finally confessed that he had been like this before he 
came over here... [he] makes little attempt to get well. Always one 
complaint or another. 
Finally, on the I Oth of January 1941 Sargant concluded: 
Thyroid does not seem to have altered condition ... Seems a 
complete "softy" and that is all there seems to be in this case. I am 
sure that treatment will do no further good. 
When Sargant realised that this patient's problems were not due to a 
physical cause his opinion of the patient changed. Sargant's opinion 
became gradually more negative as his suspicion that Eric was a chronic 
neurotic became confirmed. 
While the rationing of treatment can partly be explained by the fact 
that wartime resources were scarce, it is likely that the most significant 
reason for limiting treatment was that most patients were seen to be 
unlikely to benefit from it due to their inherent inadequacies. For example, 
some civilian patients who were thought to have very good previous 
personalities and therefore very good prognoses were treated with a 
leucotomy -at the time a highly experimental and resource- consuming 
procedure. The patients chosen for these procedures during the war 
suffered from relatively minor symptoms, for example one young female 
patient 's complaint was recorded to be "looking at men's trousers, can't 
bear to go out anywhere because of what people will think of such 
conduct" while another suffered from headaches and disliked waiting354 . 
Yet, such operations took precedence over the much simpler treatment of 
military patients. This may have been partly because the Sutton 
psychiatrists had a particular interest in developing experimental treatments 
but it was also because they felt that such 'good' patients were more likely 
to benefit from treatment. 
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The decision in the early part of the war to send military psychiatric 
patients to EMS units such as Sutton rather than to military hospitals near 
the front line was bome out of necessity. In such units, civilian 
psychiatrists worked on the presumption that most of their patients were 
constitutionally inferior and would be unable to return to the military. 
Consequently, a large majority of such patients were discharged -most of 
the time without anyone even attempting to treat them. This situation did 
not necessarily contradict military wishes, as there is some evidence that 
combatant officers did not like to have men who had broken down in their 
units. In the later years, most soldiers received treatment abroad where the 
discharge rates were significantly lower. However, most solders evacuated 
to the LTK continued to be discharged. 
354 CMAC, PP/WWS, Box 15, F. M. 
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Chapter 5: Psychiatry in the Theatres of War 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the different clinical practices adopted by 
psychiatrists working in theatres of war. Unfortunately, the absence of 
sources means that few details are known about the psychiatric practices in 
the Far East or in Normandy beyond a few statistics published by 
individual psychiatrists, 355 so inevitably this chapter will focus on the 
Middle East, North Africa and Italy. However, this disadvantage does not 
overwhelmingly affect this work because the institutional model for 
psychiatric practice initially established in the Middle East remained much 
the same in the other theatres of war. Of course, model aside, the 
practicalities of setting up psychiatric facilities were different and some 
recent work has discussed how these influenced the return of casualties to 
the front line. 356 
Furthermore, this chapter will show that actual therapeutic practice 
was very local and depended on the interaction between the specific 
circumstances in which each psychiatrist found himself and the ideas and 
values he brought to that situation. Hence, none of the practices discussed 
here are specific to a particular theatre. Instead, it will be shown that 
therapeutic practices were influenced by a number of factors such as the 
local military requirements for psychiatrists to either retain or remove 
patients, the psychiatrists' proximity to the front line, their interest in 
developing experimental new treatments and whether their patients had 
experience of battle. All these aspects became crystallised in one all- 
355 Regarding Normandy see T. Main'Quarterly Report, October 1944', CMAC, GC 
13 5/13.1; J. W. Wishart 'Psychiatric Summary, Week ending Sunday 18 June, 1944', 
nd CMAC, RAMC 408/3/2; D. J. Waterson'Weekly Report by Psychiatrists attached to 2 
Army for week ending 24 June'. For the Far East, see'The Medical Services with 2nd 
Division', CMAC, RAMC 814; 'Operation by 33 Indian Corps', CMAC, RAMC 
1237/l/l. 
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important question: What did the psychiatrist think had caused the 
individual patient's breakdown? Was it his experience of warfare or his 
deficient intelligence and inadequate personality -lesions formed decades 
ago by poor genetic inheritance and incompetent upbringing. 
This question of aetiology mediated clinical practices. This was not 
because treatments were specific to what was seen to be the cause of the 
breakdown but because the possibility of treatment was dependent upon the 
possibility of a cure, and while some aetiological explanations allowed for 
the possibility of cure others did not. For example, when the cause of 
psychiatric breakdown was seen to lie within the patients' constitution, it 
was presumed that no treatment (besides, according to some psychiatrists, 
years of psychoanalysis) would work. By contrast, when the cause was 
thought to be physical exhaustion, the treatment (rest and nourishment) was 
assumed to be very successful. 
Of course, no psychiatrist had identical aetiological narratives to 
explain the breakdown of all their patients, and differences were frequenýly 
just a matter of emphasis. All psychiatrists invariably agreed that the 
following causes played a significant part in the psychiatric breakdown of 
soldiers: constitutional inadequacy, inadequate personality, mental 
deficiency, physical exhaustion, difficult climate, low morale, lack of esprit 
de corps, poor leadership, homesickness, financial anxieties, no/bad news 
from home, lack of confidence in their own weapons, death of a close 
friend, or a near miss. Often these causes were subdivided into 
predisposing and precipitating causes and all were give due notice. 
Nonetheless, psychiatrists did invest in particular aetiological accounts that 
determined their clinical practice. Furthermore, some psychiatrists gave 
aetiology a much more prominent role in their writings. 
... M. Harrison (2004) Medicine and Victory, British Military Medicine in the Second 
World Mar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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During the Second World War, a significant number of British 
soldiers (approximately 10% of battle casualties) received psychiatric 
treatment whilst in a theatre of war, sometimes in close proximity to the 
front line. A system of treating psychiatric casualties near the front line had 
been established during the First World War and in the Second World War 
this system was expanded. The model that emerged was a three-tier system 
in which soldiers were treated initially very close to the front line in an 
exhaustion centre run by the local corps or divisional psychiatrist. 
Treatment in exhaustion centres consisted mainly of restorative measures 
(plenty of food, rest, tranquillisers to aid sleep, and sometimes chemical 
abreaction). After two or three days rest, patients who were thought to have 
recovered were returned to the front line while the others were sent to a 
hospital further back where they could be treated further. If this treatment 
was not successful then casualties were evacuated to a base hospital where 
more elaborate treatments could be tried such as ECT, continuous narcosis 
and insulin therapy. If this treatment failed to restore patients at least to the 
extent that they could be usefully employed in a non-combat capacity, they 
were evacuated back to the UK where they were usually discharged from 
the Army. 
Psychiatrists practicing in theatres of war faced a number of 
pressures from the military some of which where conflicting. One very 
significant pressure was the number of patients psychiatrists had to look 
after. Most hospital units of 100 beds were catered for by a single 
psychiatrist, yet this fact alone does not demonstrate the real pressure 
psychiatrists were under in high turn over units. For example, the Tripoli 
Area psychiatrist, Harold Palmer, treated 1071 in-patients and 343 
outpatients in a period of two months in the spring of 1943, in a unit of 
only 80 beds where the average stay was just five days. 357 
357 R. F. Barbour (1943) 'An Experimental For-, vardPsychiatry Unit', CMAC, GC135 
BI (2 of 4). 
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Secondly there appeared to be no clear military leadership on what 
precisely psychiatrists should be aiming for -to return as many soldiers as 
humanly possible to their units or to evacuate all those who were unlikely 
to ever become good and efficient soldiers. While psychiatrists with high 
Return to Unit (RTU) results were praised as for example when the 
Adjutant-General praised the work of Harold Palmer who achieved an 
evacuation rate of less than 2%, 358 other psychiatrists reported that they 
worked with Commanding Officers and Directors of Medical Services who 
were keen to evacuate as many as possible of the soldiers who did not fit in 
the units . 
359This conflict was referred to by the consulting psychiatrist J. R. 
Rees when he defended the high discharge rate for psychiatric disorders 
and argued that while administrators back home were critical of 
psychiatrists for discharging too many soldiers, fighting, commanding 
officers were not. 360 
In addition, psychiatrists also had the task (as did all medical 
personnel who came into the Armed Forces) of realigning their civilian 
medical ethics to fit the war environment. This meant that their patients' 
welfare was no longer of primary concern as the interests of the Army as a 
whole had to have primacy at all times. As the corps psychiatrist Dugmore 
Hunter said: "Mentally, the psychiatrist, like every other soldier, finds 
himself in a new world with standards and values of its own. 06 1 According 
to Hunter: 
358 R. F. Adam, (1943) The Health ofthe Army, p. 5, CMAC, RAMC 466/3 8. 
359 For example, one psychiatrist reported that COs in infantry battalions were 
'extremely enthusiastic' at the idea of getting rid of many men who they considered a 
liability rather than an asset. P. J. R. Davis (1946) 'Divisional Psychiatry. Report to the 
War Office', Journal of the Royal Army Medical Coips, 86, p. 259. Another psychiatrist 
reported very positive comments regarding psychiatry by three ADMS who thought 
psychiatric work was very helpful in "cleaning up" and "weeding out" their divisions. 
R. J. Philips, (1944) 'Psychiatry at Corps Level', CMAC, GC 13 5, B 1, (4 of 4). 
360 J. R. Rees, (1945) The Shaping ofPsychiatiy by JFar, London: Chapman & Hall; pp. 
27-28. 
36 1 D. Hunter, (1946) 'The work of a corps psychiatrist in the Italian campaign', Journal 
of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 86, p. 128. 
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[The Corps psychiatrist's] useftilness varies directly with his 
own capacity to adapt, his willingness to learn and t4e extent to 
which he can identify himself with the basic aims of an Army at 
war. It also depends on his ability to get on with combatant officers 
and men and to offer technical advice under the guise of "plain 
common sense"... 
While making full use of his professional training, he must keep 
both feet firmly planted in the real situation, which is the Army as 
he finds it. He must indeed feel himself to be genuinely part of that 
Army and not an outsider, looking on. 362 
One psychiatrist who explored the subject of how the psychiatrists' 
own feelings affected their clinical practice was T. F. Main, who worked in 
the Middle East and later with the British Liberation Army in the invasion 
of Europe and in Northfield Hospital in the UK. He pointed out that front- 
line psychiatry was not objective and that psychiatrists were influenced by 
their external situation: 
It would be nice to report that in the forward areas psychiatry is 
cool and accurate and unimpassioned. But if we take thought for an 
instance we can see that this can never be so. Psychiatric disease 
and normality are only relative matters affected by current social 
standards and culture patterns. An emotional problem which might 
at home be described legitimately as severe anxiety, might on the 
field be called bravery or cowardice depending on whether the 
psychiatrist himself is frightened or not. 
A forceful moral diagnosis is therefore sometimes made by the 
psychiatrist before he applies the new nomenclature of the Royal 
College of Physicians, and treatment is sometimes affected by the 
psychiatrist's needs as well as by the patient's. 
Other influences also affect ob ectivity. There is an 
understandable desire during a war to feel important and useful. 
The inevitable hardships and sacrifices of war affect everyone to 
some extent, and , 
lead to various emotional by-products of 
bitterness and impotence, anger, and -if one's own job is not heroic 
or important enough-to defensive swashbuckling or a guilt-driven 
compassion for the others who have to undertake risks of death in 
battle. Sentimentality and anger about neurotic soldiers, therefore 
362 lbid, p. 130. 
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commonly influence clinical judgement in prognosis and 
363 disposal 
. 
This chapter will discuss how all these pressures influenced 
psychiatric practice. In particular, it will analyse the influence on 
psychiatric practice caused by whether a psychiatrist saw his job to be to 
primarily treat patients or to select patients (for treatment, evacuation, 
downgrading, or discharge). In the majority of time, psychiatrists who 
invested more time in treatment and developed new methods of treating 
patients did not favour constitution as an aetiological explanation for 
psychiatric breakdown. Although they accepted that their patients were to 
some extent predisposed to nervousness, they emphasised other causes for 
their breakdown such as low morale and battle stress. This approach made 
treatment purposeful and hopeful because it accepted that patients were 
essentially curable. 
On the other hand, many psychiatrists, either by choice or due to the 
nature and location of their employment, followed the mantra that 
'Prevention is better than Cure' and worked mainly by filtering out for 
evacuation and Base duties, soldiers perceived to be incurable. These 
psychiatrists evacuated from the front line not only men who had become 
psychiatric patients but men who they predicted would become so in the 
future; men who scored low in IQ tests, made a nuisance of themselves or 
who were diagnosed as having a psychopathic personality. 
In order to decide which men would go on to be efficient soldiers and 
which would not, these psychiatrists invariably relied on the notion of 
constitution or predisposition. Neither the term 'constitution' nor the term 
'predisposition' implied a necessarily biological or genetic approach and 
were often used by psychiatrists who favoured a psychoanalytic approach. 
These terms merely implied a belief that the cause of breakdown in most 
363 T. F. Main, (1945) 'Discussion: Forward Psychiatry in the Army', Proceedings of the 
Royal Society ofMedicine, 39, pp. 140-4 1. 
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patients lay in the past, buried in their fundamental personality and 
intelligence. While psychiatrists tended to agree that intelligence was 
genetically determined, many thought that personalities were formed as a 
result of early childhood influences. In order to assess the soldiers' 
constitutions, psychiatrists looked to the men's pasts and 'inherent' qualities; 
the soldiers' IQ scores, medical and psychiatric history, work record, 
childhood fears and behaviours were all scrutinised for evidence of a long- 
term co nstitutional problem. Importantly, no psychiatrists believed that all 
soldiers who experienced psychiatric breakdown were constitutionally 
inadequate (although perhaps inferior); the entire point of examining 
patients' pasts was precisely to separate those constitutionally adequate (the 
curables) from the constitutionally inadequate (the incurables). 
The Psychiatrists' aetiological approach was also influenced by 
whether the. breakdown was thought to be justified. It was accepted that all 
men bad their breaking point and that it was quite normal to break down 
under some circumstances. Men who had seen front line action, and had 
endured particularly harrowing situations were therefore regarded with 
greater sympathy than those who broke down at Base. In the former cases, 
no great aetiological analysis was needed, as the stress undergone by the 
soldiers made the cause of breakdown self-evident. In contrast, when men 
broke down in situations which were held to be less stressful, elaborate 
aetiological explanations regarding the patient's constitution were deemed 
necessary. Psychiatrists varied in what they regarded as stressful 
circumstances so while some for example regarded the Dunkirk evacuation 
as not necessarily a severe stressor, others regarded motor accidents in the 
Army as a valid cause of breakdown. Furthermore, when there was a 
shortage of manpower or when the military stakes were high, the value of 
stressful situations was deflated and front line experience was not in itself 
sufficient guarantee that a patient would not be perceived as fundamentally 
inadequate. 
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Furthermore, psychiatrists who were more interested in treatment. 
and favoured a present-centred aetiological approach tended to favour 
symptom-based medicine, while psychiatrists working on selection, using a 
constitutional approach focused more on history taking. In the former, 
patients were classified according to the type and intensity of their 
symptoms (e. g. black-outs, anxiety, memory loss) while in the latter, 
symptoms displayed by the patient were seen as a culmination of problems 
exhibit ed ever since the patient was born and possibly even by his family 
members before that. Patients were therefore classified according to the 
prevalence of an abnormal personal and family history. 
The Middle East Force and the History of the Medical Services 
The official history of the Medical Services contains one account of 
psychiatry overseas. This is the history of psychiatry in the Middle East 
Force and is based on an account written by G. W. B. James, Consultant in 
Psychiatr y. As the senior psychiatrist in the Middle East Force James'job 
was to set up psychiatric services, supervise them and liase with the DMS. 
The Middle East Command included Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Eritrea, 
Abyssinia, Libya, Cyprus and originally also Iraq and Iran. The fighting 
began in September 1940 when the Italians under Graziani attacked Egypt. 
Wavell and the 4b Indian Division stopped Graziani's advance and in 
December, the Western Desert Force under Richard O'Conner virtually 
annihilated the Italians and had by February 1941 cleared Cyrenaica 
(Libya), destroyed 10 Italian divisions, and captured 130,000 prisoners at 
the cost of less than 500 killed and 1,500 wounded. Wavell was able to 
eject a pro-German government that had seized power in Iraq and take 
Syria from the French authorities that had remained loyal to Petain's 
government in Vichy. Then, however, Hitler decided to help the Italians 
keep Libya while Churchill decided to send troops to Greece. The Italian 
and German troops under Rommel attacked in March 1941 and had reached 
160 
Egypt by the end of May. The British kept Tobruk (Libya) under siege. 
Wavell launched a counteroffensive in July 1941 that failed. He was then 
replaced by Auchinleck who undertook an offensive in November 1941. 
This succeeded and by the New Year, Rommel's forces had withdrawn to 
El Agheila. However, Rommel's second offensive from 21" January to the 
7 th July 1942 re-occupied Tobruk, capturing 30,000 British and South 
African troops, and drove the 8 th An-ny back to El Alamein (Egypt), 
Finally, in October 1942, Montgomery who had replaced Auchinleck began 
a British advance, which drove the Germans and the Italians right out of 
Egypt and Libya to Tunisia. 
The troops fighting in the Middle East before El Alamein were 
known to suffer from particularly low morale. According to the official 
medical history, the worst period for fighting was between May and July 
1942.364 In the same period, the incidence for desertion was so high that the 
Commander-in Chief Middle East, C. J. E. Auchinleck, recommended to the 
War Office the reintroduction of the death penalty. 365 In the British Army 
as a whole, the incidence for desertion was highest in the period between 
October 1940 and September 1941 (22,248 men deserted, 1.0% of the 
Army's total strength), followed by the period between October 1941 and 
September 1942 (20,834 men, 0.8%) and dropping in the period between 
October 1942 and September 1943 (15,824 men, 0.6%). 366 
The incidence of psychiatric casualties in the M. E. F. was estimated 
to have been 8.5 per thousand troops in 1940,24 per thousand in 1941, 
21.2 per thousand in 1942 and 15.2 per thousand in 1943.367 These figures 
show an inverse correlation between the success of the fighting and the 
364 F. A. E Crew, (1957) 'The Army Psychiatric Service. Middle East Force. 1940- 
1943' The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, vol. H, HMSO, p. 487. (Based on the 
diary of G. W. B James). 
365 R. A. Ahrenfeldt, (195 8), 'Appendix B', Psychiatty in the British Army in the Second 
Morld Mar, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 272-273. 366 lbid p. 273. 
367 F. A. E Crew, (1957) p. 491. 
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incidence of psychiatric casualties; during the more successful campaigns 
in 1940 and 1943, psychiatric casualties were reduced. 
The Consultant in Psychiatry in the Middle East, G. W. B. James had 
already served as a doctor in the First World War and had won the Military 
Cross twice. He was appointed Consultant in Psychological Medicine 
(Brigadier) and was sent to the Middle East in September 1940. His 
services were made available to the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and 
to the Dominion and Allied contingents in the Middle East Command. As a 
consultant, James was an adviser to his Director of Medical Services 
(D. M. S). All the consultants appointed to the M. E. F. formed a panel of the 
organisation of the D. M. S. at General Headquarters and possessed no 
administrative powers. When recommendations made involved 
administrative action, it was essential to consult with all medical and other 
officers involved. 368 
The psychiatric facilities in the Middle East grew in small steps. 
Initially James was the only psychiatrist in the Middle East but gradually 
more psychiatrists were sent over and more beds became available for 
psychiatric patients. The first psychiatric centre was instituted in 64 British 
General Hospital (B. G. H). in Alexandria. In October 1940, a specialist in 
psychiatry was attached to this hospital and he was able to carry out 
psychiatric first aid and early treatment. Patients from this centre, were 
either passed on to general hospitals in the base areas with a view to being 
evacuated to the Union of South Africa and from there to the U. K. or were 
sent to Convalescent Depots with a view to either being returned to their 
units or found alternative non-combatant duties. 369 
More accommodation for psychiatric patients was provided in 
several 'observation wards' attached to general hospitals in Tel el Kabir, 
Nazareth and Jerusalem. However, there were not sufficient psychiatrists to 
368 lbid p. 440. 
369 lbid, p. 441. 
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attend the patients there. With the exception of Alexandria, psychiatric 
patients could be attended to by a psychiatrist only in Cairo where James 
operated an out-patient clinic twice a week. Although James did travel to 
all the hospitals that housed psychiatric patients, the majority of care was 
370 provided for by regular R. A. M. C. doctors. 
In the summer of 1941 two more psychiatric centres were opened, 
one attached to 19 B. G. H. near the Bitter Lake on the Suez Canal and the 
other attached to 23 B. G. H. on the plain between Jerusalem and Jaffa. 
These had 170 beds each. By November a 600 psychiatric hospital was sent 
to the Middle East and was established in Kantara finally accepting patients 
in March 1942. From 1942 onwards, the numbers of the psychiatric staff 
and the hospital beds available increased dramatically. By January 1944, 
there were 26 psychiatrists in the Middle East including 8 Area 
psychiatrists and 17 specialists working in hospitals. Furthermore, Malta 
was appointed its own Adviser in psychiatry and was no longer dependent 
on the Middle East Force, and three more psychiatrists were sent to the 
Middle East to form Selection Boards for the selection of new officers from 
the ranks. Psychiatrists were able to do more outpatient work (by 1943 out- 
patients outnumbered inpatients) and return many men to their units. 
James was characteristic of psychiatrists who believed that soldier- 
patients could be divided into two groups: a large group who were 
fundamentally inadequate and useless to the Army; and a smaller group of 
good soldiers who had experienced enormous stress coupled with physical 
exhaustion and had resisted the breakdown for as long as possible. James's 
job, as he perceived it, was to distinguish between these two kinds of men, 
evacuate the former and treat the latter. This analysis pervaded James's 
writing on the Middle East and the official account of psychiatry overseas. 
When outlining who were the soldiers who would be of no further 
use to the Army, the easiest group to classify were the psychotic patients. 
370 Ibid. 
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Psychotic illnesses were widely regarded to be completely unrelated to 
wartime experiences and while it was thought that a stressful situation may 
occasionally trigger a psychotic episode, it was believed that those who 
developed psychosis would have done so eventually in civilian life as well. 
Psychotic symptoms affected a small minority of psychiatric patients, 
however in the Middle East, James decided that: 
The psychotic group, for administrative purposes and especially for 
evacuation purposes, was made to include cases of mental 
deficiency, psychopathic personality and the diagnosis 
temperamental instability. While this was unfortunate from the 
point of view of the clinician it was a practical method of dividing 
the casualties. The psychotic group amounted to nearly 30 per 
cent., a high figure of comparatively useless personnel. 371 
The psychotic group, therefore, by including mental defects, 
psychopaths and chronic neurotics lost its clinical meaning and became 
another way of distinguishing those who were of value to the Army from 
those who were not. James's distinction between patients who were 
constitutionally adequate and those who were not became enshrined into 
the psychotic/neurotic distinction and became part of official policy. 
Furthermore, James believed that the way to assess whether a patient 
was constitutionally adequate or not was by investigating his personal and 
family history. In contrast, he seemed to have very little interest in the 
patients' symptoms. In the official history, James argued: 
The examination of many samples of breakdown revealed that 
constitutional factors were present in a great number of individuals, 
and it was a matter of constant surprise that so many officers and men 
had managed to get into the Army or other Services in the face of so 
many obvious danger signals in their personal and family histories. It 
was repeatedly found among case material that men had suffered 
previous breakdown of a neurotic or psychotic character in civilian 
life, that employment records were poor, indicating defect or 
instability or a mixture of both, that far too many men had been unable 
371 lbid, p. 495. 
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to manage their lives in a social sense and had experienced financial, 
marital and other troubles as a chronic accompaniment to living as 
civilians. Childhood and adolescence were often loaded with 
undesirable personal traits, the most frequent being somnambulism, 
enuresis, anxieties and phobias, truancy at school, delinquencies of 
various types, broken homes and the story of having been 'under the 
doctor' or 'delicate as a child'. 372 
According to the official account therefore, a poor constitution was a 
major actiological factor of psychiatric breakdown in the military. 
Furthermore, the above quote shows that commitment to a constitutional 
aetiology was linked to the procedure of history-taking and to history-based 
medicine. In fact, a poor constitution was demonstrated by a broad variety 
of events in the patient's history, ranging from having experienced 
psychotic episodes to having been unemployed, or 'delicate as a child'. 
Furthermore, James wrote in the official history that over 20% of 
their patients showed 'a family history of 'psychotic, neurotic or social and 
behaviour disorders'373 and mentioned in particular that many men had said 
that their fathers or uncles had broken down with shell-shock during the 
previous war and were still in receipt of a pension. 
The main implication of the link between personal history, 
inadequate constitution and psychiatric breakdown was that it was possible 
to predict to a large extent who would break down and who would not and 
that a more efficient selection process would have reduced psychiatric 
casualties to a minimum. According to the official history: 
Admissions to psychiatric centres or hospitals showed an unduly 
high proportion of men who had previous psychiatric illness or 
who were mentally subnormal. It was the consultant's considered 
opinion that 40 per cent. of psychiatric casualties in the Middle 
East could have been foreseen by a careful psychiatric survey or 
even a reasonably careful medical history. Many of these patients 
received in psychiatric centres showed evidence of psychopathic 
372 lbid, p. 506. 373 lbid, p. 507. 
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traits in their previous history which would have been easily 
recognised if any accurate case history had been taken. 374 
During an inter-allied conference on war medicine James expressed 
views similar to those found in the official history. He said: 
Experience has shown me that a ruthless selection is the best way of 
reducing these casualties to a minimum ... The reinforcements arriving in the Middle East Force for long showed a complete absence of 
psychiatric screening even of a primitive kind. I remember talking to a 
man in the hot summer of 1941 and asking him what his chief 
interests had been in his childhood. He replied that he always loved 
skipping, knitting and talking with the girls! Yet this man, a 
determined homosexual, was sent halfway round the world as a 
representative of the armed forces of his country at a very critical 
period in that country's history. The first great and essential lesson of 
experience is the necessity for selection. There is no room in an army 
calling itself modem for dullards or lifelong neurotics. 375 
Dullards, lifelong neurotics, and homosexuals together with the men 
with psychopathic personalities and the psychotics were all categories of 
men who were deemed constitutionally too inadequate to be in the Army. 
Placed together in the psychotic group for 'administrative purposes', they 
were evacuated and discharged without their actual disorders ever being 
made explicit. 
As mentioned earlier, James did not believe that psychiatric 
breakdown was exclusively caused by constitutional reasons and in the 
official history, he also discussed other factors that could precipitate 
breakdown such as the separation from home, the climate, battle stress and 
the cumulative effects of war. Even in these sections however, several 
references of the soldiers' personalities were made. For example, in the 
discussion regarding climate it was suggested that the headaches which the 
soldiers attributed to sun stroke were in fact hysterical and were suffered by 
374 Ibid, p. 48 1. 
375 G. W. B. James, (1947) 'Inter-Allied Conference on War Medicine 1942-1945', 
Neuropsychiatry, London: Staple Press. 
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men who were unwilling to fight and who seized upon any somatic 
disorder to avoid doing so. In the discussion regarding 'battle stress', the 
effect of bombing was pinpointed as the commonest factor in creating 
breakdown, and this was followed by a discussion of the enemy's most 
feared weapons. While the effects of loss of sleep, lack of food and 
physical illness were discussed, the death of comrades was barely 
mentioned and the psychological effects of a 'near miss' were not 
discussed at all. These omissions are striking since other contemporary 
psychiatrists believed that the main causes of psychiatric breakdown were 
'near miss' experiences and grief over the death of comrades. By not 
discussing such factors and focusing on more mundane issues such as food, 
rest and the climate, this discussion on the environmental causes of 
breakdown became somewhat trivialised. 
James's views that that in many cases there was little point in trying 
to treat psychiatric casualties and that it was better to discharge them were 
influenced by his military situation -he was stationed at Base where 
opportunities for evacuation were good, and where many of his patients 
had not experienced battle. It is unclear however, to what extent he was 
guided by the views of the Director of the Medical Services and combatant 
officers. In James' account in the official history, he portrayed himself as 
fighting against the opinions of combatant and medical officers. In 
discussing so called inadequate men, James argues that: 
Experience has shown beyond all doubt that such men can 
influence to a grave extent the morale of the unit to which they are 
posted. They create problems and disturb the efficiency of others, 
sometimes very gravely. It is because so many officers, sometimes 
highly placed, fail to realise the gravity of the problems that such 
individuals are often posted from one unit to another in the hope 
that eventually one will be found in which they will become more 
efficient or, at any rate, less tiresome. Proper disposal is hospital 
care and evacuation, yet even medical officers would be found who 
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regard the evacuation of dullards and psychopaths as 'soft' or even 
as an 'injustice'. 376 
The opinions expressed by G. W. B. James in the official history were 
very much in agreement with those of Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Craigie, 
psychiatrist to I Psychiatric Centre in Suez. In his writings, Craigie also 
used patients' previous histories as a means of classification, and concluded 
that a significant proportion of the men who broke down had had a history 
of psychiatric breakdown, and/or personalities that were 'markedly 
abnormal' or were dull and backward. His articles were littered with 
statistics, with estimates for the proportion of the constitutionally 
inadequate group ranging from 21% to 79% depending on whether the men 
had experience of battle, were officers or men etc. Craigie, concluded that: 
A faulty personal history, a constitutional predisposition to 
neurosis, was the most important single factor in the causation of 
breakdown: if associated with a broken home life, or a faulty 
family history, the prognosis was so much the worse. "The 
qualities of a man that make him the best citizen" said Marshal 
Foch, " are those that make him the best soldier"; and this underlies 
the principles of personnel and officer selection employed in the 
Army since 194 1.377 
Craigie also examined the role of non-constitutional factors in the 
causation of breakdown. Interestingly, Craigie, like James in the official 
history systematically played down the effects of battle stress: 
... it was found that 
battle stress alone was neither the most 
common nor the most important cause of breakdown in forward 
areas, and in base areas; there was in fact no fundamental 
difference between the causes of breakdown in forward and in base 
areas. Brigadier James said very aptly-"men break down for fear 
of life, not of death": and indirect mental or physical stresses were 
376 F. A. E Crew, (1957) pp. 481-482. 
377 H. B. Craigie, (1945) 'Discussion: Forward Psychiatry in the Army', Proceedings of 
the Royal Society ofMedicine p. 140. 
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often much more significant on their effect upon the soldier than 
combat itsel f. 
378 
Furthermore, in his writings, Craigie consistently played down the 
importance of treatment. In fact, in the section of his article regarding 
treatment he began by saying 'In no field of medicine, and more 
particularly military medicine is the dictum "Prevention is better than cure" 
more applicable than in the handling and treatment of cases of psychiatric 
breakdown. ' 379 Almost a third of this section discussed selection rather than 
treatment, and when treatment was discussed, the focus was on the 
treatment that ought to be provided by the regimental medical officers. 
Undoubtedly, Craigie did use various treatments on his patients but he was 
not optimistic about their role in reducing psychiatric casualties. The 
reduction of psychiatric casualties was the remit of the preventive methods, 
of mental hygiene (which he argued was more significant than physical 
hygiene): 
... in the elimination of the misfits, of the chronic neurotics, and of 
the psychopaths lies the most direct and most hopeful method of 
prevention available to us. Very little can be done in an actual 
battle area to limit or alleviate the stresses ... or to alter the adverse 
environment; and, given sufficient stress and strain, any person 
may break down. We can, ... and we should, sift out those who are 
likely to break down early-the weaker brethren, those who can 
cause difficulties and disharmonies and perhaps even disasters out 
of all proportion to their numbers, and whose presence constitutes 
a continued if only a potential menace to the morale of the group as 
380 a whole. 
Nonetheless, the statistics provided by Craigie show that most of his 
patients did return to duty and that during a period in 1942 he returned more 
378 lbid, p. 140. 
379 H. B. Craigie, (1944) 'Two years of military psychiatry in the Middle-East', BHJ, p. 
108. 
380 lbid, p. 106. 
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patients than during 1941, indicating perhaps that he was under more 
pressure to do so. 381 
Harold Palmer in Tripoli, 1943 
Craigie's attitude can be compared and contrasted with that of 
another RAMC psychiatrist, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Palmer. Palmer was 
the Area Psychiatrist in Tripoli. He was considered to be a very able 
psychiatrist and had received ample praise from the Consultant in 
Psychiatry J. R. Rees when the latter visited the unit. 382 The Adjutant- 
General, himself referred to this unit as an example of the achievements 
psychiatrists were capable, when able to administer treatment to patients as 
quickly as possible. 383 The grounds of all this praise were Palmer's results. 
Palmer reported that he was able to return 93% of men back to full duty 
within a month and 98% within two months. Although only 30% returned 
to full battle duty, but these were nonetheless successful results. 
The military pressures on Palmer were much more intense from those 
on James and Craigie. As Tripoli was situated 1300 miles from the base in 
Alexandria, land evacuation of casualties was out of the question and 
hospital ship facilities were extremely limited. It was therefore imperative 
to reduce evacuation of cases to an absolute minimum. 384 
In contrast to Craigie, James and the official history, Harold Palmer, 
emphasised the role of enemy action in breakdown. In the aetiology section 
381 In a series of 350 cases of neurosis between Jul to Dec 1941,71.5% were returned to 
duty (53.7% to full, 17.8% to base duties). In the period April to June, 1942,625 
neurotic and 216 psychotic cases were discharged from the hospital: of the former group 
92% were returned to duty (61% to full, 31% to base duties); of the latter 70% were 
returned to duty (48% to full, 22% to base duties). According to Craigie, follow-up 
suggested that not more than 5 or 6% of cases required readmission. (Ibid, p. 109). It is 
unclear whether "full duty" actually means "battle duty" but this is unlikely. Palmer, for 
example, in his statistics gives very different figures for battle duty and full duty, see 
below. 
382 J. R. Rees, (1943) Report by Consulting Psychiatrist to the . 4rnzy on a visit to the 
overseasforces in Gibraltar, North Africa and Middle East. p. I 2., CMAC, GC 13 5B1. 383 R. F. Adam, (1943) The Health of the Army, London: The War Office, p. 5, CMAC, 
RAMC 466/38. 
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of his article, he stated that: 'Enemy action provokes breakdown much more 
often than does the most intense physical discomfort'. 385 Although Palmer 
agreed with James and Craigie that there was a constitutional element in the 
breakdown, the language he used was considerably more moderate. Palmer 
wrote: 'Most of these men have a hereditary constitutional predisposition to 
breakdown, with a history of previous minor neurotic traits and of 
emotional trauma in early life; hence they may be classified as insecure 
386 persons who have always been dependent on their families'. He then 
went on to say 'The most common precipitating cause is the real or 
imagined "near miss"; the most common contributory factor is the death of 
a close comrade or platoon officer. ' 387 Significantly, the aetiology section of 
Palmer's article was much shorter than Craigie's. Overall, Palmer focused a 
lot more on how to treat patients than on discussing what caused their 
breakdown. 
There were other differences between Palmer and the psychiatrists 
discussed previously, most notably in the categorisation of the patients and 
the focus on treatment. Palmer did not make any calculation regarding the 
percentage of men who had a history of personal or family mental illness. 
Furthermore, he did not classify patients according to the standard clinical 
nomenclature, which would have resulted in an implicit aetiological 
categorisation (mental defect, psychosis, psychopathic personality, 
psychosis and chronic neurosis are all clinical diagnoses which imply an 
overwhelming constitutional element, aetiologically). Instead, Palmer 
classified patients according to two criteria: firstly whether the patient had 
a high or low morale and secondly whether he responded to stress with 
anxiety or dissociation. Men were judged to be genuinely sick if their 
384 R. F. Barbour, (1943). 
385 H. A. Palmer, (1945), 'Military Psychiatric Casualties, experience with 12,000 cases' 
Lancet, ii, p. 454. 386 lbid, p. 454. 387 lbid, p. 454. 
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symptoms did not abate once they found themselves in a secure 
environment. 
For Palmer, the division of patients in to those with high morale 
(35% of the total) and those with low morale (65% of the total) was really a 
division of those who cannot continue fighting and those who simply refuse 
to continue fighting. According to Palmer, men with low morale reported 
sick fairly early on, before they were really sick. Because they were 
demoralised, these men accepted the role of the invalid easily, and because 
they were not really sick, their symptoms disappeared once they were taken 
away from stressful situations. The predominant symptom of these men 
was 4an unwillingness to fight'. Palmer named the syndromes under this 
category 'Sitnple " Wind ip " or Loss of Grip'. "' Wind up " with Signs of 
Mild Anxiety: Scare'. "'Wind up" associated with Vague Features of 
Dissociation: False Blackout', 'Simple Motor and Sensoiy Hysteria' and 
collectively termed them 'Panic Reactions' to contrast them with the 
'Anguish Reactions' of men of high morale, who reported sick because 
they suffered unbearable mental pain. 
Palmer was interested in treatment, to the extent that he developed 
his own version of abreaction by using ether. 388 Although from some 
informal statistics regarding treatment it appears that a large minority of 
Palmer's patients received no treatment besides rest, 389 Palmer was keen to 
provide treatment for everyone if for no other reason but 'to give the 
patients the idea of something being done for them'. 390 
So why did Palmer's aetiological account and psychiatric practice 
differ from that found in the History and in the writings of James and 
Craigie? Firstly, Palmer was situated much closer to the front than either 
James or Craigie and was under pressure to evacuate as few patients as 
3 88 R. F. Barbour, (1943); H. Palmer, (1948) 'Recent Technique of Physical Treatment 
and Its Results', Modet-n D-ends in Psychological Medicine, (ed) N. G. Harris London: 
Buttenvorth. 
389 R. F. Barbour, (1943). 
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possible. The majority of his patients (although by no means all of them) 
had some experience of enemy action, which rendered their breakdown 
morally justified. Being in some danger himself, Palmer may have had 
more sympathy with the soldiers' fears and was therefore less likely to 
emphasise any constitutional element in their breakdown. By choosing to 
focus on low morale as a major aetiological factor, Palmer to some extent, 
exonerated individual patients, as soldiers and particularly the men, were 
not held personally responsible for their own morale. 391 
Secondly, Palmer differed from James and Craigie by his emphasis 
on treatment. The absence of a constitutional aetiological focus in Palmer's 
work went hand in hand with a belief that the vast majority of the patients 
were essentially curable (as shown by the fact that he discharged 98% of 
his patients as eligible for full duty) which in turn was associated with 
Palmer's interest and focus on treatment. Although no direction in causality 
between these different aspects of Palmer's psychiatric ideology and 
practice can be shown, it can be said that for psychiatrists to believe that a 
treatment is potent they must first believe that the patients are essentially 
curable, and such patients are by definition patients who are not 
constitutionally fundamentally damaged. 
Palmer perceived the soldiers' incapacity to fight in mainly 
psychological rather than medical terms. He perceived his role in relation 
to his men to be to persuade those with low morale to return, and cure 
those genuinely sick to enable them to return. An essential part of 
persuading patients to return to the front was to constantly remind them of 
their military role and duty. Palmer wrote that in his ward 'the patient was 
not allowed to forget that he was a soldier and not a half trained civilian. ' 392 
390 Ibid. 
391 On the other hand, the historian Ben Shephard, (2000) describes Palmer as a tough 
hard-liner and has quoted psychiatrists S. MacKeith and R. S. Morton, as saying that 
they were "wary of his [Palmer's] 'rather dramatic, very simplistic ideas' and the way 
he talked about 'cowardice. "' p. 217. 392 R. F. Barbour, (1943). 
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One of the core elements of treatment was to convince patients that 
'something was being done for them'. For example, the hospital ward was 
constructed on the model of the factory production line so as to give 
patients a sense of progress: 
At the near end of the ward new arrivals were kept as far as 
possible on the leftside and patients completing treatment on the 
right hand side. Throughout treatment every attempt was made to 
give the patients the idea of something being done for them and 
this progression round the ward-admission (left hand side)- 
treatment (lower end)-recovery (right)-was definitely helpful. 393 
Besides medical treatment, other persuasive methods were used: 
Every form of psychotherapy was used, persuasion, suggestion, re- 
education, analysis. On occasion a man might be "dressed down" 
in public, but at the same time another man would be singled out 
for praise and encouragement. Only the psychiatrist was pen-nitted 
to use the more aggressive forms of persuasion, but in certain 
cases, it undoubtedly had the desired effect. 394 
For Palmer, an essential element of the patient's treatment was an 
induced breakdown from which the patient would rise repentant having 
been converted to Palmer's way of thinking: i. e. knowing that he must 
return to his military duties. The following description of the typical 
patient's experience through the wards shows that Palmer perceived his 
role, not so much as that of doctor but as that of a preacher who condemned 
the sinners who gave up their duty and rewarded those willing to resume it: 
... he [the patient] is ushered into the office, not in the manner of a 
patient visiting a doctor, but in the manner of a soldier parading 
before his Commanding Officer. ... The interview commences with 
a quiet sympathetic examination, but the atmosphere gradually 
alters, so that by means of question and answer, the patient is left 
in some doubt as to whether his present absence from the front line 
is consistent with his duty as a soldier. He is told that he can be 
393 lbid, p. 2. 394 lbid p. 2. 
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cured and warned that no ten'ns can be made with his responsibility 
to his comrades. He is then subjected to the Ether technique, his 
Amnesia recovered, an emotional Catharsis induced, and strong 
suggestion exhibited regarding his symptoms. ... Following the Narcosis regime 48 hours convalescence is allowed. During this 
phase the Sister's personality has ample scope, 395 following which 
the patient receives his final interview with the Psychiatrist. The 
Psychiati-ist's intervieiv can only be compai-ed at this stage to the 
methods of the successful Salvation Army Evangelist in ivhich the 
sinnei- is fu-st knocked sideivays and then exalted to 1-epentance, 
finally being admitted to the group to be saved Once this stage of 
gr ace has been induced he is fit for rehabilitation and is received 
into the arms of an understanding but soldierly N. C. O. at the 
rehabilitation centre whose job it is to prevent backsliding and 
recultivate a soldierly bearing, discipline, self-respect and pride. 396 
Prior to the process of repentance and forgiveness inherent in the 
final psychiatric interview, patients were expected to break down. During 
the emotional peak of the abreaction Palmer stopped the administration of 
ether and tried to get the patient to break down in tears: 
I invariably attempt to induce tears at this point, using if necessary 
the most intensely maudlin suggestion. With my military material I 
never had any doubt that it was the induction of this emotional 
catharsis which was a condition of the cure, and I have seen 
patients who fought the onset of tears retain their symptoms 
pending a second interview when, their resistance being broken 
down, tears were obtained and a remission of symptoms 
occurred. 397 
Treatment itself could also include an element of corporal punishment as for 
example, in the abreaction of psychotic patients: 
395 Apparently the 'Sister was' particularly successful with those "Agin the 
Government", [sic] men who were "fed up to the back teeth". H. Palmer, (1943) quoted 
b R. F. Barbour, (1943)p. 2. 
3V6 lbid p. 3. My italics. The description in the last few lines resemble the descriptions 
found in Sargant's monograph The Battle for the Mind regarding the process of 
brainwashing and religious conversion which he also compared to psychiatric treatment. 
397 H. Palmer, (1948), 'Recent Technique of Physical Treatment and its Results' in N. G. 
Harris, Modern Trends in Psychological Medicine, London: Butterworth &Co, p. 242. 
This approach can be contrasted to that William Sargant, who required that the patient 
become stunned during the emotional peak of the abreaction. William Sargant will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
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It has often been asserted that Warfare produces no increase in 
Psychosis ... I am in no doubt that certain cases of depression I have seen, even allowing for constitutional factors, were 
precipitated by Battle experience. 398 ... These patients suddenly become terrified and are subject to intense visual hallucinations. 
They are acutely paranoid and feel that every enemy gun is trained 
upon them and may develop ideas of reference towards their own 
comrades. They proceed to run amok and are often extremely 
violent. The condition often subsides without interference, failing 
which they should be subjected to the Ether Technique, which 
rapidly reactivates all the features of the acute phase. At the height 
of this re-enacted fantasy, Ether is stopped and the patient smartly 
brought back to reality by vigorous face slapping. He will probably 
remain in a dazed state for a few minutes, and should be then given 
a twenty-four hour's Narcosis Regime. 399 
Alternatively, many psychiatrists who were engaged with selection 
rather than treatment were more likely to classify patients according to their 
constitution and their history rather than their symptoms. Major 
MacDonald, for example, who was the forward psychiatrist in the Eighth 
Army and was responsible for deciding who should be sent back to the 
front and who should be sent further back to Palmer for treatment, used 
such a classification. MacDonald's figures show that he classified patients 
into six distinct categories according to their history of previous psychiatric 
and non-psychiatric treatment in both civilian and military life. 400 So unlike 
Palmer, MacDonald, who examined soldiers with experience of battle and 
was himself very close to the front, classified patients according to what he 
believed was their constitutional abnormality. 
398 Here Palmer again diverges from mainstream psychiatrists to adopt a battle-centred 
aetiological approach. 399R. F. Barbour, (1943) pp. 10- 11. 400 lbid, 'Appendix H: Analysis Of Disposal Of Cases Seen By Forward Psychiatrist 
With Eighth Army, 16 March- 13 May 43'. 
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American Psychiatrists in All! iers, 1943 
The American psychiatrists Roy Grinker and John Spiegel were 
based in Algiers, and like Palmer, they treated psychiatric casualties 
within a few days of their breakdown (casualties from the Tunisian 
Campaign were air-lifted to Algiers). Because Grinker and Spiegel were 
Americans, they were under considerably less pressure to minimise 
manpower wastage. Consequently, although Grinker and Spiegel 
recommended approximately 70% to selective non-combatant service, 
they recommended less than 2 per cent of men to the front line. 401 
Grinker and Spiegel shared a similar actiological approach to 
Palmer. Although they classified patients according to the standard 
clinical nomenclature, they did not use the terms 'psychopathic 
personality, 'chronic neurotic' or 'mental defect', which imply a 
fundamental constitutional problem. Like Palmer, Grinker and Spiegel 
focused on treatment rather than on selection and they developed an 
abreactive treatment using Pentothal, which they named narcosynthesis. 
Similarly to Palmer, Grinker and Spiegel accepted that "constitutional 
factors and the individual's life history are very important" aetiological 
factors in war neurosis but also argued that "many observers have given 
these factors undue weighV 7402 and that "the most compelling etiological 
factors are psychological. Continued threat of injury and death, and 
repeated narrow escapes produce a cumulative effect". 403 
Furthermore, Grinker and Spiegel did not give credence to statistics 
reporting that psychiatric patients were very likely to have pathological 
personal and family histories. They argued that: 
401 R. Grinker & J. Spiegel, (1943) War Neuroses in North Africa, the Tunisian 
Campaign, CMAC, GC135/B. 2 (file 2 of 4) p. 163. This volume was published by 
Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, New York. 
402 lbid, p. 102. 403 lbid, p. 100. 
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After the last war it was written that 65 per cent of patients with 
war neuroses had a personal or family history of nervousness while 
only 45 per cent of non-neurotics gave such a history. We are not 
satisfied that the history of past neuroses can be evaluated fairly. 
Men who develop war neuroses have their attention directed to 
nervousness and "remember" more of similar events in their past 
than more normal soldiers unconcerned with the problem at the 
moment. The latter have a tendency to deny all previous anxieties 
or phobias. Their pasts are too healthy to be true. 404 
Instead, Grinker and Spiegel hypothesised that having a history of 
anxiety may be beneficial to soldiers and provide an insulating effect from 
the anxiety of warfare. They wrote: "Anxiety is nothing new to these 
people; they have always had it, and know how to deal with it. 15405 
Like Palmer, Grinker and Spiegel also played on the patients' 
feelings of guilt in order to get them to return to duty. In contrast to Palmer 
however, Grinker and Spiegel believed that the vast majority of their 
patients were genuinely very sick. Although they believed that their 
treatment was very effective in restoring men to normality, they did not 
believe that men who had broken down were, in the majority of cases, able 
to return to the front. 
Consequently, Grinker and Spiegel used techniques, which although 
very similar to Palmer's, sought the opposite result. In the majority of cases, 
Grinker and Spiegel aimed to appease their patients' feelings of guilt. In 
doing so, they provided themselves as role models of useful non-combatant 
personnel with whom the patients should identify with if they were to 
overcome their crippling sense of guilt. 
To begin with, Grinker and Spiegel encouraged patients to stop 
identifying with their comrades: 
... it is the task of the therapist to attack, at the earliest possible 
moment, the super-ego itself at its most salient points; the 
identification with the ideal of the former combat outfit. So long as 
404 Ibid, p. 95. 405 Ibid, p. 97. 
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the super-ego maintains its identification with the spirit of friends 
on the battlefield both dead and alive, it will remain angry and 
demanding. 406 
Ginker and Spiegel then encouraged patients to identify with non- 
combatant personnel such as themselves: 
The unreasonable demands of the outraged super-ego must be 
combated by the therapist whose task is to substitute a new 
identificator. This task is made easier through the already growing 
transference identification with the Medical Officer, who is himself 
a member of the large group of non-combatant personnel with 
which the patient must identify himself in the future. The patient is 
repeatedly told that a useful and important job awaits him as soon 
as he is well enough to be reclassified. ... The Medical Officer tells 
the patient that he has nothing to be ashamed of; that he has 
actually "stuck by his guns" as long as possible, which is all that 
duty could require of him. 407 
Lastly, Grinker and Spiegel were able to treat patients in such a way 
because they did not suspect the patients' motives. Unlike other 
psychiatrists, who believed that patients became sick consciously or 
unconsciously in order to avoid combat, Grinker and Spiegel felt that 
patients stood to loose from their neuroses: 
Commanding officers, medical officers and even psychiatrists 
consider that the illness is developed in order to avoid combat 
duties ... These same psychiatrists attempt to make the hospital 
environment more disagreeable than battle experiences and devise 
a wide range of punishing methods. 
Patients with severe anxiety states have no "gain" from their 
illness but instead a loss. They suffer considerably more from their 
anxiety than from their fears on the battle field and anxieties are 
continuous night and day not subsiding at the end of a battle ... We believe that no neurotic consciously becomes ill to gain 
freedom from combat, but whatever gain arises is unconscious and 
consists of a satisfaction of a passive dependent state to which the 
patient has regressed by virtue of his neurotic process. Punishment 
406 lbid, p. 185. 407 lbid, pp. 187-188. 
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serves only to increase his internal resentments, hasten and 
408 increase his regressions to still more dependent status . 
The comparison between Palmer and Grinker and Spiegel 
demonstrates how military requirements altered clinical practice. Palmer 
was under pressure to return as many patients as possible to their units so he 
did -Grinker and Spiegel did not have that pressure so they returned 
considerably fewer men. On the other hand, all these psychiatrists had an 
interest in developing new treatments and were dealing mostly with men 
who had battle experience -so they followed aetiological explanations that 
focused on the experiences of war rather than constitutional inferiority. 
Italv, 1944 
Early in February 1943, Rommel's forces retreated to Tunisia. By the 
following summer, the Allies, including Montgomery's Eighth Army, had 
captured Tunisia and had begun the invasion of Sicily. On the 25 th July 
1943, Mussolini fell from power and Eisenhower was authorised to invade 
mainland Italy. By June 1944, the Anglo-American Fifth Army entered 
Rome and by August 1944, allied troops invaded Marseilles. 
The Adviser in Psychiatry in Italy was Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen 
MacKeith. Like James, he also established a 3-tier system of evacuation 
where treatment was provided at a Corps Exhaustion Centre, an Advanced 
Rehabilitation Centre and at an Advanced Base Psychiatric Centre. If a 
soldier had not recovered after treatment at all these levels, he was sent to 
base and then evacuated to the United Kingdom. Overall, the morale of the 
British troops was reported to be high and MacKeith argued that 
psychiatric cases were milder than had been in the Middle East and North 
408 lbid, p. 127 
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Africa due to the speed with which casualties received psychiatric 
treatment. 409 
Psychiatrists in these therapeutic centres practised a range of 
treatments particularly sedation and some abreaction, but also selection - 
choosing which patients were to be evacuated and which were to be sent 
back to the front. One psychiatrist, who was under enormous pressure to 
reduce wastage from psychiatric casualties but who responded differently 
to this pressure than Harold Palmer, was the corps psychiatrist H. D. 
Hunter, the senior psychiatrist of the Eighth Army. Hunter felt under 
particular pressure to maintain men in a fighting position as it was felt that 
at this stage all non-combat jobs were already being done by personnel who 
were unsuitable for combat -i. e. it was no longer possible for downgraded 
men to free up fit men for a combat role. In August 1944, Hunter wrote: 
We are now entering the last phase of the war in Europe. The value 
of downgraded soldiers is thus much less than it was. The 
manpower problem remains acute. It is therefore essential that we 
get the last ounce that every man is capable of giving before we 
discard him as a fighting soldier. The wastage from psychiatric 
casualties can, and must, be diminished. 410 
Hunter felt that his job was primarily to stop soldiers becoming 
psychiatric casualties. He was successful in this as only 10% of patients 
were sent back to the UK and 30% were returned to combatant duty -these 
results were almost as good as those achieved by Palmer. 41 1 However, 
unlike Palmer, Hunter did not concentrate on treatment but on selecting 
who should be withdrawn from the front-line. Hunter classified patients 
into five types which ranged from soldiers who suffered from simple 
exhaustion and soldiers who had broken down either due to a very 
409 S. A. MacKeith (1946)'Lasting Lessons of Overseas Military Psychiatry', Jow-nal of 
Mental Science, 92, pp. 542-550. 
410 H. D. Hunter, (1944) 'Eighth Army Memorandum No. 1, (RefHdhJIIO/8/44), 
Psychiatric Casualties in Battle', GC 13 5, BI (File 4 of 4). 
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traumatic experience or due to an accumulation of trauma from a number 
of campaigns (such men were dubbed 'the willing horse') to soldiers who 
were either chronic neurotics or persons with inadequate personalities. 
According to Hunter, those who should be evacuated quickly were the 
soldiers who were likely to return soon -curable patients. The others, who 
were constitutionally inadequate, should not be evacuated until they broke 
down completely: 
In psychiatry, almost everything depends on the basic 
personality of the patient. Thus one can afford to evacuate a good 
man early, knowing that he will return to the unit with high morale, 
having clearly benefited from rest and treatment. The poorest 
human material is like a cheap car, which must be run to the limit 
and then discarded. 
The psychiatrist cannot make good fighting men out of 
inadequate individuals. These should be sent back only when no 
further useful service can be obtained from them, or when they 
become a positive embarrassment to the Unit. In general there is a 
tendency for the poor stuff to be evacuated too soon, and the 
willing horse too late. 412 
Hunter made therefore a constitutional distinction between 
different types of patients, on the basis of which, he analysed the 
benefits of treatment. 
Hunter wrote this report towards the end of the war when as he 
pointed out the shortage of men was acute. In these situations, men with 
ample combat experience also came to be viewed as inadequate men; 
their breakdown was no longer justified by their front-line experience. 
They were described in similarly unflattering ways as the men who 
broke down upon arrival to the Middle East were described by James 
and Craigie: 
41 1 H. D. Hunter, (1946) 'The work of a corps psychiatrist in the Italian campaign', 
Join-nal of the Royal Ay-my Medical Coips, 86, pp. 127-130. p. 127. 412 H. D. Hunter, (1944). 
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These men have never been much good either at school, in civil 
life, or in the Army. They may be discarded colloquially as "wet 
fish", and have sometimes been labelled "Men of Poor Moral 
Fibre". ... They are often very selfish individuals. When sent into 
action they commonly vanish at an early stage in the fight, to 
reappear from nowhere, looking very busy, as soon as the danger is 
over. They show a compassionate longing to assist a wounded man 
on his journey to the RAP, and even beyond it. They are to be 
found on multitude of mysterious and unnecessary errands. Or else 
they dig a deep slit-trench with commendable rapidity, and stay in 
it till the battle is finished, never firing their weapons lest they 
attract unkind retaliation. Some of them spend years in the Infantry 
without firing a shot. When shells fall near, they paniC. 413 
Hunter concentrated on selection rather than treatment and his 
description of what treatment befits such inadequate men is clearly 
disciplinary: 
'H 
, ysterical' screaming and 
jibbering can often be stopped at once 
by means of a sharp command, a gallon or two of cold water, or 
the abrupt application of the flat of the hand to the side of the face. 
These are to be regarded purely as common-sense forms of first- 
aid. 
There is no treatment for "Poor Moral Fibre" beyond such rough 
and ready measures as can be administered on the spot. Detention 
is accepted as a rest cure. A firm insistence on the proper 
performance of duties in the line, reinforced by whatever sanction 
ingenuity can devise, is always salutory, both to the individual and 
to others. 414 
These men were defined as incurable because the source of their 
breakdown was not seen to lie in the conditions of warfare but imbedded 
within their personality. 
Ultimately, Hunter was able to withdraw from clinical practice 
altogether and focus instead on what he termed the 'positive' side of 
psychiatry: prevention. Key to this was a positive relationship with 
combatant officers. Hunter visited combatant units both when they were 
413 Ibid. 
414 Ibid. 
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active and during rest periods and advised combatant and medical officers 
on how to handle their men. His advice, he claimed, was asked on a variety 
of issues including compassionate leave, disciplinary problems and 
rehabilitation. Keen to be a true member of the military, Hunter appeared to 
have much preferred this aspect of his work than the clinical practice. 
A number of other front-line psychiatrists chose to focus on 
preventive aspects of psychiatry. Those who focused on selection as a way 
of increasing military inefficiency were inevitably disappointed by the 
quality of the average soldier. For example, the Divisional psychiatrist 
A. A. Martin, who practised in Burma in 1945 sought to rectify the 
problems of a battalion by interviewing and administering intelligence tests 
to the NCOs. He found that that the majority were of low intelligence, were 
"lacking in confidence and had poor personalities of neurotic type almost 
completely lacking in the qualities of leadership" .4" After testing some of 
the men, he was appalled by what he considered the constitutional 
inferiority and particularly the low intelligence of front line soldiers. In his 
report, he wrote: "Some of the material removed at this time was 
appallingly bad, and it was a constant source of wonder to me that the Bn. 
had previously been able to carry such a large number of dull and backward 
men, and still conduct itself favourably in action during the previous 
,, 416 campaign. 
Providing some contrast with the aforementioned psychiatrists were 
two Corps psychiatrists Major F. P. Haldane, and Capt. J. L. Rowley who 
were working at the Corps Exhaustion Centre in Italy. Their role was also 
to select patients -they interviewed psychiatric patients very close to the 
front and chose who had to be returned to the front and who should be sent 
further back for treatment and/or evacuation. Like Palmer, Haldane and 
4 15 A. A. Martin, (I 945)'Psychiatric Report', CMAC, RAMC 1900 18/1. 
416 lbid, (1945). 
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Rowley did not regard the majority of the men they saw as sick or neurotic. 
They wrote: 
Many lists of clinical types have been published. We have no wish 
to add to these. We merely wish to observe that these often tend to 
suggest a lack of the sense of proportion. They often fail to make it 
clear that the great bulk of these men are not ill with a neurosis at 
all. They may be said to have had their "anxiety threshold" lowered 
-a recurrence of the anxiety reaction facilitated. They may be said 
to be men whose initial "anxiety threshold" was not high. They 
may be said to be men whose "anxiety tolerance" is low. But "low 
anxiety threshold" and "low anxiety tolerance" are not neuroses. ... They are simply men who have been very badly frightened, and 
are, in fact, too incapacitated by fear to be capable of effective 
action under fire. But their fear is appropriate to the conditions in 
which it arises. It is not in the narrow sense pathological. Some 
Psychiatrists talk about a "phobia of shells". This sounds to us like 
a bad joke, on a par with saying that a man is allergic to bulletS. 417 
When it came to selecting which men should be returned to the front, 
Haldane and Rowley, also sought to ascertain constitutional differences 
between the men. Haldane and Rowley belonged to the psychoanalytic 
school and so the quality they looked for was 'strength of ego', which they 
argued, was formed in the early years of a child's life. A strong ego, they 
argued, was the same quality other psychiatrists referred to as having 
Cguts': 
Some Service Psychiatrists talk openly of "guts"; others covertly 
think about them. While deploring the emotional and subjective 
attitude implied in the use of the term "gutlessness", we have to 
admit that the reality to which this appellation refers is the central 
problem in the type of psychiatric casualty under discussion. This, 
in fact, is the condition, the degree of which has to be estimated at 
the psychiatric interview at the Exhaustion Centre. The condition is 
not, however, a legitimate target for sweeping and harsh abuse. 
Obviously it is simply a condition with which we have all for long 
417 F. P. Haldane & J. L. Rowley, (1944) 'The Principles and Functions of the Psychiatric 
Interview at the Corps Exhaustion Centre' CMAC, GC135 BI (file 4 of 4) p. l. (It was 
later published in the Lancet, 1946, ii, pp. 599-601). 
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418 been familiar-weakness of the ego... 
The most significant thing about Haldane and Rowley however is 
that in contrast to the aforementioned psychiatrists, they completely 
rejected the technique of history-taking as a way of selecting their patients. 
They rallied: 
... 
Must we simply, with our tongues in our cheeks, settle down to 
filling pro-formas with symbols and point-ratings on "family- 
history", "Background", "Civil Adaptation" and so forth, and 
cynically hand on our patients, duly ticketed and docketed in a 
quite worthless manner, to our baffled colleagues at the next level? 
We trust not. 419 
Haldane and Rowley chose instead to let each patient talk for 15 
minutes (which was all the time that was available for each examination) 
on a subject that was likely to bring about an affective response from the 
patient. The majority of soldiers talked either of their last battle experience 
or of their families. Based on their intuitive reaction to each patient, 
Haldane and Rowley decided who would be able to return to the front after 
four or five days rest or who needed to be evacuated further back for more 
treatment. The large majority of the patients Haldane and Rowley 
interviewed were evacuated further back for more treatment. 420 
It is difficult to know why Haldane and Rowley rejected history- 
taking but they were certainly an exception. When Haldane and Rowley 
published their views they received a scathing review from Hunter, who 
was the senior psychiatrist in the Eighth Army. Hunter defended the 
'historical approach' and berated Haldane and Rowley for assuming that 
their colleagues 'do not know what they are about' and concluded that 
418 Ibid, p. 2. 419 lbid, p. 3. 
420 F. P. Haldane & J. L. Rowley, (1944) Psychiatry At The Corps Exhaustion Centre. A 
technique of Rapid Psychiatric Assessment', CMAC, GC135 BI (file 4 of 4). 
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'seldom has a useful contribution been presented so deplorably garnished 
with garbage'. 421 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to explore the different clinical 
practices in theatres of war and examine how these were influenced by 
different military circumstances such as the pressure to retain or remove 
men., and the patients' battle experience. Such circumstances influenced the 
psychiatrists' commitment to particular aetiological explanations, as did the 
psychiatrists' enthusiasm for developing new therapies and their affiliations 
to particular psychiatric schools. 
Overall it has been argued that psychiatrists who developed 
treatments of their own, like Harold Palmer, R. Grinker and J. Spiegel, 
tended to emphasise morale, battle stress and other psychological 
aetiological explanations to breakdown, although they recognised that the 
majority of their patients had some constitutional inadequacies. However, 
the patients who were treated by Palmer, Grinker and Spiegel were all front- 
line personnel whose breakdown was perceived as justified. In conjunction, ' 
such factors influenced and promoted each other: the belief that patients 
were not ftindamentally damaged was aided by the psychiatrists' situation 
of treating patients whose breakdown was justified by their front-line 
experiences; meanwhile the presence of curable patients encouraged 
psychiatrists to develop new treatments. 
Most importantly, Palmer, Grinker and Spiegel did not divide their 
patients into constitutional categories; Palmer classified patients according 
to their morale and their symptoms while Grinker and Spiegel used standard 
clinical nomenclature but without using the terms that implied fundamental 
constitutional inferiority (mentally defective, psychopath, chronic neurotic). 
42 1 H. D. Hunter, (1944) 'Scrutinising the Ego' CMAC, GC 13 5BI (file 4 of 4). 
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The main contrast between Palmer and Grinker and Spiegel was that 
while Palmer regarded the majority of his patients as demoralised men who 
were not sick and who could be returned to duty, Grinker and Spiegel 
thought that the majority of their patients would never be able to fight 
again. Palmer perceived his role to be to persuade men to return to the front, 
while Grinker and Spiegel concentrated their effort on reassuring their 
patients that they need not feel guilty about not returning to the front and 
that there were other useful jobs for them to do. This difference between 
Palmer, and Grinker and Spiegel may have been partly based on ideology 
but it was undoubtedly facilitated by their practical circumstances; Palmer 
was under much greater pressure to return men to the front than wereý 
Grinker and Spiegel. 
In contrast with Palmer, Grinker and Spiegel, some psychiatrists 
either by choice or by circumstance spent their resources in selecting men 
rather than in treating them. These psychiatrists generally professed that 
'Prevention is better than Cure' and classified patients by both the standard 
clinical nomenclature (making full use of terms which conveyed a 
constitutional inferiority) and by a further classification according to the 
patients' history of previous treatment and adjustment. This classification 
served to segregate soldiers who were thought to be constitutionally too 
damaged to be of any use to the Army from the men who were thought of as 
fundamentally normal and curable. Although some psychiatrists who 
favoured a constitutional aetiological approach, such as G. W. B. James and 
H. B. Craigie, were stationed a long way from the front and treated many 
men whose breakdowns had not been legitimised by experiences of battle, 
(which may have encouraged their notion of a constitutional Predisposition 
to breakdown) these views were also shared by front-line psychiatrists. 
Major MacDonald, H. D. Hunter, and A. A. Martin all had experience of 
front-line troops but they nonetheless favoured the constitutional 
aetiological model with regard to at least some of their patients. MacDonald 
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classified patients primarily according to their history of previous illness.. 
Hunter divided patients according to five personality types that included 
men who were either chronic neurotic or had inadequate personalities, 
whom he compared to a 'cheap car, which must be run to the limit and then 
discarded'. Martin was appalled at the number of dull and backward 
soldiers his battalion had carried. It has been argued that the process of 
selecting men encouraged a constitutional aetiological model because in 
making a prognosis psychiatrists had to distinguish between men who were 
essentially normal and curable and men who were essentially abnormal and 
incurable. In most cases, this prognosis was reached through the process of 
history-taking. 
The psychiatrists Haldane and Rowley had a different approach. They 
too looked for a constitutional difference between men (for the 
characteristic, which they said other psychiatrists called 'gutlessness', but 
which they called weakness of the ego). They argued that history-taking 
was an inadequate way of assessing this, and instead they allowed patients 
to talk freely to them and then made an intuitive decision. Their approach 
however, was strongly criticised by Hunter. 
Finally, some psychiatrists including Tom Main recognised that 
psychiatrists working overseas had difficulty in being objective, and were 
influenced in their judgement by feelings of fear, guilt, frustration and 
anger. The way with which psychiatrists resolved aetiological issues was 
related to these feelings, for in resolving what caused a breakdown, 
psychiatrists could pinpoint who or what was to blame for the psychiatric 
casualties. With the passing of each patient for whom a constitutional 
aetiological explanation was found, psychiatrists became convinced that 
breakdown was a question of inherent weakness. When low morale, poor 
leadership, an inadequate diet or the absence of mail were used 
aetiologically, the blame was placed on inadequate military logistics and 
training. However, when aetiology was seen to be inherent within the 
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horrors of battle, the grief over dead comrades and the separation from 
loved ones, then the blame for psychiatric casualties lay firmly within the 
natiti-e of warfare. This meant that psychiatric casualties were not 
preventable. Most psychiatrists faced with the task of being useful to the 
Army, shied away from such an explanation and sought to place blame with 
the inadequate personalities of the soldiers and the inadequate logistics and 
training of the Army. 
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Chapter 6: Northfield Military Hospital 1942-1945 
Introduction 
The legend of Northfield is one of those myths of creation. 
Everyone who works in group psychotherapy, the therapeutic 
community, art therapy, therapeutic social clubs or a number of 
other related fields knows where their origins were. Northfield 
Military Hospital in the early 1940s was populated by Olympian 
psychiatrists and psychotherapists. We can treasure this fabled 
past, and know we are the descendants of gods. 422 
As the above quote shows, Northfield Hospital was the one psychiatric 
innovation that ensured that the Second World War came to be seen as a 
turning point in the history of psychiatry. Of course, only therapists 
interested in social treatments have invested Northfield and the Second 
World War with such significance; for the more medically/physically 
minded Northfield was an irrelevance on the eve of the Pharmaceutical age 
of the 1950s. For social therapists however, Northfield Hospital marks the 
beginning of a new psychiatry which was free from the medical paradigm 
and which took its therapeutic value not from drugs and other medical 
interventions but from the study of social relationships. Therapy in 
Northfield was strongly based on principles such as empowerment, 
democracy, honesty, openness and social interaction. But the most 
significant values espoused in Northfield were those with particular 
relevance in wartime: personal and social responsibility and the greater 
importance of the group over the individual. 
Northfield Hospital is the most written about aspect of military 
psychiatry in the Second World War. All the main participants have written 
accounts of their time there, and in 2000, the psychiatrist Tom Harrison 
422 B. Hinshelwood, (2000) 'Foreword' in T. Harrison (2000), Bion, Rickman, Foulkes 
and the Northfield Experiments, Advancing on a Diffei-ent Ront, London: Jessica 
Kingsley, p. 7. 
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wrote a book-length comprehensive account. 423 As a result, it is not 
necessary to describe Northfield in full detail; however, it is hoped that in 
retelling the story emphasis will be placed on the proper context and the 
result will be less progressivist and more historical than in previous 
accounts. Precisely because histories of Northfield to date are written either 
by the protagonists themselves or those whose who work in the same 
clinical tradition, it is important to write a more critical account in which 
the participants' rhetoric is recognised to be just that. In the following 
chapter emphasis will be placed on the same themes that have been 
discussed in previous chapters: the relationship between psychiatrists and 
the military, the nature of the psychiatric treatment and the methods of 
selecting patients for this treatment, the psychiatrists' focus and 
classification of patients and the psychiatrists' attitude towards patients 
with a low IQ. In addition, an attempt will be made to sketch out the 
ideology of the Northfield psychiatrists which will include, as well as the 
above, their attitudes towards the responsibility of the individual to society. 
Finally, some of the tensions arising between staff will be discussed. 
The Settins! 
Prior to the Second World War, Northfield Hospital in Birmingham 
had been known as Holymoor mental hospital, and as such it had 
functioned since the late nineteenth century. At the onset of the war, its 
patients were transferred to other psychiatric hospitals and it was converted 
to an Emergency Medical Service hospital intended for use by the local 
civilian population. It was then requested by the War Office and on the Is' 
of April 1942, it became Northfield Military Hospital. According to much 
of the secondary literature Northfield was specifically created to improve 
the rate of return to the front line -it was felt that patients in military 
423 T. Harrison, (2000). 
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hospitals would do better than the patients in civilian EMS hospitals. 424 
Furthermore, according to one account, psychiatrists in Northfield were 
specifically "invited to try out new forms of treatment" in order to increase 
the rate of casualties returned to military duties . 
425 It is clear that Northfield 
was intended to cater specifically for men of whom there was a reasonable 
expectation of recovery. The patients who were sent to Northfield, had 
been selected prior to admission as the men most likely to return to active 
service. 426 
The hospital, with an official capacity of 800 beds was split into two. 
The first wing, of two hundred beds was used for treatment and was for 
patients who were ostensibly sick; the other 600 beds were in the 'training 
wing' where men were rehabilitated. The idea was that men would be 
initially admitted into the medical wing, progress to the training wing and 
then return to the Army. 
The nature of the training wing with its paramilitary nature was been 
inspired from an experiment carried out by the psychiatrist John Rickman 
at Whamcliff hospital. 427 There, Rickman had introduced paramilitary 
occupational therapy to substitute the more feminising occupational 
therapy traditionally found in mental hospitals which tended to be centred 
around arts and crafts: basket and rug making, painting, embroidery etc. 
This paramilitary occupational therapy was available to all the patients and 
that in itself was a cause for disagreement. In particular, the psychiatrist 
424 This is frequently referred to in the secondary literature for example W. Holden, 
(2000) Shellshock, London: Channel4 books, pp. 118-119 but it has not been possible to 
find a reference to it in War Office records. 
425 H. Bridger, (1990) 'The Discovery of the therapeutic Community, ' The Social 
Engagement of Social Science, A Tavistock Anthology Vol. I. - The Socio-Psychological 
Perspective, (eds) E. Trist & H. Murray, London: Free Association Books. 
Unfortunately, historical accounts written by psychotherapists are rarely adequately 
referenced so it is unclear where this information comes from. 
426 R. Ahrenfeldt, (1958) Psychiatty in the British Army in the Second World War, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 150; T. Harrison (2000), p. 155 
427 This experiment is thought to have originated from a memorandum written by W. 
Bion for his analyst J. Rickman. However, the memorandum has never been found. See 
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Eliot Slater (see chapter 4) visited Wharncliff where he had admired the 
scheme, yet had written a rather critical report of it: 
The method has a specific value only in a proportion of cases, 
principally in those whose return to military duties is expected and 
desired. ... The method would seem to be best applied as a form of 
convalescent treatment to men of good personality and good 
prognosis. It would not appear to have many advantages as a 
method of general application to all cases. Results would probably 
be even better than at present if only those cases were treated 
where there was good hope of return to military duties. The 
method is one of building up morale and is accordingly susceptible 
to unfavourable influences from unsuitable neurotic cases that 
inevitably require invaliding. 428 
In response, Rickman wrote to Slater to say that the report had been 
unfair. Slater acknowledged he had been harsh and disclosed that he was 
preparing to copy the scheme in Sutton. In Sutton however, the scheme 
would be open to selected cases only and Slater would be personally 
responsible for the selection; a job which he said would suit him 
temperamentally. 429 By contrast, , 
in Northfield (following from 
Whamcliffe), the dominant view was that treatment was for everyone. This 
was part of the ideology that made Northfield distinct from contemporary 
psychiatric establishments. Nonetheless, even in Northfield some patients 
were excluded from some treatment and these exceptions will be discussed 
later. 
From the start, the staff in Northfield were psychiatrists of good 
repute who were interested in advancing new treatments. A good deal of 
physical therapy went on: mainly ECT, continuous narcosis and modified 
insulin therapy, although there has been some suggestion that leucotomies 
W. Bion, (1961) Experiences in Groups London: Tavistock Publications, p. 83 
(footnote); 
428 E. Slater, (1941) 'Report on visit to Wharricliff emergency hospital, 13th and 14th 
January 194 1', Archives of the British Psycho-Analytic Society, CRR/F 16/09. 
194 
were also carried oUt. 430 Drugs were used both as sedatives and as relaxants 
during abreaction. In addition, a variety of psychological methods were 
used including hypnosis, psychotherapy and occupational therapy. While 
Tom Harrision has found that in subsequent interviews with Northfield 
patients the most common perception was that there was no treatment, 431 
Northfield was from the start (relative to the standards of the time) 
therapeutically active and innovative. Even excluding the main protagonists 
of what came to be known as the Northfield experiments, the other 
psychiatrists were on the whole men and women who viewed their patients 
with respect and with optimism; they believed that on the whole it was 
possible to cure patients and make them useful members of society once 
again. Among these psychiatrists was Joshua Bierer who had been, prior to 
working in Northfield, the first person to experiment with group therapies. 
While working in a mental hospital, Bierer had experimented with the 
creation of a social club that was radically different. As he put it: 
"Entertainments for patients are arranged in all modem hospitals. The basis 
of the social club is just the opposite: nothing is arranged for the patients 
but everything is arranged and governed by them". 432 The purpose of the 
social club was to empower patients but also to help them accept 
responsibility: 
... we forget that when patients are admitted to a mental hospital 
they are stripped of all their responsibilities, deprived of all 
independent action, and are in no way self-governing -in fact, they 
are made into "tools". The social club should be the first important 
429 E. Slater, (7/3/41) Letter to John Rickman, Archives of the British Psycho-Analytic 
Society, CRR/F16/12 
430 The author and ex Northfield patient Rayner Happenstall %vrote an autobiographical 
novel in which the narrator recalls how in his time in Northfield, another patient taken 
away for an operation and subsequently died. The narrator concludes that the operation 
must have been a leucotomy. Harrison, however, has argued that there is no definite 
evidence that leucotomies were ever performed at Northfield. T. Harrison (2000), p. 
14 1; R. Happenstall, (1953) The lesser inforfune, London: Jonathan Cape. 
43 1 T. Harrison, (2000), p. 173. 
432 J. Bierrer, (1942) 'Group Psychotherapy' BMJ, 1, p. 215. 
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step towards making the patient change his position from that of 
being an object to being a subject... Patients in mental hospitals 
become independent, active, and "self-deciding" which helps a 
great deal in speeding up their cure. 433 
Also significant was the didactic form of group therapy instituted in 
434 Northfield by D. Blair. Acting originally for the purpose of saving time 
Blair made two changes in his normal routine: Firstly he encouraged 
patients to write a history of their lives "with special reference to any 
events which may have affected their mental welfare"435 . This served the 
purpose of saving time that would have been spent on eliciting information, 
but according to Blair provided relief for patients who were thus able to 
unburden themselves. Secondly, Blair designed a 10-lecture course in 
which he educated the patients on biology and psychology in order to help 
them understand their symptoms: lectures were conducted on topics 
ranging from anatomy, sex and the instincts to how mental conflicts may 
arise, an understanding of fear and the relationship between the body and 
the mind. Blair noted that to his surprise most patients were able to 
understand the lectures and as a result develop an insight into their own 
disorders. 
The main protagonists of the Northfield experiments are usually 
identified as the psychiatrists John Rickman, Wilfred Bion, Sigmund 
Foulkes, Tom Main and the non-psychiatrist Harold Bridger. Tom Harrison 
has elaborated on the influences of the thinking of these men, particularly 
the former three, and has noted that they shared an interest in 
psychoanalysis and a perception of groups as positive rather than negative 
influences. Rickman and Bion had personal experience of putting groups to 
good use in their work in selecting officers from leaderless groups (see 
433 J. Bierrer, (1942) pp. 215-216. 
434 D. Blair, (1943) 'Group Psychotherapy for war neuroses', The Lancet, 1, pp. 204-205. 
435 D. Blair, (1943) p. 204. Blair however makes it clear that there were "certain obvious 
exceptions" from whorn he didn't ask such biographies such as "low-grade mental 
defectives". 
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chapter three). Bion, Foulkes and especially Rickman were influenced by 
Melanie Klein (Rickman was in analysis with Klein prior to the war) 
Ronald Fairbairn and object relations theory. 436 Furthermore, Rickman had 
for some years been writing about the implications of psychoanalytic 
theories on the structure of society and was interested in what types of 
society are more healthy, apparently favouring the British model of a 
democracy as a society which by virtue of permitting differentiation 
permits its members to mature. With regard to S. H. Foulkes, Harrison 
identifies some slightly different influences but which lead to the same 
results: the works of the neurologist Kurt Goldstein and the sociologist 
Norbert Elias. Foulkes as a Jewish immigrant from Germany also had 
rather different life experiences from the other psychiatrists. According to 
de Mare, Foulkes was influenced by the Frankfurt School as the Institute of 
Social Research in which they worked was housed in the same building as 
the institute of psychoanalysis in which Foulkes was working. 437 
Furthermore, Foulkes had experience of group psychotherapy long before 
he started working in Northfield; his first group sessions took place in 
Exeter in 1939 where he worked with Eve Lewis. Foulkes and Main were 
also influenced by American psychotherapists such as Trigant Burrow, 
Louis Wender, S. R. Slavson, P. Schilder and L. J. Moreno. 438 In general, it 
seems fair to say that the Northfield participants were familiar with the 
various notions of group psychotherapy in both small and large groups and 
of the idea of using the environment as a form of treatment. The most 
explicit theoretical acknowledgment made by the participants was to Kurt 
Lewin and his social fields theory which was described later by the 
Northfield psychotherapist Patrick de Mare as a "Gestalt quasi-Marxist 
436 T. Harrison, (2000) pp. 50-51. 
437 It is possible that de Mare who at the time described himself as a communist 
exaggerated this influence. De Mare also said that Foulkes used to tell him that "he had 
not yet analysed a communist whose political stance was not based on some form of 
neurotic conflict. " P. De Mare (1983) 'Michael Foulkes and the Northfield Experiment, ' 
The evolution ofgroup analysis ed. M. Pines, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
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A3 
approach' 9. The significance of Lewin's field theory lies in its optimism, 
it implies that by changing the social fields, i. e. the environment to one that 
is beneficial and encouraging, one can achieve a lasting effect on patients. 
The First Northfield experiment 
The 'First Northfield experiment' came to be known as such in the 
1970S440 when it became established as the precursor of what was 
originally known as the Northfield experiment (and then later, as the 
Second Northfield experiment). It took place when the psychiatrist Wilfred 
Bion was posted as CO of the Training Wing at Northfield in the autumn of 
1942 after having worked in the War Office to establish the War Office 
Selection Boards for the selection of officers and in particular the leaderless 
groups. Our knowledge of it arises from two articles published by Bion in 
1943 and 1946 during which time it was referred to as an experiment only 
by Bion and Rickman. The discussion of the first Northfield experiment 
which will follow here arises from an analysis of these two articles. 
The purpose of the articles was threeforld: Firstly Bion redefined 
military psychiatry, arguing against the hitherto accepted exemplar of 
civilian general medicine. For Bion, the aim of military psychiatry was to 
unite failed and demoralised soldiers into a unit capable of combat - 
therefore his role model for this task was not the civilian doctor but the 
combatant officer. This demonstrates the commitment he felt to the war 
effort which led to his willingness to supplant traditional medical values 
which focused on the patient's welfare for the superlative value of 
maintaining military strength and manpower. Secondly, Bion and to a 
lesser extent Rickman suggested a new psychiatric rationale -cure from 
438 T. Harrison, (2000) pp. 58-64. 
439 P. De Mare, (1985) 'Major Bion', Bion and Group psychotherapy, M. Pines (ed), 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 112. 
440 The first written reference to the first Northfield experiment that I have been able to 
find is by Tom Main, (1977) 'The concept of the therapeutic community: variations and 
viscissitudes', Gi-oup Analysis, 10, pp. 2- 10. 
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neurosis could be achieved through a process of re-socialising the neurotic 
patient and that this results from getting patients to examine themselves, 
and their relationships with others critically. Finally, the articles were a 
vehicle for Bion and Rickman to proclaim their fury with the authorities 
who six weeks into their experiment had removed them from Northfield, 
ostensibly because they were unable to maintain military discipline -the 
very thing they had been trying to foster. 
The first of these points is the most salient and explicitly stated: Bion 
lamented the way Northfield was run when he first started working there 
because it was not fulfilling the aims of military psychiatry as he saw them. 
Furthermore, for those in the know, Bion pointed out why it was that his 
perspective was different from the run of the mill psychiatrists -he had 
combatant experience from the First World War where he had served as an 
officer in the Tank Corps and had been awarded the Distinguished Service 
Order. He described Northfield as follows: 
An observer with combatant experience could not be help being 
struck by the great gulf that yawned between the life led by 
patients in a psychiatric hospital, even when supposed to be ready 
for discharge, and the military life from which their breakdown 
had released them. Time and again treatment appears to be, in the 
broadest sense, sedative; sedative for doctors and patients alike. 
Occupational therapy meant helping keep the patients occupied - 
usually on a kindergarten level. ... a 
few [patients], usually the 
most spectacular, were dosed with hypnotics. Sometimes a critic 
might be forgiven for wondering whether these were intended to 
441 enable the doctor to sleep ... 
In addition, Bion identified as a key problem for psychiatry's lack of 
success: the identification between mental and physical illness. This flew 
completely against the direction of the majority of psychiatric thinking 
which held that psychiatry could only achieve results when it became fully 
integrated into general medicine, mental patients were treated in general 
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hospitals, and the stigma associated with mental illness had been explained 
away by the fact that mental illness was a disease like any otheIA42. In 
contrast, Bion argued: 
Unfortunately ... psychiatry has already accepted the doubtful 
analogy of physical maladies and treatments as if they were in fact 
similar to neurotic disorders. The apparatus of the psychiatric 
hospital, huge buildings, doctors, nurses and the rest, together 
provide a magnificent smoke screen into which therapists and 
patients alike disappear when it becomes evident that someone 
may want to know what social function is being fulfilled, in the 
economy of a nation at war, by this aggregate of individualS. 443 
According to Bion what was required was: 
The presence of an officer who... know[s] what it is to be in a 
responsible position at a time when responsibility means having to 
face issues of life and death. He must know what it is to exercise 
authority in circumstances that make his fellows unable to accept 
his authority except in so far as he seems able to sustain it. He must 
know what it is to live in close emotional relationship with his 
fellow men. In short, he must know the sort of life that is led by a 
combatant officer. 444 
Bion also claimed that this experience was necessary in order for the 
psychiatrist to understand that men must be returned to their units as 
willing, responsible adults who accept their military duty. And it was the 
same moral framework of accepting one's duty that would protect 
441 W. R. Bion, (1946) 'The leaderless Group Project', Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 
Vol. 10. No. 3. p. 78. 
442 For example, the Mental Treatment Act 1930, which was widely held to have 
brought huge benefits by permitting voluntary treatment was based on the notion that 
"that there is no clear line of demarcation between mental illness and physical illness" 
and that therefore treatment for mental illness must, where ever possible, be informal, 
readily available and not constrained by the delays and legalities of the process of 
certification. Report of the Royal Conunission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder (HMSO, 
1926, Cmd. 2700) p. 15. 
443 W. R. Bion, (1946) pp. 78-79. 
444 W. R. Bion & J. Rickman, (1943), 'Intra-group tensions in therapy, their study as the 
task of the group', The Lancet, ii, p. 678. 
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psychiatrists from feelings of guilt for playing a non-combatant role while 
returning other men into action. 
A psychiatrist who knows this will at least be spared the hideous 
blunder of thinking that patients are potential cannon-fodder, to be 
returned as such to their units. He ivill realise that it is his task to 
produce self-respecting men socially adjusted to the community 
and therefore willing to accept its responsibilities whether in peace 
or war. Only thus he will be free from deep feelings of guilt which 
effectually stultify any efforts he may otherwise make towards 
tr I eatment. 445 
In this passage, Bion made a crucial link between self-respect and 
social adjustment on the one hand and willingness to accept responsibility 
(in this context the responsibility of active combat) on the other. This was 
at the crux of his approach which perceived unwillingness to fight in the 
war as a neurotic symptom. Using the ongoing metaphor of a battalion in 
action, Bion argued, that the training wing required a common enemy and 
that in their situation the enemy was neurosis. Patients needed to see that 
'neurotic behaviour adds to the difficulties of the community, destroying 
happiness and efficiency. ' In particular, 'Communal distress' should be 
shown to be a 'neurotic by-product' so that 'neurosis itself would be seen 
to be worthy of communal study and attack. 046 The underlying difficulty 
that Bion faced, and was certainly aware of, was that the exact opposite 
could be argued: neurosis was in fact very useful because it kept both 
patients and doctors out of harms way. However, Bion felt this was not an 
honourable position and that once the patients realised this was their 
motivation for being ill they would willingly give it up. 
Neither Bion nor Rickman gave many details as to the nature of their 
experiment. Initially, it seems that Bion reduced regulations so that the 
neurotic behaviour of the patients would become evident. Secondly, he 
introduced compulsory group meetings: one daily meeting for the entire 
445 W. R. Bion & J. Rickman, (1943) p. 678. My italics. 
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unit, and other activity group meetings of which soldiers had to attend at 
least one and were expected to form their own if none of the offered 
activities were suitable. One such activity group had the job of mapping out 
the programme of all the groups and their activities; in this way the 
expansion of activities was documented and provided a guide for the 
morale of the hospital. However, while the number of groups and activities 
constantly expanded Bion suggested to the patients that very little genuine 
activity was taking place as most patients did not in fact join in any of the 
activities and that this was hypocritical considering the patients most 
common complaint against the army had been the 'eyewash'. 447 According 
to Bion, after this, the training unit became self-critical. When some men 
complained that the wards were getting dirty, they organised a group who 
would keep the wards clean. Some men continued to complain that only 
20% of the men were working hard, while the other 80% were shirkers. 
Instead of solving this problem, Bion suggested that this was a problem not 
just with the hospital but with society at large and asked the patients to 
come up with solutions themselves. According to Bion gradually the 
morale of the unit improved and even though patients were constantly 
changing the good conditions remained. Gradually the groups began to 
operate well and military offences were reduced. In typically self- 
aggrandising language Bion concluded that: "The atmosphere was not 
unlike that seen in a unit of an army under the command of a general in 
whom they have confidence, even though they cannot know his plans". 448 
These articles were radically different from most other contemporary 
articles describing military psychiatry. Bion did not discuss any of the 
common themes found in such articles: the medical histories of the 
patients, their symptoms and military experience, or the cause of their 
neurosis. His entire emphasis was instead on his relationship with the 
446 lbid, p. 678. 447 lbid, p. 679. 
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patients and his success at making them self-critical and raising their 
morale. Furthermore, the treatment, as described, included everyone and 
was present in everything the patients did. 
John Rickman also described the group therapy he instituted in his 
ward of 14-16 patients. Group therapy consisted of having a group 
discussion every morning from which patients could raise issues that they 
discussed privately with the psychiatrist in the afternoon. As described by 
Rickman the main theme in the discussion was "their personal difficulties 
in putting the welfare of the group in the first place during their 
membership of the group" summarised by Rickman as "the social 
implications of personality problems". 449Again, this section is free from 
any discussion of the patients' histories, intelligence or symptoms and 
focused entirely on treatment. The decision as to who gets treatment was 
made entirely by social rather than clinical criteria; treatment was limited to 
those in the ward; just like Bion's mode of therapy was limited to patients 
residing in the training unit. The essence of treatment was learning to cope 
with putting the welfare of society before that of the individual -and its 
natural conclusion was the patient's acceptance that he must become a 
soldier again. 
Finally, Bion used the 1946 article to point out that his dismissal 
from Northfield had been a tragedy in which he had behaved heroically. He 
drew a parallel between himself trying to stop a retreat into illness and a 
combatant officer trying to stop an actual retreat. About the latter he said: 
His prominence at such a time will certainly mean that he will be 
shot at by the enemy; in extreme cases he may even be shot at by 
his own side. Outside Nazi Germany psychiatrists are not likely to 
be shot for doing their jobs, though of course they can be removed 
from their posts. Any psychiatrist who attempts to make groups 
study their own tensions, as a therapeutic occupation, is in today's 
448 lbid, p. 680. 449 lbid, p. 680. 
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conditions stopping a retreat and may as well be shot at. But he 
will lose some of his feelings of guilt. 450 
Bion's rhetoric about the heroic part played by the First Northfield 
experiment in which he was effectively shot by his own side has succeeded 
in giving those six weeks at Northfield an unprecedented status in the 
history of social therapy. 
The purpose of the first Northfield experiment was to increase the 
number of patients who were rehabilitated and returned to combat service. 
Bion's central criticism of Northfield had been that prior to his arrival the 
hospital was run far too much like a general hospital and not enough like a 
combatant unit. So considering that his aims were explicitly pro-military, 
why had he been sacked by the military? The most commonly cited 
explanation is that the hospital military staff could not put up with the 
chaos caused by the lack of discipline during the initial stages of Bion's 
experiment. Patrick de Mare, a psychiatrist on the Northfield staff wrote in 
the 1980s that Bion's radical approach "produced a cultural clash with 
hospital military authorities. The fear that Rickman's and Bion's approach 
would lead to anarchy and chaos occasioned War Office officials to pay a 
lightning visit at night. The chaos in the hospital cinema hall, with 
newspaper-and condom-strewn floors, resulted in the immediate 
termination of the project. 05 1 However, it can be argued that it was not so 
much a culture clash between Bion and military authorities that resulted in 
his dismissal, but a clash between him and the other psychiatrists - 
furthermore, in practice, the distinction between military and psychiatric 
staff is nonsensical since all the psychiatrists involved held military rank. 
Tom Main later argued that the problems started when Bion quarrelled with 
his commanding officer who was responsible for liasing between the 
450 W. R. Bion, (1946) p. 8 1. 
451 P. de Mare, (1985) cited in Bridger, (1990) p. 73 
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professional and administrative staff . 
452 The commanding officer was also a, 
psychiatrist and he too was sacked only a few weeks after Bion and 
Rickman. The decision to remove these psychiatrists was taken in all 
probability by psychiatrists in the Directorate of Army Psychiatry, which 
having been formed on the same day as Northfield was responsible for 
psychiatric personnel. In practice therefore, it appears that it was not a 
conflict of cultures between the military and psychiatry, but a conflict 
between psychiatrists that led to the ending of the first Northfield 
experiment. 
The non-psychiatrist Harold Bridger has offered another explanation 
for Bion's sacking, which suggested instead that Bion's approach was far 
too pro-military for the other psychiatrists to bear. According to Bridger, 
Bion had caused a drift between himself and the other psychiatrist because 
he was too military minded and was ". facing ... the hospital professional 
staff with the responsibility for distinguishing between their existence and 
purpose as a military organization and their individual beliefs that in the 
majority of cases health entailed a return to civilian life". 453 In other words, 
the staff resented Bion because he discouraged the invaliding of patients 
- and enforced an attitude that returning men to the front was the doctors' 
primary duty. 
The Second Northfield Experiment 
After Bion and Rickman were dismissed, the hospital is reported to 
have stagnated. This picture has to some extent been compounded by the 
portrait of Northfield drawn in the autobiographical novel by Rayner 
Happenstall, an ex-Northfield patient. However, experimental therapeutic 
work was going on in the hospital, such as that described earlier by Blair 
452 T. ' Main, (1983) 'The concept of the therapeutic community: variations and 
viscissitudes', The evolution of grotp analysis ed. M. Pines, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, p. 205. 453 H. Bridger, (1990) p. 73. 
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and then later in the form of the group-therapy practiced by Foulkes and 
Bierer who arrived at the hospital in 1943. Remarkably, the hospital 
permitted the patients an astonishing degree of freedom of speech, which 
was expressed in the hospital newspaper The Psyche. The newspaper had a 
specific section entitled ruthless rhymes in which readers were invited "to 
give free expression to their latent sadism (thus considerably facilitating 
their psycho-therapeutical treatment at Hollymoor) by composing verses of 
this kind454" the editors later stating that "we will sail as close to the wind 
as we dare in the publishing of them. 1)455 One can only guess what the 
psychiatrist FRC Casson had to say when he read the following poem 
published in the first edition of Psyche: 
I venture to remark on passant 
that a certain young doctor named Casson 
should -be left in a cove 
with his head in a stove 
and the tide coming in and the gas on. 
456 
The newspaper provided anti-authority commentary on all aspects of 
hospital organisation and the disciplines of Psychiatry and Psychology 
were mocked repeatedly. On one occasion, the editors reported that the 
astrology section of the paper would be discontinued because "as a 
harmless sedative and as a cheap means of bringing comfort to the millions, 
astrology cannot hope to compete with behaviourist psychology". 457 The 
newspaper also published radical political commentary criticizing 
Churchill: 
454 PP/SHF/C. 3/25 Psyche 1, May 1943. 
455 PP/SHF/C. 3/25 Psyche 4. 
456 Pat Byrne, Psyche 1. The fact that in 1945 Casson referred in a private letter to 'the 
chronic neurotics, psychopaths, and defcctive unstable Pioneer Corps fellows' he had 
encountered at Northfield may to some extent explain why patients had felt the need to 
write such a poem but also why Casson may have kept a grudge. F. R. C. Casson, 2.7.45, 
Letter to John Rickinan, Archives of the British Psycho-Analytic Society, CRR/IF20/22. 
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Before the war, numerous intellectuals spoke of themselves as 
"Good Europeans". After the war, it looks as though any 
Englishman whose sympathies extend beyond the tribe will have to 
call himself "A Good Anglo- Saxon". We wonder whether in the 
end Mr Churchill will settle in Washington or whether he will rule 
us from Whitehall as a sort of U. S. Viceroy. But perhaps the 
common man's distaste for American soldiery and his strong 
458 feeling for Russia will keep us attached to Europe after all... 
This comment became even more radical by stating that Viceroy was 
'Anglo-Indian for "Gauleiter" A59 thus drawing a parallel between the Nazi 
occupation of Europe and the British Empire and another parallel between 
the relationship between Britain and its empire and between America and 
Britain. 
The origins of the Second Northfield experiment are difficult to pin 
point to a specific moment. According to Bridger, it began with his arrival 
at Northfield towards the end of 1944. As described by Foulkes, there was 
a precursor to the experiment some six months earlier created by the sense 
of emergency caused by the imminent opening of the Second Front. This 
allowed the administrative divisions in the hospitals to relax in order to 
facilitate therapy. This change was made possible by a change in the type 
of patients coming to Northfield. The initial patients had no combat 
experience, they were 
unwilling soldiers with long-standing difficulties; their chief 
preoccupation was discharge from the Service. The key to the 
"pearly gates" into civilian life was the patient's neurotic 
symptom, and as like as not if he had nothing dramatic to show 
when he set out from his unit for the hospital, by the time he ... had had a chance to talk to the other patients he was well equipped with 
457 Psyche 1. As this is the first edition of the paper, it would seem that there was never 
an astrology section to be discontinued; the whole thing is a set up for the jibe. 458 R. Happenstall, Psyche 1. 
459 Ibid. 
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agents for promoting his civilian freedom which he would use in 
the battle with his psychiatrist to come. 460 
This contrasted with the patients arriving later on in the war who had 
had combat experience: 
Soon we were dealing with young, active soldiers who had seen 
battle. The staff, many of whom had not been active in the fighting, 
had to respect these men who were ill and exhausted. The boot was 
now on the other foot; the less active soldiers on the staff felt guilty 
and discovered a real sympathy for the patients. 461 
The difference in the type of patients took place partly because the 
Directorate of Army Psychiatry decided in December 1943 that patients 
sent to Northfield would be even more stringently selected than previously. 
Rather than admit patients "where it appeared probable that, after a short 
course of treatment, they would be fit for further military service in some 
capacity 062 they now admitted only cases where "there was a high 
probability of return, after treatment, to high grade military duties". 463 The 
explanation offered for this change of policy by the Directorate of Army 
Psychiatry was that 'chronic neurotics with a poor constitutional 
background' did not generally give effective service to the Army and had 
subsequently to be discharged. All positions that could be economically 
employed by such men were already filled and therefore considering the 
shortage in medical manpower it was best to reserve Northfield to treat 
those men most likely to be of greater service. 464 
460 S. H. Foulkes, (1948) Introduction to Group-Analyfic Psychotherapy, Studies in the 
social integration of individuals and groups, London: William Heinemann Medical 
Books, p. 45. 
461 Ibid, pp. 46-47. However, according R. Heppenstal's novel, patients with combat 
experience had begun arriving since 1943 when the casualties from the 8'h army had 
been evacuated. 
462 F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1953) 'The Army Psychiatric Service'p. 473. 
463 Ibid. 
464 Ibid. 
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Without a doubt, the appointment of Harold Bridger as CO of the 
training wing was crucial to the development of the Second Northfield 
experiment. Bridger had been a mathematics teacher prior to the war and 
had no experience in psychiatry, however, during the war he had worked 
with the Directorate for the selection of Personnel in selecting officers. 
When he was selected by the psychiatrist Ronald Hargreaves of the 
Directorate of Army Psychiatry to take over the training wing at Northfield, 
Bridger was someone who could be depended on to be loyal to both the 
military staff (of whom he was one) and to the psychiatrists. In practice, 
however, Bridger became treated more as an honorary psychiatrist. 
Bridger's input was to follow in the line of Bion and Rickman while 
explicitly trying to maintain a positive relationship with all the staff - 
professional and administrative. He appointed himself as a Social Activities 
organiser, and in that role encouraged patients to take responsibility in the 
running of the hospital. For example, Bridger famously organised a 
hospital club by not organising it -after emptying a ward and naming it 
'The Hospital Club' he waited until the patients organised a protest about 
the waste of resources involved in the empty space before telling them that 
it was up to them to organise it. Apparently, the hospital club was 
frequently smashed up, but the disorder was tolerated and it was up tothe 
patients to put it together again. There was also an explicit education in 
democracy, where each ward elected representatives, who met with the 
other staff to make decisions for the hospitals in what were named 
"constituency meetings" and "house of commons meetings". 
Bridger's appointment was followed by that of the psychiatrist Tom 
Main early in 1945. Main had previously been the psychiatric adviser to the 
21" Army Group and so had plenty of experience of front-line psychiatry in 
the invasion of Europe. Furthermore, he had a history of meeting the 
military staff on equal terms, for example, when he had been called out to 
the Middle East to give advice on problems of morale in the Parachute 
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Regiment he had insisted on getting wings himself. 465 In Northfield, he 
supported Bridger's work but also explicitly tried to smooth relationships 
with the military staff in an attempt to break administrative barriers and 
create a therapeutic con2munity -the first use of this term. Main would later 
describe his time in Northfield as a voyage of self discovery, where he 
leamt to put himself in the position of the military staff and comprehend 
why it was that they were unhappy with how Northfield was being run. The 
ultimate cause of disagreement appeared to be discipline: 
There was much indiscipline in the patients. Their psychiatrists 
tolerated this and excused it on grounds of illness, but my non- 
psychiatrist commanding officer and his non-Psychiatric military 
staff throughout the hospital were far from content with the 
psychiatrists' tolerance and sought to have soldiers who got drunk 
or got out at night or were violent or mutinous or had untidy wards 
to be put on charges and sent to the orderly room. I had a difficult 
time with my (superior) commanding officer over such cases 
almost every morning. I also had a difficult time with my (inferior) 
officers [who thought that]... As a senior doctor I should protect 
the patients from the insensitive mind of the military so that my 
psychiatrists could get on with their important therapeutic work. 466 
This situation apparently made the military staff insecure, as they were 
aware that the previous commanding officer had been sacked for failing to 
maintain discipline. Main began to fear that he too would be sacked but 
chose to resolve the situation by getting the military staff more involved - 
not just with the psychiatrists but with the social aspects of the patients' 
therapy: 
In the few more months I was there military staff began to 
participate in examining tension systems. They slowly but 
increasingly joined crisis-groups and ward discussions, and now 
task-groups and hobby-groups with patients. It became ordinary for 
orderly room clerks, staff sergeants, Matron's staff, secretaries, 
military cooks and orderlies and night staff, yes, and sometimes 
465 B. Shephard, (2000) p. 248. 466 T. Main, (1983) p. 204. 
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my commanding officer and his adjutant, to be seen in groups 
alongside patients and psychiatrists. ... The military staffs 
grumbles and ideas and problems were given equal status to 
everybody else's and they themselves were seen increasingly as 
people working in legitimate and inescapable roles and inevitably 
contributing to constraints and freedoms in the whole system. They 
now argued and discussed with patients and others and came to 
recognise their own total usefulness, People of individual style and 
potential and work needs were better recognised where Stereotypes 
of the sensitive sick and the insensitive staff had tended to exiSt. 467 
Main did not claim that relations with the military ceased to be 
antagonistic altogether, but did recognise that it was essential for military 
psychiatrists to fit in the ethos of the army. Nonetheless, the tone he 
adopted when describing relations with the military staff never ceased to be 
that of patronising superiority. Still, the remarkable achievement of the 
Second Northfield experiment was the promotion of inclusiveness -this 
time not just meaning inclusiveness of all the patients but also of all the 
staff professionals and administrators alike. This was (and still is) a 
revolutionary premise. 
. _S. 
H. FoulkeS468 
Although the Northfield experiments have been Northfield's most 
longstanding contribution, much of what was going on in Northfield was 
unrelated to the experiments. One example of this is the work of the 
psychiatrist Sigmund Foulkes. He was one of the most remarkable 
psychiatrists in Northfield but his contribution did no fit in easily with the 
ideology of Bion, Rickman, Bridger and Main. Fundamentally, there were 
two disagreements: the first related to the style of therapy and the second to 
attitudes towards the military and to what Main and the others called the 
"real life situation". 
467 T. Main, (1983) pp. 211-212. 
468 S. H. Foulkes was also known as Michael. 
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With regard to therapy, Foulkes' main interest was to conduct 
psychotherapy in small groups without much regard for the larger 
environment -the hospital as a whole or the country at war. The technique 
he used was that the patients sat in a circle together with the therapist and 
had a discussion, which was not directed by the psychotherapist (the 
equivalent of free association in individual therapy). The idea was that this 
helped patients because it provided support, it allowed patients to gain 
insight-into their own conditions by observing the same problems in others 
and it provided invaluable information to the psychiatrist because it 
permitted patients to act out their social problems. This meant that rather 
than the psychiatrist having to take the patient's word for how he related to 
others with only his own relationship with the patient as a guide he could 
observe the patient in genuine social interactions. This form of group 
therapy was backed by individual therapy; where the patients could discuss 
the issues arising in private. 
Group therapy as instigated by Foulkes shared some attributes in 
common with the schemes introduced by Bion, Rickman and Bridger. 
Among these was the emphasis on the therapeutic effects of social groups 
and the emphasis on the present rather than the past. The central differences 
however was that patients were selected for group therapy (not everyone 
was regarded as suitable) and once in the group, there was no emphasis 
placed on the wider community. Furthermore, Foulkes's groups tended to 
be directed by him to a wider extent than was thought acceptable to others, 
although this would have been denied by Foulkes. 
Unlike Bion and the others, Foulkes did not aim to work with all the 
patients but with ones he had selected -although admittedly selection was 
not vigorous. The quality of the patients was an important issue to him -as 
shown for example by his claim that the change in the kind of patients was 
a determining factor for the instigation of the Northfield experiment. 
Although in the above passages Foulkes attributed the change of attitude to 
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the other staff, his own focus on distinguishing between good and bad 
patients remained throughout his time in Northfield. This attitude was 
suppressed by the dominant ideology of Main and Bridger which did not 
permit such distinctions, but it remained as a distinctive feature and found 
resonance in other staff who shared Foulkes' perspective. For example, in 
the staff discussions Foulkes (and other psychiatrists) make frequent 
references to two types of patient. Foulkes in particular, referred to "those 
who have a positive aim to be ill" and "those who want to get well)A69 or 
"the 25% good cases and the remainder". 470 . Foulkes was 
happy to share 
power with patients but he preferred working with the very best; and when 
at the end of the war Foulkes had taken over from Bridger as social 
therapist he formed a 'co-ordination group' from the most intelligent 
patients to form a steering group for the hospital. 
The types of patients who were generally considered unfit for group 
therapy were the depressed, those with low intelligence and the 
psychopaths. In practice, once a group was up and running, patients who 
did not fit in where de-selected: in the group discussions one Captain Essex 
said that it was a question of eliminating the people who do not 'do very 
well in general' . 
47 1 The notes from the group discussions contain many 
tantalising hints about the nature of selection such as references to defining 
the 'treatable patient'472 and to group psychotherapy being 'intensive 
treatment for a few' but the notes are not sufficiently clear for these themes 
to be pursued. 
473 
While the issue of how to select patients for a group preoccupied the 
therapists, the main guidance given by Foulkes was to avoid large 
disparities in intelligence, social background and probable disposal. With 
regard to patients with low intelligence, Foulkes proclaimed: "A group of 
469 S. H. Foulkes Discussions on Group therapy, 26/4/45, PP/SHF/C. 3/8. 
470 lbid, 10/5/45, 
471 lbid, 8/8/45 
472 lbid, 10/5/45 
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dullards would be very interesting but we usually leave them OUt.,, 474 And 
later he added: "One couldn't have the same type of conversation with an 
SG4 as with an SGI. ... 
It is much more difficult to talk to people of low 
intelligence. 1)475 On the other hand, the psychiatrist and communist Patrick 
de Mare said that "People who according to the tests are below average 
intelligence, often have deep insight. " Foulkes brought up the example of a 
group where contrary to expectations, a patient with very low intelligence 
seemed not to have any difficulties coping in a group with very intelligent 
patients. Foulkes nonetheless concluded: "By and large we prefer fairly 
,, 476 even levels. We would prefer an intelligent group to a stupid one. 
In practice, there did not appear to be a specific selection process for 
a group, but patients were picked out of the group if they did not appear to 
be fitting in. In addition, it was concluded that patient who did not fit into a 
477 
group were unlikely to benefit from any other kind of treatment either. 
When years later, the other staff discussed Foulkes's uncomfortable 
relationship with the military, they gave as an example his incapacity to 
perform a proper military salute. It was also reported that he told patients to 
look upon him as they would "a doctor in a white coat and not as someone 
'in uniform", an attitude which totally contradicted Bion's approach of 
getting the patients to regard themselves as members of a combatant unit. 478 
Foulkes also had unrealistic expectations of the army; on one occasion 
when members of a particularly successful group had been released from 
the hospital, Foulkes wrote to request that the men not be separated. While 
this did prove feasible in the short-term it did question the extent to which 
Foulkes prepared his patients to face the real world. However, within the 
473 Ibid, 1015145 
474 Ibid, 1/11/45 
475 SG stands for selection group and refers to the group a patient has been placed 
according to his intelligence. SGI refers to the top 10% while SG5 to the bottom 10 %. 
SG4 refers to the 20% above SG5. 476 1/11/45 
477 For example, 8/8/45 478 Bridger, (1990) p. 74 
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hospital, Foulkes had many supporters. This prompted Main in a letter to 
Rickman to describe Foulkes's supporters as a 'cult' of Toulkes- 
worshippers' and the outsiders as 'an out-group of emotionally reacting 
sceptics wondering whether christ was as phoney as he seemed. "'9 
The notes from a series of group psychotherapy sessions reveal a 
number of issues with regard to the patients and psychiatrists' perspective 
on treatment. For example, it is noted that the patients regarded group 
psychotherapy as a privilege and that members were keen to attend. 480 On 
the other hand, the psychiatrist James noted that patients resented Foulkes. 
In fact, the group he took when James was away on leave was poorly 
attended and eventually had to be dropped. 481 Patients complained about 
being asked personal questions by FoulkeS482 and being told what to do. 483 
When during a meeting on the 5 th December 1944, James announced that 
Foulkes would not be attending 
This was greeted with cheers. There was a very free and active 
discussion immediately involving all but two members of the 
Group (12 were present). F was thought to exert a sinister 
influence and there was general agreement that the atmosphere was 
improved when he was not present. His piercing glance was 
singled out particularly ... 
484 
According to the notes, one patient stated that Foulkes "was Jewish 
and ungenerous as opposed to Y' and James identified two "resistances" 
towards Foulkes which were suggested by the patients: firstly that "he was 
too clever for them" and therefore patients could not understand him and 
secondly that patients were frightened of his attacking them. "When you 
479 T. Main 7/9/45, Letter to J. Rickman, Archives of the British Psycho-Analytic 
Society, CRR/F20/35. 
480 Saturday 4/11/44, Gi-oup Discussions, PP/SHFIC. 3/2. 
481 lbid, Saturday 21/10/44 
482 lbid, 28/10/44; 04/11/44,05/12/44. 
483 lbid, 04/11/44 
484 lbid, 05/12/44 
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,, 185 begin you don't know where he'll make it lead. One patient said at a 
private interview that he was frightened of being questioned. 486 
Further evidence that Foulkes was inadvertently guiding the 
discussion comes from the notes made on a group which had veered into 
discussing political issues: 
F. talked for a long time on individual responsibility and the 
evolution of society, from groups dependent on a despotic leader to 
self-governing groups. Subsequent interviews suggest that the 
point of this was not fully appreciated by the Group. Negative 
feelings to F. are still manifest. Mason developed a stomach ache 
and a stammer as he thought he would put his foot in it if he told F. 
what he really thought, e. g. his inability to follow the argument 
about social evolution. Braithwaite manifested his resistance by 
saying that the Government was fattening us up for the next war. 
King did not speak. He explained later because he could not follow 
the thread and what he wanted to say did not bear on F's topic. ... Randall's only interjection (that the Beveridge report is just 
propaganda) was discouraged by F. ... Further selection of the Group members is needed. Possibly Braithwaite should be dropped 
as unlikely to cooperate. J feels that he can help by taking a more 
prominent part and thus minimise negative feelings to F. which are 
a problem. ... Dye's remarks about Beveridge later proved to be defensive. He was concerned that he might be asked personal 
questions by F and insists that this could never happen at a Group 
with J alone such as he had attended prior to J's leave. 487 
The note that an uncooperative member should probably be dropped 
was a recurrent theme in staff discussions on group therapy. It was thus set 
out that the welfare of the group was more important than the welfare of 
the individual patient. 
Conclusion 
The Northfield experiments were not a success in terms of increasing 
the numbers of men who could return to active duty. The first experiment 
485 lbid, 05/12/44 
486 Ibid, 05/12/44 
487 lbid, 29/10/44 
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lasted only six weeks and the second took place when the outcome of the 
war was already certain and there was no high demand for men who had 
already broken down so severely as to require evacuation to Britain. So 
unlike Harold Palmer's experimental work in North Africa the Northfield 
experiments have no dramatic statistics demonstrating their success. 
Where the Northfield experiments did succeed in is in providing an 
alternative model of psychiatry and military psychiatry, in particular. This 
change affected both the methods and the aims (although not necessarily 
the results). The change in methods came with the refocusing of psychiatric 
intervention away from individuals and their histories and onto their social 
relationships, their wider environment in the here-and-now frame. At a 
time when there was extraordinary pressure on people to stand together and 
sacrifice themselves for the common good, these psychiatrists told their 
soldier-patients to do just that -and tried to support them in this by 
examining what was going wrong with their relationships with others and 
giving them practice in accepting their social responsibilities. The change 
in aims came with realignment with the values of the military and a 
separation from civilian medicine. Bion, Rickman, Bridger, Main and even 
Foulkes perceived psychiatry's roie in the war effort to be to return men to 
combat and to coexist harmoniously with the military staff -there is 
certainly no story here of liberal psychiatrists protecting patients from the 
authoritarian military. However, the most truly revolutionary aspect of the 
psychiatric treatment at Northfield was its inclusiveness. Aside from 
particular exceptions, treatment was for everyone and everything was 
treatment. This set Northfield apart from hospitals like Sutton. 
What made the Northfield experiments possible was firstly the 
psychiatric interest in meetings and groups which had its roots in the social 
psychology of the 20s and 30s but was also influenced by the war and the 
army's own dependence on group units. Secondly, it was a group of 
ambitious and dedicated psychiatrists who were willing to take big risks 
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with their reputation and who held fundamentally optimistic views about 
their patients. Thirdly, it was due to the military background which was 
tolerant of psychiatric self-government and which for all the psychiatrists, 
complaints, interfered little with how Northfield should be run. Finally, it 
was the patients that Northfield received. Especially selected to be the most 
likely to recover, they justified their doctors' optimism and hence 
encouraged the experimentations with democracy and self-governance. 
In September 1945, Main remarked to Rickman about the 'hideously 
bloated reputation 488 of Northfield. While Northfield has been a 
disappointment to many of its participants who have felt that its 
innovations have not been realised in post-war psychiatry, the reputation of 
Northfield itself is firmly established. 
T. Main, Letter to J Rickman, 7/9/45 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation has explored the role played by British psychiatrists 
during the Second World War. In so doing, it has asked a number of 
questions such as: How important were psychiatrists to the military? How 
much power did psychiatrists have? Were there significant ideological 
differences between psychiatrists and the military? Why were the particular 
selection procedures in recruitment and officer selection instituted, and 
what were the circumstances that facilitated their use? What were the 
therapeutic regimes devised by psychiatrists during the Second World War 
and did they vary according to their military settings? To answer these 
questions, this dissertation has examined the history of the medical 
responses to trauma prior to the Second World War, the administration of 
psychiatry during the war at the War Off ice and abroad, and the 
development of new selection procedures and new therapeutic regimes in 
Britain and in the theatres of war. Evidence has been sought from a variety 
of primary and secondary sources: archival material including reports and 
correspondence from the National Archives, the Contemporary Medical 
Archive Centre, the Liddell Hart Centre and the Archives of the 
Psychoanalytic Society', articles, monographs and textbooks published by 
contemporary psychiatrists, the official histories of the medical services 
and the few current historical volumes that deal with this topic. 
The research has shown that psychiatry was indeed a highly valued 
specialty to the military and that psychiatrists were given considerable 
independence and authority. The value of Psychiatry was recognised in the 
organisation of the Army Medical Department, in which an independent 
directorate for psychiatry was formed, and in the organisation of the 
Directorate for the Selection of Personnel which although run by a regular 
soldier functioned according to the advice of psychologists and 
psychiatrists. In addition,. throughout the war, the Army continued to 
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employ increasing numbers of psychiatrist thus permitting truly forward 
psychiatric treatment to take place, as well as the forward selection of 
personnel. Crucial to the establishment of psychiatry in such a powerful 
position was the patronage of the Adjutant-General Ronald Adam and his 
deputy F. H. Vinden, and the backing of the Director-General of the Army 
Medical Services Sir Alexander Hood, and the Director of Army Psychiatry 
H. A. Sandiford. Such support was there because these officers became 
convinced that psychiatrists had a valuable role to Play in treating early 
cases and returning them to the front, evacuating unsuitable personnel, 
creating psychological tests that could indicate the jobs each soldier was 
suitable for and recognising which men would become good officers. Thus, 
psychiatry was used in treatment but even more so preventively -mostly in 
the selection of personnel, but also in advising officers in disciplinary cases 
and issues of morale and rehabilitation. 
This wide use of psychiatrists also indicates something about the 
nature of the British Army as an army which relied heavily on the morale 
of its troops rather than on more overtly disciplinarian methods. Arguably, 
psychiatry gained momentum in the Second World War because 
psychiatrists promised to vouchsafe the troops' morale -to ensure that the 
soldiers were happy in their jobs and in their ranks, that they were led 
properly, and to minimise all the other frustrations that proved to be 
destructive to morale. Their most significant job was to remove individuals 
who suffered from low morale, and who mightinfect' others. As a result, 
the British Army appears to have been one in which it was not particularly 
difficult to get discharged -and a number of psychiatrists acknowledged 
that the majority of their patients were not actually sick but suffering from 
a loss of morale. Psychiatrists who were committed to maximising the 
number of men who could be returned to the front such as Harold Palmer 
or the Northfield psychiatrists were involved in treatments with a 
significant social component designed to foster morale -in the case of the 
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Northfield experiments this was an explicit aim while in Palmer's case it 
was more covert. 
The fact that psychiatrists were given considerable independence can 
be demonstrated from the fact that psychiatrists mostly carried on their own 
inspections. War Office psychiatrists, particularly the consulting 
psychiatrist to the Army, J. R. Rees, visited a number of facilities both in 
the UK and abroad and wrote reports on their findings. 489 In addition, 
consulting psychiatrists abroad inspected the relevant treatment facilities. 
One non-psychiatrist who carried out inspections was the Director of 
Psychiatry, H. A. Sandiford but he was always sympathetic to psychiatrists 
and argued to increase their numbers, rank and administrative status. 490 On 
the one occasion where an inspection led to the sacking of psychiatrists - 
when Wilfred Bion and John Rickman were removed from Northfield 
Hospital and found alternative jobs in Personnel selection- psychiatrists 
from the Directorate of Army Psychiatry had probably been directly 
involved. 
Overall, it also appears that there were few conflicts between 
psychiatrists and military officers or military doctors. There are some 
examples: the physician to the Prime Minister, H. M. Moran spoke out 
against psychiatry to the extent that he was described by Adam as 'the 
prosecutor 491 of psychiatry and later wrote in his book that psychiatrists 
had been responsible for a huge waste of resources. 492 Also, when the 
psychiatrists John Wishart and Coleman Kenton arrived in Algiers they 
received a distinctly hostile welcome by the medical staff who expressed 
489 For example, 'Report to the Director General of Army Medical Services on Tour to 
Malta, Paiforce, India, A. L. F. S. E. A., M. E. F. & C. M. F. By the Consulting Psychiatrist to 
the Army' (December, 1944 - March, 1945), CMAC, GC 13 5/13.1 (2 of 4). 490 For example, H. A. Sandiford, (1942) War Diary, TNA, WO 165/129; H. A. Sandiford 
(1942) Report on Visit to 21 A. G., B. L. A By D. A. Psych. and Consulting Psychiatrist to 
the Army; H. A. Sandiford, (1944) Report On Visit To C. M. F. By Director of Army 
Psychiatry December I to December 23,1944, TNA, W032/11550 
49 1 R. Adam, (1942)18A 'Extract from the conclusions of the 103rd (42) Meeting of the 
War Cabinet held on 4th August, 1942. 'TNA, W032/11972. 
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very negative views about neurotic patients, suggested that the psychiatrists 
should pretend to the patients that they were regular doctors and imposed 
illegal monetary penalties on patients. 493 Nonetheless, the relationship 
improved and DDMS Major Cantlie told a conference in psychiatry that 
whereas he had initially told Wishart that "he was the most unwanted man 
in the corps" he quickly changed his mind. What was probably instrumental 
in improving the relationship was that Wishart had asked for, and was 
494 given, the opportunity to take part in an attack . 
On the whole, therefore, relations appeared to be positive. The 
psychiatrists themselves reported few conflicts with combatant officers but 
greater problems with administrators and medical men back at home. 495 
Part of the difficulty appeared to be that there was no consistent military 
doctrine about what the psychiatrists should be aiming for -to return as 
many psychiatric casualties to front-line duties as soon as possible or to 
discharge men who had found it impossible to adapt to military life. Rees, 
suggested that the administrators who argued against "the discharge of men 
who were obviously too dull or too unstable to soldier" were out of touch 
with the pressures faced by combat units while "the fighting soldier is in no 
496 doubt at all as to the kind of man he wishes to have with him". The 
Divisional psychiatrist P. J. R. Davis reported that COs in infantry battalions 
were "extremely enthusiastic" at the idea of getting rid of many men who 
they considered a liability rather than an asset. 497 On the other hand, 
psychiatrists also received praise for returning patients to full duty -the 
492 H. M. Moran, (1946) In My Fashion, London: Peter Davies. 
493 'Meeting of Allied Psychiatrists B. N. A. F. Held at 95 General Hospital June 5th 
1943. ', CMAC, GC 13 5B1 (2 of 4). 
494 Report of a Conference on Psychiatry in Fonvard Areas. Held At Calcutta Aug. 8-10. 
1944. TNA, W032 11550. 
495 For example, J. R. Rees, (1945) pp. 27-28. 496 Ibid. 
497 P. J. R. Davis, (1946) 'Divisional Psychiatry. Report to the War Office', Journal of 
the Royal Ariny Meclical Coips, 86, p. 259. 
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psychiatrist Harold Palmer became famous for succeeding in returning 93% 
of his patients to duty within one month and 98% within two months. 
Psychiatrists also appeared to have made an easy adjustment from 
civilian medical values -where the welfare of the patient should always 
come first- to military medical values where the individual's welfare was 
subsumed within the welfare of the Army as a whole. As an example of 
such adaptation, the psychiatrist Tom Main (the Adviser in Psychiatry to 
the 21 Army Group, who later took part in the second Northfield 
experiment) argued that it was important to send soldiers back to the front 
line even if one knew that at some point they would break down again: 
With the differing functions, differing standards are needed. If a 
sergeant can recover his poise for one month, it can be regarded as 
a satisfactory therapeutic result in an Army fighting for its very 
life, though such a result would not be worth having in civilian 
iife. 498 
A few psychiatrists found such re-alignment of values difficult. For 
example, the American psychiatrists Roy Grinker and John Spiegel who 
worked in Algiers recommended approximately 70% of their patients to 
selective non-combatant service., and less than 2 per cent of men to the 
front line . 
499 Most of the time, they told patients "that a useful and 
important job awaits him as soon as he is well enough to be reclassified. " ... 
"that he has nothing to be ashamed of; that he has actually "stuck by his 
guns" as long as possible, which is all that duty could require of him-500 
Other such exceptions can be found among some of the psychiatrists 
treating patients in the UK. For example, in Sutton, the psychiatrist 
498 T. Main, (1945) 'Discussion: Fonvard Psychiatry in the Army, Noceedings of the 
Royal Society ofMedicine, 3 9, p. 14 1. 
499 R. Grinker & J. Spiegel, (1943) Mai- Neuroses in North AfHca, the Tunisian 
Campaign, CMAC, GC135/13.2 (file 2 of 4) p. 163. 
500 Ibid, pp. 187-188 
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William Sargant reported that he and his colleagues had learnt "the folly of 
trying to patch up soldiers and expect them to face again the stresses that 
501 had caused their breakdown". In Northfield, Bion complained that prior 
to his arrival, the hospital made no attempt to foster military morale but 
instead sheltered patients and doctors from military life. 502 On the whole 
however, the examples of the Northfield experiments and the psychiatrists 
working overseas show how keen psychiatrists were to serve the military. 
As the corps psychiatrist Dugmore Hunter proclaimed, it was widely felt 
that the psychiatrist "must indeed feel himself to be genuinely part of that 
Army and not an outsider, looking on". 503 
From examining the history of the medical responses to trauma, it 
has been shown that there is a long history of armies discharging soldiers 
who although not insane were unable to function in the military. From the 
I 9th century onwards, some of these diseases such as nostalgia, and 
hysteria, were regarded as mental illnesses albeit with an organic 
component -nostalgia was psychogenic but could lead to death, while 
hysteria only manifested itself in persons with a hereditary taint. Others 
such as neurasthenia, windage, shell shock, and soldier's heart (and its 
various reincarnations such as Da Costa syndrome and effort syndrome) 
had longer careers as organic illnesses for which no organic cause could be 
found -otherwise known as functional illnesses. They too, however, were 
increasingly interpreted in psychological and psychogenic terms and 
provided the means for medically discharging soldiers. Since the invention 
of the unconsciousl such disorders were re-formulated as unconscious 
malingering -where soldiers desiring an exit from the horrors of war, 
unconsciously made themselves sick in order to escape. At the same time, a 
501 W. Sargant, (1967) The Unquiet Mind, The Autobiogi-aphy of a Physician in 
Psychological Medicine, London: Heinmann, p. 117. 
502 W. R. Bion, (1946) 'The leaderless Group Project', Bulletin of the Menningey. Clinic, 
Vol. 10. No. 3. p. 78. 
503 D. Hunter, (1946) 'The work of a corps psychiatrist in the Italian campaign', Journal 
of the Royal At-nzy Medical Coips, 8 6, p. 13 0. 
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more biological, psychiatric paradigm interpreted these illnesses as signs of 
inherent constitutional instability as the contemporary social darwinist 
paradigm prescribed that war was the ultimate test of character. 
Furthermore, in the early 20th century, intelligence became re- 
formulated as a definable, heritable and easily measurable quality. Eugenic 
societies across the Western world, supported by scientists, doctors, 
politicians, philanthropists and social activists spoke out against the 
dangers of an ever increasing population of mental defectives and their sub- 
normal Yet not quite defective relatives. This 'social problem group' of 
people who scored at the lowest 10% of the intelligence spectrum were 
held responsible for the majority of crime, prostitution, alcoholism, 
infectious disease and social and moral deprivation. Eugenically inspired 
legislation to combat this threat was formulated across the Western World. 
In Britain, the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act was moderate compared to the 
far more extreme legislation taking place in the United States and in 
Germany. It required only that local authorities ascertain the numbers of 
mentally deficient persons in their catchment area and provide special 
segregated housing for them. In practice, many mentally deficient people 
continued to live in the community. Another bill for the voluntary 
sterilisation of the mentally deficient was defeated in 1930. However, what 
became established in the decades prior to the Second World War, was that 
intelligence was a quality of huge significance and that the lack of it was 
responsible for the majority of society's ills. In the Second World War, 
therefore, intelligence became the one trait that would be consistently 
measured and used to allocate soldiers to jobs. All soldiers were placed in 
particular intelligence groups, jobs were analysed according to the 
intelligence they required, and military units were given quotas of soldiers 
with particular intelligence to match their tasks and balance the unit. This 
process was thought to eliminate inefficiency and promote the well being 
of soldiers thus helping also to eliminate military offences, preventable 
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disease and psychiatric casualties. So, while the dictum formulated in the 
First World War that stated that given sufficient stress any man may break 
down was still widely held in the Second World War, psychiatric casualties 
were also being labelled dullards and defectives. 
The introduction of mass intelligence testing in the British Anny also 
had a meritocratic aim -to ensure that all soldiers were placed in the jobs in 
which they were most suited independently of their class background or 
personal wealth. This, it was thought, would not only make the Army more 
efficient, but it would also raise the morale of the troops and the people at 
home. In particular, the selection of officers had to be based on scientific 
criteria -this would raise standards and increase the numbers of men 
volunteering to be commissioned. While the new methods were not 
suppose to include any element of positive discrimination favouring the 
working class, they were suppose to tap into natural talent rather than 
educational achievement and therefore promote the most able whatever 
504 their origin. 
The task of designing the new methods of selecting officers was 
allocated by the Adjutant-General and his Deputy to psychologists and 
505 
psychiatrists who had at their disposal the German methods of selection. 
The new methods included a battery of intelligence tests, projective 
personality tests and tests of behaviour in groups as well as an interview 
with the psychiatrist. Ideally, each War Office Selection Board was to 
employ one psychiatrist and one psychologist. Furthermore, the 
responsibility of sending candidates to the Boards to be assessed, no longer 
504 In 1942, Edward Grigg made the specific point that the intelligence tests which were 
used in the Army were tests of general intelligence and not educational achievement in 
order to counter the point made previously by the Labour MP Jack Lawson who had 
claimed that "candidates were being selected because they had been to secondary 
schools or universities". Commons Debates, 5h series, 377,19 February 1942, pp. 1987- 
1990. 
505 F. H. Vinden, (1977) 'The Introduction of War Office Selection Boards in the British 
Army: A Personal Recollection', Mar and Society, a yearbook of inilitaiy hislol-y, B. 
Bond & 1. Roy, (eds. ), London: Croom Heim. 
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rested only with Commanding Officers and their Unit Selection Boards but 
with the personnel selection officers who interviewed all new recruits and 
earmarked for commission those who had high intelligence, leadership 
qualities and combat temperament. 
In terms of their meritocratic aims, the new methods appear to have 
failed. Figures show that approximately 25% of successful candidates were 
from public schools whereas around 60% were from secondary schools and 
15% from Elementary Schools. More significantly, figures show that the 
War Office Selection Boards were less inclined to pass elementary school 
boys for commissions, than were Commanding Officers and the Unit 
Selection Boards. Figures from a six week period in 1942 show that the 
proportion of boys educated only at elementary school who were selected 
to attend the Boards was small (only 24%) the proportion who succeeded 
was even smaller -only 18% because elementary school boys had a 60% 
failure rate -compared to 30% for public school boys. 
506 Once the system 
changed so that all those marked as potential officers by Personnel 
Selection Officers during initial recruitment were sent to War Office 
Selection Boards independently of their Commanding Officer's 
recommendation, the supply of candidates became even more socially 
stratified. According to the Chief Psychologist, 96% of those recommended 
by Personnel Selection Officers were secondary and public school boys. 507 
So while the War Office Selection Boards had been formed partly to 
counter the problem of Commanding Officers being unable to judge men 
who were of a different social class to themselves 508 and according to one 
psychiatrist allowed the Army to shake off the charge of being class- 
ridden 509 in reality they probably promoted fewer working class men that 
506 Office of the Adjutant-General (1943) 'Selection of Personnel', p. 14, Liddell Hart 
Centre, Adam 3/4/2. 
507 B. Ungerson, (195 3) p. 47, TNA, W0277/19. 
508 This claim was originally made in J. Rees, (1945) p. 64. 
509 Interview with John Bowlby cited in B. Shephard, (2000) A Mai- offei-ves, London: 
Jonathan Cape, p. 192. 
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would have been promoted by the previous techniques. In all likelihood, 
the main reason why boys with only elementary education were so much 
less likely to pass the War Office Selection Boards was the introduction of 
intelligence tests, as these strongly favoured the better educated. 
Moving on from selection to treatment, it is fair to say that, in the 
initial stages of the war, treatment for psychiatric casualties was piecemeal 
and inconsistent. The majority of casualties were treated in civilian EMS 
hospitals in Britain, as military hospitals were at the time only available for 
510 psychotic patients. In one such hospital, Sutton, it is clear that patients 
were treated as if they were civilians and all but 26% were discharged from 
511 
the Army. Part of the reason for this high rate of discharge was that the 
doctors held very pessimistic views about their patients and regarded the 
majority as constitutional neurotics who were unlikely to ever be of use to 
the Army. For this reason, the majority of the patients received no 
treatment whilst in Sutton. While this may have been partly due to the 
constraints of time, space and expense, nonetheless the resources to treat 
certain civilian patients with radical and time-consuming treatments such as 
leucotomies were obtained. This shows that when it was thought that 
patients were likely to benefit from a treatment -because they were not 
constitutionally inadequate- every effort was put to making the resources 
available, even in war-time. 
The decision about which patients to treat (approximately 40% were 
treated) appears to have been based on a number of factors such as the 
patients' symptoms (particularly weight loss and hysterical symptoms), 
military experience, family history, personality, intelligence and 
employment record. Evidence of a low sex drive and non-athletic 
appearance also seemed to be thought of in a negative light and make it 
510 F. A. E. Crew (ed), (1955), 'The army psychiatric service', The ArIny Medical 
Services, Adininistration, Vol. II, London: HMSO, pp. 470-474. 
511 E. Slater, (1943) 'The Neurotic constitution, A statistical study of Two Thousand 
Soldiers', The Journal qfNeurology and Psychiatry, 6, Nos I&2, p. 12 
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more likely that the patient would be regarded as a chronic neurotic., 
Overall, it seems that whether a patient was treated or not, depended on the 
extent to which his doctors thought that he was a worthwhile young man - 
and this meant having fulfilled a number of social obligations, including 
having a reasonably good career, an uninhibited sex life and to have only 
broken down after experiencing extreme military stress. Most of the 
patients did not fulfil these criteria. 
In the latter part of the war -approximately 1942 onwards, soldiers 
fighting overseas received psychiatric treatment in hospitals or 'exhaustion 
centres' near the front line. The treatment they received there was generally 
very simple -rest, tranquillisers to aid sleep, and sometimes chemical 
abreaction, ECT, continu ous narcosis and insulin therapy. 
The psychiatrists who practiced near the theatres of war were put 
under considerable pressures -to treat very large numbers of patients, to 
return patients cured and ready for action in a short time and to discharge 
unsuitable personnel whom the officers regarded as a nuisance. Tom 
between the conflict of deciding whether to treat patients and return them or 
to evacuate and discharge them, psychiatrists adopted different aetiological 
models which focused either on the patients' constitution or on 
environmental stressors such as battle stress and group morale. Most of the 
time, psychiatrists who developed new methods of treating patients such as 
Harold Palmer, Roy Grinker and John Spiegel did not favour constitution as 
an aetiological explanation for psychiatric breakdown. Aided by the fact 
that they treated front-line personnel whose breakdown was perceived as 
justified, they accepted that their patients were to some extent predisposed 
to nervousness, but emphasised other causes for their breakdown such as 
low morale and battle stress. This approach made treatment purposeful and 
hopeful because it accepted that patients were essentially curable. 
Furthermore, Palmer, Grinker and Spiegel did not divide their patients in 
constitutional categories; Palmer classified patients according to their 
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morale and their symptoms 512 while Grinker and Spiegel used standard 
clinical nomenclature but without using the terms that implied fundamental 
constitutional inferiority such as 'mentally defective', 'psychopath', or 
'chronic neurotic. 513 
On the other hand, other psychiatrists followed the mantra that 
'Prevention is better than Cure' and worked mainly by selecting soldiers 
perceived to be incurable. These psychiatrists evacuated from the front line 
not only men who had become psychiatric patients but men who they 
predicted would become so in the future; men who scored low in IQ tests, 
made a nuisance of themselves or who were diagnosed as having a 
psychopathic personality. They classified patients by the standard clinical 
nomenclature (making ftill use of terms which conveyed a constitutional 
inferiority) and by a further classification according to the patients' history 
of previous treatment and adjustment. This classification served to 
segregate soldiers who were thought to be constitutionally too damaged to 
be of any use to the Army from the men who were thought of as 
fundamentally normal and curable. Although some psychiatrists who 
favoured a constitutional aetiological approach, such as G. W. B. James and 
H. B. Craigic, were stationed a long way from the front and treated many 
men whose breakdowns had not been legitimised by the experience of 
battle, (which may have encouraged their notion of a constitutional 
predisposition to breakdown) these views were also shared by front-line 
psychiatrists. Major MacDonald, H. D. Hunter, and A. A. Martin all had 
experience of front-line troops but they nonetheless favoured the 
constitutional aetiological model with regard to at least some of their 
patients. 
512 H. A. Palmer, (1945), 'Military Psychiatric Casualties, experience with 12,000 cases' 
Lancet, vol ii, pp. 454-457,492-4. 513 R. Grinker & J. Spiegel, (1943) Mai- Neuroses in North Africa, the Tunisian 
Campaign, New York: Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. 
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Back in Britain, service patients were increasingly more likely to be 
treated in military rather than civilian hospitals. One such hospital, 
Northfield became famous for the 'Northfield experiments' that were 
conducted there. The Northfield experiments, although not a success in 
terms of increasing the numbers of men who could return to active duty 
succeeded in providing an alternative model of Psychiatry and military 
psychiatry in particular, which affected both its methods and its aims 
(although not necessarily its results). The change in methods came with the 
refocusing of psychiatric intervention away from individuals and their 
histories and onto their social relationships, their wider environment in the 
here-and-now frame. At a time when there was extraordinary pressure on 
people to come together and sacrifice themselves for the common good, 
these psychiatrists told their soldier-patients to do just that -and tried to 
support them in this by examining what was going wrong with their 
relationships with others and giving them practice in accepting their social 
responsibilities. This development was coupled with a realignment of 
values away from civilian medicine and towards the values of the military. 
The Northfield men Wilfred Bion, John Rickman, Harold Bridger, Tom 
Main and even Michael Foulkes came to the conclusion that their role was 
to return men to combat and to coexist harmoniously with the military staff 
However, one of the most truly revolutionary aspects of the psychiatric 
treatment at Northfield was its inclusiveness. Aside from particular 
exceptions, treatment was for everyone and everything was treatment. This 
set Northfield apart from hospitals like Sutton. 
A lot more research is needed to explore how the military came to 
evaluate the part played by psychiatry in the Second World War and how 
that impacted on British military psychiatry after the war. Unlike the 
shellshock disaster of the First World War which lead to the Southborough 
enquiry, the expert committee which was set up to investigate the role of 
psychiatry in the Services during the Second World War exonerated 
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psychiatrists and psychologists 514 . However, the two subsequent enquiries 
by Crocker and by Ritchie were considerably more critical. Yet, even 
though they both suggested a curbing of psychiatric authority in matters of 
officer selection in the post-war era they did not unduly criticise the part 
which had been played by military psychiatry during the war. Nonetheless, 
the enquiries resulted in a diminished role for psychiatrists who thereby 
ceased to be members of the interview panels that selected officers. 
However, psychiatrists, psychologists and their methods continued to play 
a big role in the military. Many of the techniques used in the Second World 
War such as the intelligence testing and leaderless group tests have since 
become incorporated in occupational psychology and form part of the 
selection techniques of the current -British 
Army as well as numerous 
business firms. The end of conscription changed the needs of selection - 
while the Army no longer had to deal with persons who were regarded as 
unsuitable to military life because of their intelligence scores or 
personalities, it also had to try harder to attract suitable personnel. The 
nature of preventive psychiatry also changed as greater emphasis began to 
be placed in early treatment and in ameliorating the circumstances of 
soldiers -short terms of duty, frequent leave, and de-briefing. 
Since the Second World War, the British Army has not had to deal 
with conscripted men or, since 1962, with National Service men. It is 
therefore unclear whether in a real national emergency it would deal with 
the issues of selection differently from the Second World War. The 
Americans in Vietnam decided to forego the elaborate selection techniques 
of the Second World War and significantly lower IQ requirements. Instead, 
the psychiatric focus was placed on rapid psychiatric treatment . 
51 5 This 
change suggests a re-interpretation of war neurosis with the emphasis 
aetiologically being placed on the stresses of war rather than the 
514 Report of an Expert Committee on the work ofpsychologists andpsychiatrists in the 
services, (1947) London: HMSO. 
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constitution of the individual. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, bom from 
the Vietnam War further established this shift as PTSD emphatically places 
the onus for the disorder on trauma, rather than on the patient's constitution. 
Furthermore, PTSD places the suffering endured by servicemen at a 
distance from mental illnesses such as depression and anxiety -although 
these are frequently symptomatic of PTSD but do not carry the same 
exonerating aetiological explanations. 
Ironically, at the end of the twentieth century, the military was faced 
with a new illness -Gulf War Syndrome, which carrying on from the 
tradition of shell-shock has been fought over by those who regard it as a 
new organic disorder and those who think of it is a new manifestation of 
war neurosis. Since the stigma attached to anything approaching a mental 
illness is still intact, this debate has very real consequences for the dignity 
of those involved, as well as for the surrounding issues regarding pension 
rights and treatment. 
A new study exploring how British military psychiatry has dealt with 
the challenges of the last sixty years and how these have impacted on the 
role and status of psychiatrists as well as the treatment of psychiatric 
casualties is greatly needed. 
515 B. Shephard, (2000). 
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Appendix: The Northfield Patients 
Among the archives from Northfield Hospital that can be found in 
the Contemporary Medicine Archives Centre of the Wellcome Trust there 
are twenty questionnaires which were completed by service patients in the 
first few days after their arrival to the hospital. These questionnaires are 
among the papers of German-born Jewish psychiatrist Sigmund H. Fuchs, 
and bear his stamp, which indicates that they were probably designed and 
collected by him. It is unclear whether the questionnaires in the archives 
are the only completed ones or the only surviving ones, and if they were 
kept for any particular purpose. However, questionnaires 7-14 (according 
to the order they were found in the archives) belong to patients who were 
put together in a therapeutic group along wi 
' 
th another patient. It is possible 
that the other patients whose questionnaires have been kept were also 
allocated to particular therapeutic groups as for example, patients 1-6 and 
15-18 have surnames beginning with the letter M which may also have 
served as a means of randomly allocating patients into therapeutic groups. 
There is no clear evidence for any other common link between the 
questionnaires that would justify their particular safekeeping, besides that 
they are mostly complete, well written, and very interesting and moving. 
These completed questionnaires offer a unique insight into how 
soldier-patients perceived the experience of breaking down. They show 
how they viewed themselves and their illness, what symptoms they 
suffered from, and the causes to which they attributed their illness. 
Furthermore, they show the attitudes they had towards the army and the 
war and their concerns for their family and for the future. 
Interestingly, while other historians have had access to these records 
and have clearly looked at them, they have not chosen to focus on them, 
relying instead mainly on medical records and later-day interviews with ex- 
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patients which focus on the treatment these patients received. 516 The reason 
for this is probably that these historians were more interested in revealing 
information about Northfield Hospital itself and its therapeutic 
environment rather than about the private stories of individual patients. The 
view taken here, however, is that these records are important not simply 
because of what they reveal about Northfield hospital and its doctors 
(which is a significant amount) but because of what they reveal about the 
experience of being a soldier who has become a psychiatric patient. The 
men)s experience of breakdown, their interpretations of it, their feelings 
towards their family, their fears for the future, and their disillusionment 
with the army and the war are all shown revealingly in the men's responses 
to the questionnaires. 
The questionnaires are four pages long and consist of two parts. In 
the first part various short question are asked of the patient such as whether 
any member of his family suffered from any mental complaint, whether he, 
himself, suffered from any mental complaint as a child, how he did at 
school, whether he had any friends, whether he played sports, and what 
educational qualifications he achieved. This is followed with questions 
about the patient's occupation prior to joining the Armed Forces and 
questions with regard to his military career, including disciplinary offences 
and time spent in overseas service. Then, patients are asked some fairly 
revealing questions about their condition. As well as being asked to 
describe their symptoms, they are asked. 'How has it developedT 'Have 
you had any similar complaints before? ' and most importantly 'To what do 
you think it is due? ' Although only a very short space is provided for the 
answers, some patients described traumatic experiences in this section 
while others ignored these questions altogether, focusing instead on the 
516 For example, Tom Harrison refers in his book to questionnaires but does not discuss 
the content, T. Harrison, (2000) Bion, Rickman, Foulkes and the Northfield 
Experiments, Advancing on a Different Front, London: Jessica Kingsley. Ben Shepherd 
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description of symptoms. Then, patients were asked questions about 
treatments they have had but also 'What sort of treatment, would in your 
opinion help you bestT and 'What sort of treatment do you expect to get in 
this hospital, and what course of treatment would you suggest yourself.? ' 
Finally, they were asked about what occupation they would like to have in 
the hospital. 
In Part 11, the patients were asked to write a short life history of 
themselves. The instructions asked patients to mention any special 
circumstances, or experiences which have affected them, describe their 
outlook for the future, and their attitude towards the war and the Army. 
Patients were also asked to describe themselves including how they 
imagined their best friend and worst enemy would describe them. (This 
question had been intended to prompt patients to describe their best and 
worst attributes. This however failed in the majority of patients, some of 
whom ignored this part of the question altogether while most of the others 
wrote that they did not think they had any enemies. ) Finally they were 
instructed not to just answer the questions but to write a full story adding 
"The freer and more personal you write it the better". Three quarters of the 
page were left for the patients response, but many went over this, filling in 
the back page as well. 
The questionnaires also offer a limited insight to the psychiatrists' 
interpretation of the patients' information. Several passages were marked 
with crayon (probably by S. H. Foulkes) while a few notes, frequently 
unintelligible can sometimes be found on the first page. 
The great majority of the questionnaires are dated between July and 
December 1944. Two, which have a slightly different format are not clearly 
dated but are probably from 1945. One questionnaire is dated 31/7/40 but 
this must be a mistake as Northfield Hospital did not exist then. 
on the other hand does devote some limited space to discussing them, see B. Shephard, 
(2000), 4 Mar qfNerves, London: Jonathan Cape, pp. 261-262. 
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Half the patients were aged between 19 and 22 while most of the rest 
were in their 20s. The oldest patient was 38. They were quite well educated 
for the standards of the time. Although most had left school at 14, some 
had left at 15 or 16 and even 18. Almost half had been educated at a 
secondary school (some mentioned that they had won a place there) while a 
handful had been educated in public schools. However, all the patients 
came from the ranks and most were privates. Nearly all had been in the 
service for over 2 years, nearly half had been in the services over 4 years. 
Most had seen overseas service. 
It is probable, that the questionnaire was well received by the 
patients. Only one patient referred to the questionnaire directly, but he did 
so very positively. Ian, 517 answering the question regarding treatment 
wrote: 
In my present mood I feel this hospital will do the best for me even 
if it is not what I feel to be right myself. I feel far more confidence 
than at the former hospitals, partly from the attitude of the staff, 
partly from the fact that this questionnaire has been given to me. 518 
While this maybe dismissed as an attempt to flatter the psychiatrists, 
another indicator that patients had confidence in the process, is that they 
disclosed information that was very private. For example, patients were 
remarkably unabashed about giving information about family members 
who suffered from mental illness and over half the patients declared 
something in the family history section. Three patients wrote that their 
father had been shell-shocked, while other patients offered information 
ranging from a parent who suffered from "nerves" to others who had 
suffered from "fits" or had had several mental breakdowns and had even 
517 In this section, in order to preserve the anonymity of the patients but also allow 
cross-referencing, the patients are referred to with randomly allocated names. 
518 PP/SHF/C. 3/16, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre, Wellcome Trust. This 
material will not be footnoted again as it all comes from the same source. The spelling 
has not been corrected and is quoted as far as possible exactly as it is in the original 
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been incarcerated in an asylum. In addition, two patients described how, 
their fathers used to beat their mothers, while one added that his sister was 
the unmarried mother of two. Furthermore, most of the questionnaires 
exude a sense that the responses are intimately confessional and genuine. 
The only possible exception is Ian, who described frankly his 
attempts to read up on pacifism in order to avoid the call up and offered a 
list of the names of authors he identified with, but he nonetheless, gave the 
reader a sense that something is being held back. One interpretation of what 
that may be, (although the evidence is far from overwhelming), is that Ian 
was homosexual. This interpretation arises from the two following 
passages: 
All through my life I have felt different from other people 519 &i 
think it led me to choose some rather queer companions. I used to 
associate either with older or younger people at school as a rule but 
freinds of my own age seemed to be invariably peculiar & waKped 
in various different ways. This also applies to the majority of 
freinds in the army. 
It was in the summer of 1942 that I went through a veLy peculiar 
state arising from a friendship With L. A. W. 520 It is beyond me at 
the moment to put all on paper but when it was all over I found I 
was able to take a positive attitude to everything & my attitude to 
the army also changed. It is this feeling- I have always been 
trying to get. It also swept away a feeling of fatalism I had always 
had. 
The interpretation offered by the psychiatrist however, is quite 
different. On the front page, it is written: "'Schizoid" if not more but taken 
on my Group might do well. ' If, however, Ian was homosexual, this would 
indicate that some information was considered too private to be revealed to 
psychiatrists. Nonetheless, this patient revealed very personal information 
although there may be some errors due to the inherent difficulty in making out the 
handwriting. 
5 19 The underlined passages were marked in crayon, in all probability by S. H. Foulkes. 
520 These are probably a person's initials. 
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and stated that he would like to have "a complete analysis" of himself, in 
order to "complete the job" of finding out about himself. 
Another somewhat sulky response was given by George who when 
asked what he thought might be a suitable treatment for him responded that 
originally he though rest would suffice but he has had plenty of rest without 
any noticeable improvement, and went on to add: "Not being an expert in 
these matters I am unable to suggest any alternative form of treatment. " 
Overall,, however, most responses appear sincere and forthcoming. 
The symptoms most commonly described by patients were anxiety, 
headaches., inability to concentrate, depression, insomnia and nightmares. 
For example, in the section entitled 'Present Complaint' George described 
his symptoms as follows: 
Suffer a great deal from insomnia. Also I frequently get a strange 
sensation as though I were falling and involuntarily my whole 
body jerks as though to save myself. This is becoming more & 
more frequent. 
At night I am always waking up in a sweat from some dream or 
other which I can never remember. Also I dread doying off to sleep 
because I have some horrible dreams when I am only half awake. 
Some patients reported some more unusual symptoms such as James 
who wrote "I sometimes get in a mood that I want to kill myself or 
somebody who has said something I dislike", or Henry who wrote "... a 
contraction of the 5th finger on either hand" or Eric who wrote 
"Headaches, fear of colosoll things, nightmares, fear of hurting my mother 
fear of being like my father fear of committing suicide". Still more 
uncommon was the symptom reported by Cecil: "I cant stand the thought 
of seeing my wife or family" More significant than the actual symptoms 
was the interpretation patients made of these and the causes to which they 
attributed them. Henry, for example, said of his symptom: "I cannot 
understand how it can be connected with Psychiatry. I am not nervous in 
any way and I've never had any shock or suffered with nerves at anytime". 
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The majority of patients however appear to have accepted their psychiatric 
diagnoses and to have attributed them by in large to enemy action. Brian, 
for example stated that he was suffering from "Hysterical Amnesia" which 
"Developed by German dive bombing" while Quentin attributed his 
condition to: "getting mortared and shelled. I could not stand up to it". 
Other patients described acquiring the symptoms after being wounded or in 
one case after suffering an attack of diarrhoea, which resulted in heavy 
weight loss. 
The fact that patients mostly attributed their illnesses to their military 
experiences did not necessarily stop them from also simultaneously 
attributing their condition to some inherent personality defect or to 
acknowledge that that they had previously suffered nervous complaints. 
Overall, about half the patients, (including approximately half of those who 
said that their symptoms were caused by enemy action) wrote that they had 
either suffered from mental complaints before, or that a childhood 
experience had caused them similar or other problems in the past. For 
example, Ian wrote: "I think it is due to the limitations of my personality 
but am trying to avoid this attitude". Cecil wrote "I have always been easily 
depressed even before I joined the army", and described how even though 
his childhood was happy he "never could stand noise or upset", while Eric 
wrote "I have once tried to commit suicide which failed. " Most of these 
statements were underlined by the psychiatrist as they indicated a positive 
history, which meant that the prognosis would be less optimistic. In some 
of the patients' accounts, all sorts of reasons and interpretations for their 
condition were interwoven as in the case of Fred. The underlining indicates 
the psychiatrist's interpretation as to why the patient is sick; namely the 
interplay of a history of nerves combined with anxiety at being away from 
home and military stress: 
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I have a wife and 2 kidies which I adore and I cannot abear to be 
away from them. I imagine all sorts of things a bout my Wife and it 
is always for the worst. And I have lost much sleep over it. I 
cannot explain fully. My wife is in my mind every minute of the 
day. I think I have done enough for my country, more than some 
can say and I will be the happiest man alive to get a steady job here 
at home. (In England) To tell you the truth I hate the Army more 
and more each day. I have seen my wife 28 days in 3 yrs. My best 
friend was killed by the side of me in France. ... P& nerves were 
bad before I went to France I thought the 6 months I was back in 
England my nerves were better, but as soon as I was back in action 
I new I was wrong. Infact they were worst than I had them in 
Sicily. Each time it gets worse, and I have been so bad that I have 
been on my hands and knees praying to God to let me live, and pull 
through it all. And it plays on my mind, what would happen to my 
family if anything happened to me. I have had little sleep for the 
past 3 yrs. 
Another patient who described himself as having always been 
nervous and having had a history of epileptic fainting fits described how he 
did not disclose this history to the army medical officers in order to be 
accepted by the army. When he got there he found that he was as resistant 
to stress as anybody else: 
When I came into the army I didn't know what to expect but what 
I'd heard of it. Yoften thought about what affect being in action 
would have on my nerves but after being in France I find that I 
could be easily as brave as the next fellow & keep control of 
myself as far as that was concerned & that my nervousness was not 
that way inclined. I found that my fits were getting worse & more 
frequent though & that I was begining to feel weaker. 
Two patients, however, expressly blamed their fathers for their 
conditions. Both had fathers who fought in the First World War, had been 
"shellshocked", and had been beating the patients' mothers prior to 
separation. Eric, whose description of his symptoms was quoted earlier, 
blamed his symptoms primarily to heredity from his father. In his life 
history he wrote: 
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At 2 yrs my father struck me &I must have seen him strike my 
mother. he struck my mother when she was bearing me, my mother 
then acquired a seperation & we came to Sheffield to my mothers 
home, I was taught throughout my life to hate wars because of my 
mothers' unhappiness owing to my father who had ruined our 
home. 
Patrick, on the other hand, described as the main symptom of his and 
his mother's condition as pains in the head caused from having received 
blows from his father. He described his predicament like this: 
... if I have to continue my duty, I should want to carry it out in my 
own country Ireland, as my father lefted my Mother, and is not 
living very far from her, I should like to be near in case he goes 
round and give her another kicking I think that is most the trouble 
that is worrying me ... 
While these patients blamed their fathers for their conditions, they 
indirectly blamed war toý as they implied that their fathers beat them 
because they were themselves shell-shocked. 
Other patients, particularly those whose fathers were dead and who 
were themselves unmarried, described how worried they were about their 
mothers. For example, Eric had thought that the best treatment for him 
would be "To go & earn for my mother what she has never had" while 
Robert wrote: 
The only thing I want is to get home with mother & grannie, 
mother has to support her by going to work &I know it's getting a 
burden to her now & as I was brought up mostly by my grannie I 
have every reason I suppose to worry. And I think I ought to be 
back at home to help my ma. I don't know what treatment is due 
here but the above is the only thing that would stop me worrying, 
my mother has been ill once or twice since I have been in the army 
had to have my auntie look after her but now she goes out to work 
too. 
In the following passage, Oliver displaced his own sense of injustice 
at having had to return to active service onto his mother, and rather than 
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complain that he has more than played his part in this war, he described his 
mother as the one who has sacrificed herself, and himself as demanding 
justice on her behalf. 
... going on the "Second Front" I braced myself up ... but found a 
strain and complete tension, -& worry, since Mother at home had 
to live in anxiety once more through my being on active service 
with B. L. A. ... it is my place to care for her &I feel she's done 
more than played her part in this war, in experiencing my long 
absence from home, & she's getting no younger. 
The only bitter note about a patient's mother is by Simon who wrote: 
"Never new my mother as I should have owing to second marriage Died off 
heart attack. " 
Throughout most statements, there is a pervasive sense of a complete 
loss of self esteem which was sometimes linked to feelings about the 
family. For example, Cecil wrote: "I have a wife. I love her enough to spare 
her the disgrace of having to live with me" while Lawrence wrote: 
When I married my wife I had hoped I could have done a lot of 
things for her, I was confident I could gain her respect, but through 
no fault of my own as far as I can see, I am always being reminded 
how somebody else is doing so well, everybody seems to be able to 
do better than 1.1 have lost confidence myself that if I was put back 
to-day in my civilian job I should fall down on it, and bungle it. 
Nonetheless, many patients thought that returning to their families 
would be the best treatment for their condition. 
Also indicative of the low morale among patients is that when asked 
what occupation they would like to have during their stay in the hospital 
over a quarter replied that there is nothing they would like to do or did not 
answer the question at all. 
With regard to views and attitudes towards the army, most patients 
expressed a negative view. Brian wrote: "I have no interest in the army at 
all and completely browned off with it all. The army had no interest in me 
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then, so I have no interest in the army now I dont care weither we win the 
war or j erry ... it is all the same to me, and I dont care weither I was dead or 
not. " Cecil wrote "I have always hated the army - I've stood it for 2 1/2 
years -I can't stand it anymore. " James wrote "I myself hate the an-ny 
eve! y! hing about it, I will admit it has some good points, it is a boring, and 
unthankful job I would like to be back at a job in civie street and settle 
down and forget everything I have seen in the an-ny". Quentin wrote "My 
attitude towards the army is its alright as long as you are able to stand up 
to, but I dont think I can stand up to front line duty, when you are under 
mortar & shell fire. " Robert felt disillusioned: "My attitude towards the 
army is that I've had enough of it & it surprised me in France how the 
wrong chaps were in the wrong places & who the best chaps were, I'm 
afraid for me to be taught anymore in the army the instructor would have to 
be a chap who'd seen action! " 
More positive thoughts regarding the army were expressed by Henry 
(the patient who denied he had any need for psychiatric treatment) He 
wrote: "I can say quite honestly that I've enjoyed my 5 mths in the Army 
and that I've made many friends. " Similarly Terence thought there good 
things about the army: "It was after joining the Army that my character 
changed, it did not matter then what happened to me but what happened to 
the lads, rather taught me not to be selfish, it was not until war broke out 
that I took life seriously. ... The Army I think is a good life for a single 
person and has plenty of scope for any person 
A more analytical approach towards his attitude for the army is 
shown by Ian: 
When I realised I was going to be called up within about a year I 
was very alarmed. With a view (unconsciously) to avoiding the 
army I started to study Pacifism but soon realised I was being 
dishonest & decided to work out the correct thing to do. In working 
it all out I got hopelessly tangled up. I haven't room to explain 
why. I finally decided that the war was a pity but could not be 
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helped, that I had no feeling in my guts that Pacifism was any 
good, so in a feeling of apathy I waited until I was called up. I 
hated the first 7 weeks but after my I st leave managed to adopt 
Inyself a bit better & regarded eveKything as an interesting 
experience. ... My general attitude to the army before "all this" had been that I'm 
part of it & that it is silly to talk about it as "they" & criticise 
"their" inefficiency or stupidity when one should regard it as a duty 
to put these things right if in one's power. I also took the same 
attitude to politics & Im one of the minute minority in my unit who 
filled in the proxy voting form. 
... When D-day and the 
landing came I was very excited & 
exhilarated, & enjoyed looking calm & nonchalant at difficult 
times. 
With regard to the war in general, most patients seem apathetic 
although only Brian, quoted earlier, suggested that he did not care which 
side wins. By contrast, Terence said: 
As regards the war I think it is a good thing in the sense that once 
and for all we can put an effective world wide peace into operation, 
and know that our children will not be in wars as we and our 
fathers have been. I think we have done admirably so far, but I do 
think the some civilians are being complacent and tending to forget 
that there is a war still to be fought. 
As far as returning to the army after they were released from 
hospital, many patients were adamant that they could not do it. Cecil wrote: 
"I couldn't face the army as I know it again. I would rather face 
imprisonment, than go back. " George wrote: "If I were ordered back to 
France again I suppose I should have to go, but after the last month I doubt 
if I could stick it for long. In short, I honestly think my nerve has gone 
completely. I know, it sounds silly seeing that some chaps have had a few 
years of it out East, but I just can't help myself! " 
With regard to the future, most patients wanted to return to civilian 
lives but often felt they have no future. Brian wrote: 
I have been getting 2/9 a day in the army abroad and still am, and 
when it is finished what will I get nothing, I will have to go and 
working again, and maybe into the slums, get married with 
practically nothing. and keep a family on that maybe. 
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No I want to get out of it all, and try and get back to a normal 
position, and think a little of the future. What have I now, after 
being in the army 2 3/12 yrs. Nothing and it is up to me to help 
myself. If I do have to come back into the army after this I will 
serve it in blink, and enjoy it. 
The best part of my young life has been in the army which I assure 
you, has been wasted. 
My worst enemy in the world today is the Government for 
dragging me into it. So I have no apologies. I want nothing to do 
with it, and want to steer clear of it all, because iff I dont, I will 
forever be in hospitals and jails until I do get what I want. I am 
only young and I want a chance in life and I am not getting it in the 
army. So thats that 
Cecil wrote "About the future -1 don't think about it. How I ask a 
woman to live with me now? ... In my opinion it is only a matter of time 
before I crack up" Eric wrote: "[1] have no outlook for the present or future 
owing to war". James wrote: "my life before I came in the army was 
uneventful but full of childish dreams like wanting to travell and making a 
name for myself and starting a biessness. and now all I want is nice steady 
job with quite good pay and nice home to come home to invite freends and 
to be proud of. " 
Among the career aspirations expressed were farming, the Post 
Office, the Civil Service, and teaching. More bizarrely, George wrote that 
"Since joining the Army I have decided not to go back to an office job 
again, but would like some job involving foreign travel, or a job where I 
could learn some foreign language such as censorship. " 
To some extent, each questionnaire is different from the others 
offering a unique portrayal of an individual's life. Looked at as a group 
however, they portray soldiers who were disillusioned with the Army and 
with themselves. The soldiers' confidence was to some degree shattered, 
and they oscillated between blaming the war, blaming their families, and 
blaming their own personalities for their breakdown. They were worried 
about their families and longed to return home, yet felt pessimistic about 
the future. 
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Records show that at least 8 patients (from those mentioned above: 
Ian, James, Henry, Lawrence and Oliver) went back to the army in 
categories CI and C2. 
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